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Cover Picture

Jiayu Pass, China

Situated at the West end of the Great Wall, in Gansu Province, built during the Ming Dynasty (1368 – 1644). Covered an area of 33,529 sq. meters, has a complex and integrated defensive system: an inner city, the Central Area with many buildings, an outer city, and finally a moat along with common military facilities such as arrow towers, steeples, and cannons along the wall.

Jiayu Pass was also a vital traffic fort along the Silk Road, the world's oldest trading route, connecting China, Central Asia and Europe.

Sources:
https://www.tripadvisor.ie/LocationPhotoDirectLink-g303696-d2079896-i225095573-Jiayuguan_Fortress-Jiayuguan_Gansu.html
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CONSTRUCTION OF DAMS ON KABUL RIVER AND ITS SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS FOR KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA, PAKISTAN

Shabir Ahmad Khan[*] & Muhammad Nafees[Ψ]

Abstract

Pakistan and Afghanistan have planned various developmental projects on Kabul River System (KRS) with the intention to overcome water and energy deficiencies irrespective of ecological problems faced by Kabul River and socio economic complexities of each other. The objectives of this paper are to know the present uses of Kabul River and future potential of the river for construction of dams. Studies conducted during 1990-2010 revealed that the Kabul River has already been used for hydro power generation and irrigation by both the riparian countries, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Undoubtedly, it has a major role in uplifting the socio-economic condition of the farmer communities. But this heavy extraction of water has also posed some negative impacts on the river's ecology and surrounding community such as fishermen and people attached with tourism. Therefore, further construction of dams need technical hands with the idea not to bring further distortion in the environment. As per analysis of five years flow data recorded at Nowshera station, the flow rate during July-August rose above 1000 M^3/Sec. Water received during this period of time can be termed as extra and can be allocated for storage. If Afghanistan constructs more dams on Kabul River or on its tributaries, it will have negative impacts on Khyber Pukhtunkhwa province. Three fertile districts, Peshawar, Nowshera and Charsada will be suffered in terms of productivity and crop yields. The diversion of Chitral River is good for Pakistan but not for Afghanistan. By doing so, Pakistan will be able to irrigate its eastern part, mostly fall in erstwhile Federal Administered Tribal Area (FATA), Dir and Charssada

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districts. But two fertile districts i.e. Peshawar and Nowshera will remain barren. In this way, diversion of Chirtal River cannot be counted as a good decision. It is therefore recommended to use the water after proper calculation by keeping in view both the agricultural as well as the ecological aspects. For this, both the countries are required to take the initiatives for identification of collective responsibilities/efforts and conserve the river by using it in a sustainable manner.

Key words: Kabul River System, Ecology, Hydro power, Irrigation, Prior Appropriation,

Introduction

Rivers are not only a source of economic development, but also have ecological importance. The ecological characteristics are dependent on the surrounding environment and vary from place to place and season to season. Changes in the surrounding environment and season mainly affect the river water quantity and quality.[1] Change in river's volume not only important ecologically but also economically.[2] Both the concepts, economic development and ecological changes are running parallel and are inter related and dependent.[3] Therefore a careful hand of management is always required. Over use of water for economic development can bring ecological damages in the form of decrease in water volume and increase in pollution. That has not only negative effects on aquatic and terrestrial flora and fauna but can also add to socio-economic decline in the vicinity.

Rivers are important water resources with an estimated contribution of 0.0001% to the total global water budget and are considered as the most sensitive part of the hydrological cycle in terms of ecological sensitivity.[4] Most of the rivers are flowing across the globe irrespective of political boundaries and is always a source of conflict.[5] The same is the case with Pakistan, where majority of rivers have been shared with the neighboring

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[1] Nafees. M., *Environmental Study of Kabul River and its Tributaries in North West Frontier Province* (Now Khyber Pukhtunkhwa), Pakistan. M.Phil Thesis, (Department of Environmental Sciences, University of Peshawar, 2004).

[2] Bunn, S. E., & Arthington, A. H. Basic principles and ecological consequences of altered flow regimes for aquatic biodiversity. *Environmental management*, 30(4), (2002): 492-507.

[3] Mol, A. P., Ecological modernization and the global economy. *Global Environmental Politics*, 2(2), (2002): 92-115.

[4] Peavy, H. S., Dowe, D. R and Tchobanoglous, G., *Environmental Engineering*, (Mc-Graw Hill Publisher, New York, 2015): 12

[5] Giard, J., "Water Flows across Political Boundaries, Brings Conflict with it" *Dakotafire Magazine*, (2014). URL:http://dakotafire.net/land/water-flows-across-political-boundaries-brings-conflict/6003/

countries, India, and Afghanistan. Most of the countries have resolved such conflicts by signing mutually agreed bilateral agreements in the form of treaty. In such treaties there is always reflections of two basic doctrines i.e. prior appropriation[6] and/or riparian law.[7] The basic idea of prior appropriation is, not to harm development at one place at the cost of development at another place. The famous example is of great Nile River, flowing through ten countries. First treaty on Nile River was signed in 1929 between Sudan and Egypt. Over the years the treaty was modified 21 times with the idea to benefit all the ten riparian countries.[8]

Worldwide there are certain examples related to mismanagement of such international rivers. For instance, consider the case of Amu Darya (Amu River) and Syr Darya (Syr River) are common water resources of Central Asian countries. Both the rivers were feeding into Aral Sea. That had established a unique ecology in the region with special economic activities. These include tourism and fisheries related business. There were twenty four fish species of commercial importance. Study conducted during 1988 revealed that 20 species were disappeared completely. This is a clear evidence of negative change in term of ecology and economy.[9] The upstream countries have trapped both the rivers for agriculture and hydro power generation that had created problems in Aral Sea and the down streams countries. Almost 90% of the Aral Sea has been dried. Physical and chemical characteristics of the remaining 10% Sea have been changed to an extent that it is no more habitable to support fish and other flora and fauna.[10] In this way a unique habitat was lasted with the loss of significant floral and

[6] The doctrine of prior appropriation, also known as the "Colorado Doctrine" of water law. The essence of the doctrine of prior appropriation is that, while no one may own the water in a stream, all persons, corporations, and municipalities have the right to use the water for beneficial purposes. The allocation of water rests upon the fundamental maxim "first in time, first in right

[7] As per riparian law, all owners of water frontage have rights to the water. Generally this doctrine works best in areas of abundant water where scarcity is not a serious issue. Owners must return the water to the water body, at least in theory. Running a water mill is clearly permissible. Watering crops is permissible even though much of the water soaks into the ground or evaporates. Filling a pond is debatable, especially if the filling interrupts the flow significantly. Extracting large amounts of water to transport elsewhere is not permissible

[8] El-Fadel, M., El-Sayegh, Y., El-Fadl, K., & Khorbotly, D., The Nile River Basin: A case study in surface water conflict resolution. *Journal of Natural Resources and Life Sciences Education*, (2003): 32, 107

[9] Micklin, P. P. Desiccation of the Aral Sea: a water management disaster in the Soviet Union. *Science*, 241(4870), (1988): 1170-1176.

[10] Micklin, P., The Aral Sea disaster. *Annual Review of Earth and Planetary Sciences*, 35, (2007): 47-72.

faunal species. Not only this, the dried portion of the Aral Sea is a continuous source of particulate matter (dust) and sand dune migration in the vicinity.[11] The upstream countries, like Tajikistan and Kirghizstan are enjoying bulk of water and low cost electricity, but the riparian community of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were badly suffered. These include fishing community, and people dependent on tourism. Reservoirs constructed on Amu and Syr Darya have also been affected the agriculture land of Tajikistan and Kirghizstan in terms of water logging and salinity. Moreover its negative impacts can also be seen in the downstream countries like Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. For the last so many years the riparian countries are in conflict with no visible solution.[12] Similarly Pakistan had signed a treaty on Indus water system with India in 1960. According to the treaty, management of three rivers i.e. Beas, Ravi and Sutlaj Rivers were handed over to India and three Rivers, Indus, Chanab and Jehlam were set free for Pakistan.[13] This had got negative impacts on Ravi River. The river, which was famous for fish life, tourism and re-creation, now presenting a view of a drain. Not only this, during flash flood, India releases bulk of water in those river channels and inundate Lahore city and the surrounding regions. That has got negative impacts on Pakistan economy.[14]

[11] Whish-Wilson, P. The Aral Sea Environmental Health Crisis. *Journal of Rural and Remote Environmental Health*, 1(2), (2002): 29-34.

[12] Asian Development Bank. *Central Asia Atlas of Natural Resources*. (Central Asian Countries Initiative for Land Management Asian Development Bank Manila, Philippines, 2010).

[13] Wolf, A. T., & Newton, J. T., *Case study of trans-boundary dispute resolution: The Indus water treaty*. Oregon State University Collage of Science. Program in water conflict management and transformation, (Institute for water and watersheds, 2008). < http://www. Trans-boundary waters. orst. edu/research/case studies/Indus_New. htm>[Last accessed on 3ed October 2013].

[14] Farzand A., Blood money' for flood victims. *India today*, 2010. URL: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/blood-money-for-flood-victims/1/110454.html

Kabul River System (KRS) falls in two countries (Fig. 1), Pakistan and Afghanistan and has got a big role in socio economic uplift. In Pakistan KRS decorate northern half of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa province. In Pakistan, The major contributing rivers include Chirtal, Swat, Panjkora, Jinday and Bara rivers.[15] In Afghanistan the major contributing tributaries are Kunar (coming from Chitral), Paghman, Panjsher, Alingar, Loghar and Kabul River itself. Kunar or Chitrail River is the major tributary, contributing more than 70% of

Fig. 1: Map of Kabul River and its Tributaries in Pakistan

water.[16] The main Kabul River coming from Sanglakh range was the large and central stream of KRS. This main stream is almost trapped for irrigation purposes only (Fig. 2). This is why Chitral River is the major perennial tributary that joins Kabul River at Jalalabad.

[15] Nafees, M., Ghulam K and Khan S. Investigation of Chemical and ecological evaluation of Adezai River. *Peshawar University teacher association Journal (PUTAJ)*, 9(1), (2002): 77-82

[16] Pakistan Defens. *India to help Afghanistan build 12 dams on Kabul River*. (2016). URLhttp://defence.pk/threads/india-to-help-afghanistan-build-12-dams-on-kabul-river.108204

Fig 2: View of Kabul River at Kabul City during winter

Pakistan has planned to divert about 40% of Chitral River (known as Kunar in Afghanistan) to Pajkora River during summer with the aim to irrigate District Dir and to decrease the hazard of flood caused by Kabul River in Charsada and Nowshera districts.[17] If Pakistan divert Chitral River, the main contributing tributary, will have negative impacts on Afghanistan. If Afghanistan traps Kabul River or its tributary will have drastic adverse effect on Khyber Pukhtunkhwa province in general and particularly the three major districts including Peshawar, Charsada, and Nowshera can adversely be suffered up to greater extent.

Impact on Irrigation

Kabul River System has got a great potential for irrigation. Afghanistan and Pakistan are agrarian countries and major part of population is dependent on agriculture. About 85% population of Afghanistan and 70%

[17] Fateh G. Chitral River diversion to Panjkora River basin for reducing floods in Kabul River. *Fateh Gandapur's Blog on Water Issues of Pakistan*, (2012). URL: http://fatehuk.blogspot.com/2011/03/chitral-river-diversion-to-panjkora.html

population of Pakistan are dependent on agriculture.[18] In Afghanistan 12% area is cultivable, 53% of which is irrigated and 47% is rain fed. Out of the total 53% irrigated land, 80-85% is irrigated by canal system, and 15-20% is irrigated by other means. In contrast, total cultivable land of Pakistan is 33%. Out of which 75% is irrigated.[19]

To achieve the maximum progress in agriculture, Pakistan has constructed five small and one large dam on Kabul River and its tributaries. Only Warsak Dam is on the main Kabul River (Table 1). This dam is irrigating three districts of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa. The dam provide water to the farmers for almost nine months (February- Oct) a years. During the month of Jun-August the flow rate rose above 1000 M3/Sec (Fig. 3). Water received at Nowshera can be termed as excess and is available for storage.[20]

Fig. 3 Kabul River flow rate (M^3/S) for the last five years



[18] Amin, H., and G.S. Schilz. *A Geography of Afghanistan*" Center for Afghanistan Studies, 1976: 102-123 & Karim, D.K. *A Geography of Pakistan, Environment, People and Economy."* (Oxford University Press Islamabad, 1991): 75-87

[19] Karim, D.K. *A Geography of Pakistan, Environment, People and Economy.* (Oxford University Press Islamabad, 1991): 75-87

[20] Average flow rate is based on analysis five years data recorded at Nowshera station after joining Swat and Jindi Rivers. Therefore, this data can be interpreted for this station only. Similarly, minimum and maximums flow should be determine for each tributary i.e. Shalam, Naguman and Sardaryab

The present Government of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa had announced construction of 350 dams.[21] It is not clear how many dams fall in Kabul River System. Eight dams are under construction and will be completed shortly. Out of this, five are on River Swat and fall in KRS.[22] These dams will affect flow rate of River Swat and Panjkora with ultimate effect on the main Kabul River.

Table 1: Use of Kabul River System for Hydro Power and Irrigation in Pakistan

Dam	Purpose	Install Capacity	River
Warsak	Electricity+ Irrigation	343	River Kabul
Dargai	Electricity + Irrigation	Jaban= 20 Dargai= 20 Malakand III=81	River Swat
Amandara	irrigation	NA	River Swat
Munda	Irrigation	740 (planed)	River Khyalay (Swat+Pangkora)
Bara Dam (diversion)	Irrigation	NA	River Bara
Jinday (small Band)	Seasonal Diversion	NA	River Jinday
Source: Nafees, 2010			

In comparison with Pakistan, Afghanistan had constructed nine dams on KRS, four dams are on the main Kabul River System and five are on its tributaries (Table 2). Two dams are small i.e. Qargha Dam and Band-i-Amir. Qrgha Dam was constructed on Paghman River, the major tributary of Kabul River. Initially used for drinking water supply only. In 2008, Afghan Government with the help of US-Government extended its storage capacity to make it a multipurpose dam. Now, it is used for irrigation, hydropower

[21] *The Daily Dawn*, 2014. 350 small dams to be built in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. URL: http://www.dawn.com/news/1101298

[22] Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. *Annual Development Plan 2015-16*. (Ministry of Energy and Power department, Government of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa, Pakistan, 2015). URL: http://kpkep.gov.pk/under%20construction.html

generation as well as for re-creation.[23] The present power generation capacity is 26 KW and could be extended up to 103 KW. Due to this the downstream flow has been decreased to a greater extent. Paghman River was a major perennial tributary of Kabul River; therefore, most of the times the main channel of Kabul River near Kabul city remain dry (Fig. 2). Band-i-Amir was for recreation purpose and IUCN had declared this as a national park.[24] In this regards it has no negative effect on water quantity. Other seven dams are large dams and most of them are multipurpose. These dams, if fully operational will certainly have extra negative effect on irrigation and power generation capacity at Khyber Pukhtunkhwa.

Table 2: Use of Kabul River System for Hydro power and Irrigation in Afghanistan

Existing dams in Afghanistan		
S. No	Dam	River
1	Qargha Reservoir	Paghman River
2	Jabul-e-Seraj power and irrigation dam	Tributary
3	Asadabad hydropower plant	Kunar
4	Darunta power and irrigation dam	Kabul River Main
5	Sarobi-II hydropower plant	Panjshair
6	Sarobi-I hydropower plant	Panjshair
7	Naghlu hydropower plant	Kabul River Main
8	Mahipar hydropower plant	Kabul River main
9	Cahk-e-Wardak Hydropower plant	Kabul River main
10	Charkhar power and irrigation dam	Tributary

[23] Sultan, M, and Assadullah A. *New hydrological station at Qargha Dam to help manage Afghanistan's water resources*. (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2008). URL: http://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/new-hydrological-station-qargha-dam-help-manage-afghanistans-water-resources

[24] IUCN. *WCS Applauds Afghanistan's Declaration Establishing Entire Wakhan District as the Country's Second National Park*, (2014). http://www.iucn.org/

	Planned	
1	Baghdara power and irrigation dam	Tributary
2	Kalagoosh power and irrigation dam	Tributary
3	Kama pwer and irrigation dam	Tributary
4	Gambiri power and irrigation dam	Tributary
5	Shahtoot dam	Tributary
6	Gulbahar power and irrigation dam	Tributary
7	Shah-wa-Arus pwer and irrigation bam	Tributary
8	Kunar Hydropower plant	Tributary

Source: Center for Afghani Study, University of Nebraska at Omaha

Catchments area of Kabul River System in Afghanistan is 60,6 thousands Km which is 9.3% of the total area in Afghanistan, out of which 81.74% is irrigated and 18.26% is rain-fed.[25] One-fifth of the geographic area of the Khyber Pukhtunkhwa is under cultivation (20%) and more than one tenth (10%) is wasteland.[26] In Khyber Pukhtunkhwa, 44% of the total cultivable land is under irrigation (Anwar, 1991). Kabul River irrigates the cultivable area of three districts i.e. Peshawar, Charsada and Nowshera. In Peshawar 80%, Nowshera 47.38%, and Charsada 84.67% cultivable land is irrigated form Kabul River. In terms of irrigation the total contribution of Kabul River to the total of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa is 16.92%.[27]

When we talk about irrigation we consider water quantity only. The quality is usually ignored. Different studies reveal that suspended load is increasing day by day due to which canal cleaning is now a routine job (Fig. 4). Every year during November-February there is canal cleaning campaign.

[25] Amin, H., and G.S. Schilz. *A Geography of Afghanistan*. (Center for Afghanistan Studies, 1976): 102-123

[26] UNESCAP. *Integrating environmental consideration in to the economic decision making process*, Vol.-II. (United Nation Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 2002).

[27] Abida U. *Study of Kabul River Gravity Canal for Suspended Load Management and Mitigation Measures*. M.Phil Thesis, (Department of Environmental Sciences, University of Peshawar, 2010)

Among the studied water quality parameters suspended load is high.[28] Although, suspended load will increase soil silt and clay contents, and is always a source of micro and macro-nutrients, but is creating problem of siltation in canals, which create hurdle in irrigation.[29]

Fig. 4 Canal Cleaning at Peshawar

Hydro Power Generation

Table 1 and 2 showed that both the countries, Pakistan and Afghanistan are using Kabul River for hydro power generation. Afghanistan has constructed four dams on main Kabul River stream and generating 180.8-MW electricity. In comparison Pakistan had constructed one dam on the main Kabul River stream i.e. Warsak Dam. Initially the installed capacity was 160 MW.[30] Due to deforestation and mismanagement of Kabul River Watershed there was increase in sediment load. That had got negative effect on the dam in terms of decrease in storage capacity. By the end of 1980 the

[28] Nafees. M. Role of Kabul River in Socio-economic Activities and Associated Environmental Problems. *Central Asia Journal*, 67, (Peshawar: Area Study Center, University of Peshawar, 2010): 101-112

[29] Nafees, M. and Asma A. Evaluation of Heavy Metals Accumulation in Different Parts of Wheat Plant Grown on Soil Amended with Sediment Collected from Kabul River Canal. *Journal of Agriculture Research*, 52(3), (2013): 383-394

[30] Nafees. M. *Environmental Study of Kabul River and its Tributaries in North West Frontier Province* (Now Khyber Pukhtunkhwa), Pakistan. M.Phil Thesis, (Peshawar: Department of Environmental Sciences, University of Peshawar, 2004)

reservoir was filled. The power generation was decreased to a minimum of 100 MW.[31] It is worth mentioning the present generation is on natural flow. Further decrease in flow will decrease the generation rate. As Pakistan is already energy deficient and passing through energy crises. Therefore any further decrease will have severe negative impact and can enhance energy crises.

Impact on Fish Population

Kabul River was famous for its fish but a regular decline has been observed since 1992.[32] Study conducted during early nineties reported that there were 156 native freshwater species in Kabul River System (Mirza, 2003). Out of the total fifty four species have been reported in Kabul River and thirty-five were termed as common along the entire stretch of Kabul River (Fazal et al. 1988). Recent studies revealed that the list came down to 10 species only. Out of 10 species, only two species are abundant two are adequate and six species are rare. The main causes of this decline are discharge of municipal, industrial effluent and construction of dams with percent potential threat of 15, 30 and 15% contribution respectively (Nafees, 2012). This heavy decline has got severe adverse impacts on fishing community living adjacent or near the banks of Kabul River. In 1970 fishing was the main occupation of the riparian community with 80% labor force. This percentage declined to only 20% in 2010.[33] A fisherman in early nineties (90s) has got his own business, now working as a labor with the hut owners offering fish along the bank of Kabul River (Fig. 5) or had changed their occupation. Further decrease in water volume or increase in pollution load may cause further decline in fish population.

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[31] Nafees, M., Ghulam K and Khan S. Investigation of Chemical and ecological evaluation of Adezai River. *Peshawar University teacher association Journal (PUTAJ)*, 9(1), (2002): 77-82 & Abida U. *Study of Kabul River Gravity Canal for suspended load management and mitigation measures*. M.Phil Thesis, (Department of Environmental Sciences, University of Peshawar, 2010)

[32] UNESCAP. *Integrating environmental consideration in to the economic decision making process*, Vol.-II. United Nation Economic and Social Commission for Asia's and the Pacific, (2002).

[33] Nafees, M., Ahmad, T and Maria, A., 2011. A review of Kabul River Uses and Its Impact on Fish and Fisherman. *Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, XIX(2), (University of Peshawar, 2011): 73-84

Fig 5. Huts Serving Fish at Saydaryab the major tributary of Kabul River

At Sardaryab site on Charsadda road there are numerous huts offering cooked/fried fish (Fig. 5). It is supposed that the fish serving along the river bank is captured/ collected from Kabul River. While as per survey conducted during 2010-11 revealed that 70% fish is coming from other parts of Pakistan that include Turbilla Dam and other fish farms of Punjab. Contribution from Kabul River (Sardaryab) was only 30%. Downstream of Warsak-Dam fishing is there but fish catch is very low. This decline is attributed to heavy pollution load received downstream of Budni- Sabi village near Akbar-pura till Khairabad, Attock .[34] Recent survey conducted in the same area, revealed that only 10% fish catch came from Kabul River and 90% is arranged from other parts of Pakistan. This polluted zone, established between the aforementioned places (Akbar Pura and Khairabad) is a big hurdle in fish breeding and work as a block zone for fish migration

[34] Nafees. M. *Environmental Study of Kabul River and its Tributaries in North West Frontier Province (Now Khyber Pukhtunkhwa)*, Pakistan. M.Phil Thesis, (Department of Environmental Sciences, University of Peshawar, 2004)

between Indus and Swat River. Further decrease in water quantity will decrease the dilution capacity with increase in pollution level. That is why this important economic activity may disappear or the contribution from Kabul River in terms of commercial fishing will decrease further and will affect the fish related business negatively.

Impact on Wild Life and Migratory Birds

Birds have got ecological importance and also playing a vital role in economy in terms of tourism and recreation. Kabul River and its vicinity works as a good habitat for local and migratory birds. In Pakistan about 170 types of birds' species have been reported in Kabul River System[35] with 65 migratory species (Altaf, 2013). Out of the total, 13 migratory birds are visiting Kabul River System (Box. 1). In 2008 a detail survey was conducted for 114 bird species in different parts of Pakistan. The survey revealed that the population of Shoveller, Mallard, tufted and shelduck is toward decrease and was termed as rear. Only Gull was found common. Gulls are mostly depending on fish population. As mentioned earlier, a visible decrease has been observed in fish species and fish population in Kabul River, therefore, the decrease in Gulls population is understood. [36] Decrease has been observed in bird's population is attributed due to habitat loss in terms of water quantity (due to dams) and quality (mixing of untreated Industrial and municipal waste water)

Box 1: List of Migratory Birds

1. Pintail, 2. Shoveller,
3. Widgeon, 4. Mallard,
5. Garganey, 6. Tufted
7. Ruddy 8. Shelduck,
9. Herons, 10. Lapwings,
11. Egrets, 12. Gulls and
13. Terns

(Ashiq, 1993).

[35] Saeeda, I. *Birds of Chitral*. World Wide Fund for nature, Pakistan Peshawar, 1999

[36] Durranee J., S. Hassan, A. and Ahmad E. Observations on the Birds of Sandspit/Hawkesbay Coastal Wetland Complex, Karachi Coast. *Pakistan J. Zool*ogy, 40(4), (2008): 229-237

Conclusion

Keeping in view the flow rate and its five year average data revealed that discharge is at minimum during Sept – April. Any further decrease in flow rate during this period will have economic as well as ecological complications. During July and August the flow rate as well as discharge rate rose above 1000 M^3/S and is the only part of the year in which the excess water can be stored.

There are already 12 dams on Kabul River System out of which 5 (1 in Pakistan and 4 in Afghanistan) are on the main Kabul River. That has up lifted the economy at the cost of river ecology. All developments, past and future, are irrespective of ecology of the river and its surroundings. The environmental resources have already been affected negatively to a greater extent. Construction of more dam, in any country, Pakistan or Afghanistan, on Kabul River main stream or diversion of any tributary will have negative impacts on Pakistan in general and Khyber Pukhtunkhwa province in particular. In the light of aforementioned arguments and discussions it is concluded that water quantity is the main focus. Water quality was seldom or never considered. Kabul River is a common property of both the countries and both have got the right to use it for economic up lift. But no country has got the right to degrade it. It is therefore recommended that both the countries should join hands for its protection, conservation and focus other economic and ecological activities such as fishery, eco-tourism, recreation and watershed management which primarily associated with River Kabul. The following are recommended for conservation of Kabul River and its future uses.

Recommendations

Both the countries, Pakistan and Afghanistan are required to join hands and think about the conservation of Kabul River. Identify responsibilities, such as watershed management, forestation, and pollution abetment and make the river productive for the riparian societies. To overcome threats to Kabul River, both the neighboring countries are required to sign a treaty on Kabul River by considering the following points.[37]

Geography of the river; how much territory fall in Afghanistan and how much in Pakistan. What are the present conservation measures adopted by each country and how to make these measures more effective?

[37] Mimi, Z.A. and B.I. Sawsalhi. A Decision Tool for Allocating the Waters of the Jordan River Basin between all Riparian Parties. *Water Resources Management*, 17(6), (2003):447–461

1. Hydrology: How much water is contributed by each country? What is the seasonal decrease/increase and what amount can be stored.
2. The climate: Climate affects availability of water and its usage. As the sources of Kabul River are glaciers. Therefore, in winter its availability and use is minimum in both the countries. Therefore the peak timings should be identified for water storage.
3. Past utilization of the water; this is usually discussed under the concept of prior-appropriation. Afghanistan will use the available surplus water with the idea not to damage the economic activities in Pakistan. Similarly Pakistan will use Chirtal River in such a way that could not harm Afghanistan.
4. Needs of the riparian community of the basin countries: People in both the riparian countries are directly/indirectly dependent on Kabul River. Up till now there is no such research or study that can clear this point. Therefore, there is a dire need for conducting such studies and focused it appropriately.
5. How much population was/is dependent on Kabul River System? Development at one place will affect what population at another location.
6. The comparative cost of alternate solution should be calculated. If Afghanistan traps the whole river, what alternate or second option exists with Pakistan and if Pakistan diverts Chitral River, what options exist with Afghanistan and what will be the cost in terms of economic and environmental/ecological consequences of those options. This will clarify the feasibility of the various alternatives and the management of Kabul River in its original form.
7. There is a need to explore alternate resources. Is there any other water body or any other option for irrigation and power generation? If yes why not to use those, if no, what to do with the present resource? Besides fishery, forestation and tourism are also income generating activities and should be properly evaluated.
8. What should be the minimum flow in the winter and summer with the objective not to harm the socio-economic and ecological status of the river in both the countries?

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US-INDIA STRATEGIC ALLIANCE AND CPEC 'THE GAME CHANGER': PROSPECTS FOR PAKISTAN AND RUSSIAN COOPERATION

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Abstract

South Asia equally occupies the title of the most sensitive region of the world. Regional politics is heavily governed under the principle of Balance of Power, where a continuous struggle to attain power persists amidst all the actors to ensure their state survival. A pragmatic shift in the regional politics has led to emergence of new alliances as Pak-Russian interests have coincided. Though Russia enjoys a strategic relationship with India, the Indo-U.S. nexus paves the way for Russia to extend its relations with Pakistan. Post 9/11 Russia has realized the strategic importance of Pakistan as a pivotal player towards achieving regional peace and security. The dwindling U.S. relations with Pakistan dictates latter's policies to adopt enhanced bilateral relations with Russia and China. The extension of Pak-Russian relations will provide the latter to maintain its control over the Central Asian states, and provides Moscow with the wild card to counter Indian strategic tilt towards the U.S. CPEC initiative serves as a pivotal forum to further strengthen Pak-Russian relations and aid in development of mutual trust and cooperation. Creating a win-win situation for both actors to pursue and extend their strategic interests.

This paper provides a qualitative analysis of the regional implications which are subtly governing the newly established relations while attempting to address the regional attributes which influence the newly established relations between Pakistan and Russia. Primarily, it focuses upon the economic and strategic interests of both states and how they align together

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according to the current regional scenarios. Apart from that, it also analyzes the interests of the US which exercise major influence over the regional states such as India and Afghanistan. Three questions are addressed to establish an understanding behind this cooperation which deems to be fruitful for both the states. These include how the existing Indo-US nexus contributes towards this strategic shift of partnership between Pakistan and Russia? How Indo-Afghan nexus is against Pakistani interest? And prospects for Russian connectivity with South and West Asia through China Pakistan Economic Corridor.

Key Words

US-India, Strategic Alliance, Pakistan-Russia, Cooperation, CPEC

Introduction

One cannot dismiss the fact that state relations are widely governed under national interests, which change constantly in accordance to the changing domestic, regional and global scenarios/conditions. States formulated foreign policies are gears to attain vast objectives, whether political or economic. It allows states to establish strong relations with other players in the international arena. With a paradigm shift in regional politics, where new alliances are emerging, Pak-Russian interests have coincided. Thus, both are getting closer to each other.

Russia holds an important position in the global politics. Its economic (weak economy but strong political influences given the fact that Russia is one of the 5 UNSC member) and military strength is key to enjoy this position. Geo-strategically, Russia holds a critical position and is enriched with natural resources. Russia has actively used its energy resources as means to achieve political and economic objectives and has used coercive ways to develop patterns of dependency within the European Union.[1] Similarly, these patterns of dependency are also clearly distinguishable in regards to Moscow policies towards Central Asian states.

The strained relations of the past cannot be ignored while observing the newly established relations between the two states. During its inception, Pakistan faced multiple economic and security crisis and these crises essentially directed our strategic interests to align with the western bloc to counter Soviet aggression. As our prior foreign policies directed us to be on conflicting ends, India actively utilized this period to establish stronger ties with USSR including Central Asian countries which were part of the USSR (while pursuing a non-alignment policy). Pakistan on the other hand, was

[1] John Lough, *"Russia's Energy Diplomacy*," (Chatham House: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, May 2011), https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/19352_0511bp_lough.pdf. (accessed on April 24, 2017)

focused on establishing stronger relation with the western bloc and joined SEATO and CENTO respectively.

The Soviet invasion in Afghanistan was detrimental for Pakistan in terms of developing image; a negative perception was created amidst the Central Asian states and severed our relations with Russia. From Russian perspective, Pakistan was aiding and abetting the enemy, by providing them sanctuaries and resources. Nevertheless, current regional scenario forces both Pakistan and Russia to overlook their past relations and opt towards enhancing its strategic alliance. As in the recent years, Russia has been actively maneuvering to increase its global status and has engaged itself in pursuing strategic ties with major powers of the world, playing an assertive and active role to deal with regional issues is at the helm of Moscow's foreign policy.[2]

Since decades, Russia and India have maintained strong relations, for India their bilateral relations with Russia remains to be an important mainstay of Indian foreign policy or its grand strategy.[3] The bilateral relationship which was developed under the Cold War period has allowed them to expand cooperation in areas of economy, military and diplomacy even in the present times. Trade volumes have increased between both states, and Indian companies have widely invested in Russian energy companies/sectors. During the BRICS Summit 2016, Russia and India struck important defense deals such as, a "$5 billion deal for India's purchase of the S-400 Triumf surface-to-air missile system."[4] Both states also signed deals concerning to India's import and "manufacture of Kamov Ka 226T light utility helicopters, and will also be collaborating in the manufacture of four Admiral Grigorovich–class guided-missile stealth frigates."[5] Other agreements involve; a cooperation pact between Indian and Russian railways, development of education and training facilities, space cooperation between Russian Space cooperation and Indian Space Research Organization and MoU's focusing upon urban development, smart city projects, and development transport logistics system are also achieved.[6]

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[2] Rizwana Khalid, "Resurgent Russia: Challenges and Prospects for South Asia," *ISSRA Papers*, 3;2 (2012): 86-107.

[3] Andrew J. Stravers and Peter Harris, "Indian Foreign Policy: The Cold War Lingers," *The Diplomat*, (March 24, 2014), http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/indian-foreign-policy-the-cold-war-lingers/. (accessed on May 2, 2017)

[4] Nabarun Roy, "Is India Losing Russia?" *National Interest*, (October 27, 2016), http://nationalinterest.org/feature/india-losing-russia-18208?page=2.

[5] Nabarun Roy, "India Losing."

[6] "India-Russia defense deals: Six things India got from old friend Russia", *Economic Times*, (October 17, 2016). http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-

Additionally, "Russian aircraft building company, Irkut, plans to sell between 100 and 200 promising MS-21 aircraft to India by 2025–2030."[7] Other promising deals include; "designing of multirole fighter and multirole cargo aircraft, licensed manufacturing of SU-30MKI aircraft and T-90S tanks, designing and manufacturing BrahMos cruise missiles, and modernizing MiG-29 aircraft and 877EKM submarines."[8] Apart from that, the construction of International North-South Transport Corridor is also underway; "which is a land-and sea-based 7,200-km long network of ship, rail, and road route between India, Russia, Iran, Europe and Central Asia."[9] The project aims at improving trade connectivity between Europe and Southeast Asia, acting as another hallmark of strengthened Indian-Russian relations.

India on the other hand, is also deeply interested in enhancing its relations with U.S. In the recent years, both states have expanded their cooperation in the fields of defense, energy, economy, research and technology. US is one of India's largest trading and investment partner.[10] Both states are also committed and collaborating in bilateral and multilateral fora to address specific challenges such as; ensuring mutual energy security, combatting climate change and supporting the development of low carbon economies that will eventually generate opportunities and fuel job growth in both states.[11] Since 2008, "U.S.- India defense trade has increased from $ 1 billion to over $ 15 billion, which includes the Indian procurement of 13 Lockheed Martin C-130 Hercules aircraft, 10 C-17 Globe master and 12 P-8 Poseidon aircraft from Boeing, as well as 22 AH-64 Apache and 15 CH-47 Chinook helicopters."[12] The biased U.S. stance towards India, to support the latter's ambitions as a regional leader in South Asia disrupts the balance of power in the region. Though Russia have been traditional allies, Indian tilt towards the U.S. orbit is eyed critically by Russia along with Pakistan and

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nation/india-russia-defence-deals-six-things-india-got-from-old-friend-russia/articleshow/54866551.cms.

[7] I.E. Denisov; O.A. Popadyuk, "100 Postulates on Russia-Indian Relations", *Russian International Affairs Council*, Working Paper 29 (2016). http://russiancouncil.ru/common/upload/WP-India-Russia-29-Eng.pdf. (accessed on July 29, 2017)

[8] I. E. Denisov, "*Russia-India Relations*."

[9] Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, "International North South Transportation Corridor for better Indo-Russian connectivity inches Towards Reality", *Economic Times*, (April 10, 2017). http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/international-north-south-transportation-corridor-for-better-indo-russian-connectivity-inches-towards-reality/articleshow/58099129.cms.

[10] "U.S. Relations With India," *US Department of State*, (Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs Fact Sheet, October 9, 2015), https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3454.htm.

[11] "U.S. Relations."

[12] "U.S. – India Defense Relations Fact Sheet," *U.S. Embassy & Consulates in India*, (December 8, 2016). https://in.usembassy.gov/u-s-india-defense-relations-fact-sheet-december-8-2016/.

China. The 2016, Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) signed between U.S. and India allows both states to operate and access military bases.[13] U.S. ambitions to counter China's influence within the region and South China Sea through LEMOA further complicates the strategic balance between India and Pakistan.

The rivalry between nuclear armed India and Pakistan continuously makes the strategic stability of South Asia ambiguous. As deterrence has played a critical role in minimizing chances of a full fledge war amidst Pakistan and India, yet, if deterrence itself becomes weaker between both states it would have disastrous consequences.[14] The current geo-political and regional environment paves the way for Pakistan and Russia to advance their bilateral relations. Russia has shown immense interests in maintaining stability within the region. The dwindling "security situation in Afghanistan has raised apprehensions about the spillover effect due to the presence of non-state actors." Russian fear that the existing instabilities within South Asia will transcend towards its borders and affect its internal security. Pakistan has been suffering tremendously under the havocs of terrorism, thus, stability within Afghanistan holds critical importance for both Russia and Pakistan. A stable region ensures enhanced ties amidst regional states to promote effective and sustainable developments. As relations between U.S. and India reaches new horizons it further cultivates Russian interests within Pakistan. Additionally, Pakistan appears to be a lucrative market for Russian armaments in wake of dwindling Pak-U.S. relations.[15]

Indo-US nexus and Strategic Shift of Partnership between Pakistan and Russia

The regional dynamics of South Asia heavily influence Pakistan's foreign policies especially vis-a-vis India. The prime factor which drives Pakistan's defense policies is profoundly affected by India's aggressive policies towards Pakistan. Indo-Pak antagonistic relations have fueled hostility towards each other. As both states possess nuclear weapons, a rough balance has deterred both to go for a full fledge war. Pakistan exercises "credible minimum deterrence" against India, and the state officials have maintained that, Pakistan does not have an intent nor can

[13]Anwar Iqbal, "US-India Defence Pact to Impact Pakistan, China," *Dawn*, (August 30, 2016). https://www.dawn.com/news/1280873.

[14] Walter C. Ladwig III, "A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine," *International Security*, 32:3 (Winter 2007/08), 158–190. http://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/IS3203_pp158-190.pdf. (accessed on 24 April, 2017)

[15] Rizwana Khalid, "*Resurgent Russia*." 100.

afford to pursue a conventional or nuclear arms race with India.[16] Pakistan believes in retaining a "minimum credible nuclear deterrence" as a keystone of its national security policy.[17] To maintain state sovereignty and to counter the persistent antagonistic Indian policies, Pakistan has opted towards enhancing its military capabilities. According to *Foreign Policy*, "India has been developing a top-secret nuclear city to produce thermo-nuclear weapons" to enhance its states nuclear power, however, this resultantly disrupts regional stability.[18] Additional reports have suggested that India has already succeeded in developing nuclear submarines and is in pursuit of developing six more advanced submarines under project P-75I to enhance Indian navy's undersea warfare capabilities. According to reports, these developments are also a counter towards China's swift expansion of submarine fleet.[19] Additionally, the progressive relations with U.S. has provided India with significant strategic depth and wavers the balance of power between Pakistan and India.

Under the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) 2012, "U.S. and India have launched seven joint working groups to explore collaborative projects and programs and signed two Science and Technology government-to-government project agreements – the Next Generation Protective Ensembles and Mobile Hybrid Power Sources – worth roughly $2 million."[20]

The following timeline indicates the other trademarks of intensified bilateral relations. The "Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region" was issued between President Obama and Prime Minister Modi in January 2015 – "essentially both parties affirmed their shared vision for promising prosperity and stability within the region."[21] During June of the same year, Secretary Carter and Minister Parrikar signed the "Framework for the U.S.- India Defense Relationship"- the framework

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[16] Waseem Qutab, "*Pakistan's Nuclear Diplomacy and NSG Membership: Opportunities and Challenges*", (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 21 July 2016). https://www.iiss.org/en/events/events/archive/2016-a3c2/july-652c/pakistans-nuclear-diplomacy-and-nsg-membership---opportunities-and-challenges-adc1.

[17] Kurshid Khan, "Deterrence Stability, Security Doctrines and Escalation Control in South Asia", *IPRI Journal* XIII:2 (Summer 2013). 42-62.

[18] Adrian Levy, "India Is Building a Top-Secret Nuclear City to Produce Thermonuclear Weapons", *Foreign Policy*, (December 16, 2015). http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/16/india_nuclear_city_top_secret_china_pakistan_barc/. (accessed on July 28, 2017)

[19] Rahul Singh, "Rs 64,000-cr project to build submarines in India creates buzz", *Hindustan Times*, (March 29, 2016). http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/rs-64-000-cr-project-to-build-submarines-in-india-creates-buzz/story-hNwPyJUshugN7x38Fv35QJ.html.

[20] "U.S. – India Defense Relations Fact Sheet", US *Embassy and Consulate*.

[21] "*Fact Sheet: U.S.-India Defense Relationship*", https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/US-IND-Fact-Sheet.pdf. (accessed on July 30, 2017.)

covers multitude of common interests between both actors such as; (a) enhanced cooperation's in military training, exchange of intelligences and education,(b) to conduct joint military exercises and to collaborate in various multinational operations, (c) to work towards enhancing respective capabilities to prevent any proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,(d) enhancing the defense capabilities of establishments in order to promote security and defeat roots of terrorism, (e) further investigate avenues for strengthened collaboration within missile defenses and also cooperate in enhancing maritime security.[22] In the following year of 2016, April marked as another significant and progressive step in the enhancement of their bilateral relations, as both actors launched a new bilateral "Maritime Security Dialogue"- which precisely addressed towards the Asia-Pacific maritime challenges, naval cooperation and other multilateral engagements.[23] In regards to cooperation in fields of defense and security, to enhance military cooperation via conducting joint military exercises; India participated (with a ship) in the Rim-of-the-Pacific (RIMPAC) exercises held in both 2014 and 2016 which were hosted by U.S. Pacific Command.[24] In relation to sales of armaments, in December 2016, both states also signed a deal worth approximately $732 million- in reference to providing the Indian Army with 145 M777 Howitzer guns.[25] Furthermore, U.S. in 2017 also finalized India's designation as a "Major Defense Partner", this development further marked as another critical achievement of its fruitful diplomatic ties.[26] The closer proximities between both actors and their respective accomplishments cannot go unheeded by Pakistan, therefore it fuel grounds for Pakistan to switch and find other alternatives and embark upon extending relations with other major powers to intensify its strategic foothold.

Observing the bilateral relations amidst India and Pakistan, it can be deduced that the former has time and again opted aggressive policies towards the latter; as multiple reports pinpoint or highlight's how India's military has explicitly developed its "Cold Start Doctrine" for usage in a potential warfare against Pakistan. The content of Doctrine itself encompasses or envisages various divisions or protocols through which its respective military could successfully accomplish offensive operations with

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[22] "*Framework for the U.S. – India Defense Relationship*", http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/2015-Defense-Framework.pdf. (accessed on July 30, 2017.)

[23] "*U.S. – India Defense Relations Fact Sheet*", US *Embassy and Consulate*.

[24] "*U.S. – India Defense Relations Fact Sheet*", US *Embassy and Consulate*.

[25] "*U.S. – India Defense Relations Fact Sheet*", US *Embassy and Consulate*.

[26] "*U.S. – India Defense Relations Fact Sheet*", US *Embassy and Consulate*.

both speed of deployment and operational efficiency.[27] Therefore, if war erupts between both actors, the key target of the doctrine is to enable Indian military to conduct successful attacks that would ultimately constrain any nuclear or conventional retaliation from Pakistan.[28]

To sustain effective deterrence against India and to counter the Cold Start Doctrine, Pakistan military has conducted military exercises codenamed "Azm-e-Nau" between years of 2009 and 2013; the exercises were focused towards the formalization and operationalization of a conventional response towards the Cold Start Doctrine.[29] Ultimately, these advances has resulted in the implementation and development of "new concept of war fighting" (NCWF) by the Pakistan military; the goal is to successfully counter any aggressive attacks and additionally targeted towards attaining and improving the mobilization period of troops, along with enhancing the inter-services coordination between its Army and Air Force (specifically).[30] Addressing towards Pakistan's strategic weapons program to counter India's BMD capabilities (India's Ballistic Missile Program), to increase her deterrence capabilities at shorter ranges- Pakistan has successfully developed its Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) – Ra'ad and Hatf IX SRBM.[31] Pakistan also possesses other operational and tactical level short range systems that it can employ in case a conflict erupts against India which includes: the subsonic Babur Land Attack Cruise Missile (LACM)- that holds the range of 700 kilometers, other suited and potential counterforce employment missiles include various Short Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs) that consists of: Hatf-1A- which holds range of 100 kilometers , Abdali- which holds range of 180 kilometers and Ghaznavi- which holds range of 280 kilometers.[32] In regards to Pakistan's arsenal of road-mobile ballistic missiles, which are likely to be reserved or assigned for counter value targeting includes; the solid-fueled Shaheen-I (holding 750-kilometer range), Shaheen-1A (holding 1,100-kilometer range), Shaheen-II (holding 2,000-kilometer range), Shaheen-III (holding 2,750-kilometer range), and lastly the liquid-fueled Ghauri ballistic missiles which holds 1,100-kilometer range respectively.[33]

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[27] Walter C. Ladwig III, "*A Cold Start*." 164-168.
[28] Walter C. Ladwig III, "*A Cold Start*." 164-168.
[29] Meenakshi Sood, "Pakistan's (Non-Nuclear) Plan to Counter 'Cold Start'", *The Diplomat*, (March 25, 2017). http://thediplomat.com/2017/03/pakistans-non-nuclear-plan-to-counter-cold-start/. (accessed on July 28, 2017)
[30] Meenakshi Sood, "*Pakistan's (Non-Nuclear) Plan*."
[31] Kinza Arif, "Pakistan Completes Nuclear Triad", *Foreign Policy News*, (January 16, 2017). http://foreignpolicynews.org/2017/01/16/pakistan-completes-nuclear-triad/.
[32] Mansoor Ahmed, "Pakistan's Tactical Nuclear Weapons and Their Impact on Stability", *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, (June 30 2016). http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/pakistan-s-tactical-nuclear-weapons-and-their-impact-on-stability-pub-63911. (accessed on July 28, 2017)
[33] Mansoor Ahmad, "*Pakistan's tactical Nuclear Weapons*."

On account of the creation of this Doctrine, Pakistan has blamed India for intentionally creating perilous environment in South Asia, by the continuous engagement in a military buildup which threatens Pakistan's security.[34] Enforcing Pakistan to expand its own military capacities, and also prospect scenarios where Pakistan will adopt "offensive defense" against India in a manner which will lead towards a nuclear war.[35]

How the Indo-US Nuclear Deal and NSG Waiver Misbalances the Strategic Stability of South Asia?

After the 9/11 incident, the West primarily adopted a biased approach towards India. Then again, this biased approach became clearly evident under the Indo-US Nuclear Deal and the NSG waiver granted to India.[36] Multiple analysts have pointed out how both actions are in clear violation of the guidelines of Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT).[37] Under the Indo-US Nuclear Deal both entities have signed 123 agreements which allows India to enhance its conventional military capabilities, thus, disrupting the regional balance of power. In depth analysis of Indo-US Nuclear Deal showcases how India is empowered under US assistance; primarily, US has removed various high-technology sanctions imposed upon India since 1974. Essentially, this very element allows India to exercise its full potentials to strengthen its nuclear program.

Secondly, it has enhanced economic relations between both entities. As this deal displays, how it aids US to become India's largest trading partner. Which would also enable India to transform its economic power to attain other national interests. Subsequently, enhanced commercial dealings would assist in formulating people to people contacts. Thirdly, this very deal enables them to form a strengthened alliance to counter "terrorism". A clause within this deal allows US forces to use Indian military bases in wake of an "international crisis". To further fulfill the objectives, both states have expanded critical intelligence sharing. Lastly, it depicts how US has become a prime provider of arms supply to India, e.g. US support towards India for development of next generation aircraft carrier.[38] These ties are further

[34] Walter C. Ladwig III, "*A Cold Start*." 169.
[35] Walter C. Ladwig III, "*A Cold Start*." 172.
[36] Mateen Haider, "Indo-US nuclear deal will negatively impact South Asia: Sartaj Aziz", *Dawn*, (28 January, 2015). http://www.dawn.com/news/1159804.
[37] Kinza Arif, "Pakistan Completes Nuclear Triad."
[38] C. Raja Mohan, "10 years of Indo-US civil nuclear deal: Transformation of the bilateral relationship is the real big deal", *The Indian Express*, (July 20, 2015). http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/10-yrs-of-indo-us-civil-nuclear-deal-transformation-of-the-bilateral-relationship-is-the-real-big-deal/.

enhanced as it showcases how both parties have showed keen interests in pursuing full civil nuclear cooperation, and via this deal it has only enabled them to further enhance India's nuclear program. These steps however, are detrimental towards nuclear deterrence within South Asia.

Additionally, the NSG waiver further tilted the strategic balance of the South Asia, as this waiver substantively favors India's position against Pakistan. Adding fuel to the everlasting rivalry amidst both entities for big power resources and geo-strategic advantages. Though Russia along with France approved India's position to attain the waiver, in hopes of garnering large share of the estimated $100 billion in nuclear fuel and technology purchases India would plan to make. However, viewing the enhanced bilateral cooperation between India and US, Russia is anxious to avert India from being pulled into the US orbit.[39] China on the other hand, expressed concerns over this special status provision towards India within the nuclear regulatory regime. This opposition was viewed critically by India, as their officials openly voiced disappointment towards China. Relations between China and India have remained strained since 1962, and not long after China became a valuable strategic ally of Pakistan. However, both states have pursued strong economic relations in the recent years.[40]

Though Pakistan desired towards reaching a similar agreement with US, nevertheless, US did not pay heed to Islamabad's desire. A civilian nuclear deal would have aided Pakistan to overcome energy crisis it has been facing in the recent years and also would have assisted in establishing a stronger economic hold in the global market. With the rise of terrorism and the wars against it, Pakistan has suffered tremendously. Despite aiding the international community to eradicate threads of terrorism, US has widely adopted a biased approach towards India. As discussed previously, such inclinations towards India disrupts the regional stability.

Under this dilemma, if Pakistan opts towards establishing closer ties with Russia, the energy crisis it has been facing in the recent years can be addressed. As Russia enjoy key energy reserves, investments by Russian companies can aid Pakistan to establish its effective economic hold.[41] Positive examples of such cooperation can be seen under Russian investments towards the expansion of Guddu and Muzaffargarh power plants and the development of Thar Coal Project etc. In order to maintain the strategic balance in the region, Pak-Russian interests have aligned positively.

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[39] Kranti Kumara and Deepal Jayasekera, "Nuclear Supplier Group gives India unique "waiver," but only after row between Delhi and Beijing", *World Socialist Web Site*, (17 September 2008). https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2008/09/nucl-s17.html.

[40] Kranti Kumara and Deepal Jayasekera, "Nuclear Supplier Group."

[41] Sabah Aslam, "Pakistan-Russia joint military exercise: New doors of opportunities", *Foreign Policy News*, (September 26, 2016). http://foreignpolicynews.org/2016/09/26/pakistan-russia-joint-military-exercise-new-doors-opportunities/.

Pakistan resultantly, under these circumstances, becomes a lucrative market for Russian armaments and allows Russia to maintain its presence within the region.

Along with the Middle East, South Asia remains to be one of the most sensitive regions of the world. Pakistan and India are actively engaged in expanding its nuclear arsenal and becoming diversified at an aggressive pace. Indian military doctrine is confrontational towards Pakistan's internal securities; the Cold Start doctrine is an active scheme to seize Pakistan's territories before stepping into a nuclear war.[42] Though, India maintains the claim that such developments are only ensued to safeguard its respective securities against China, blatantly it cannot be denied, that its respective mobile convention forces are steered towards Pakistan, as due to its geographical positioning/limitations they cannot be implemented or used against China. Therefore, the regional balances have begun to shift under the introduction of the Cold Start Doctrine, as the deterrence within South Asia has generally become more complicated and directing towards an unending arms race.

Though the Indo-US Nuclear Deal has not been implemented on its full potential, yet it has enabled India to enhance its civilian nuclear program with construction of 6 reactors by 2017. The NSG waiver granted India the strategic depth it needed. To offset any future coercion by India, it is imperative for Pakistan to take concrete steps to enhance its defensive capabilities. These developments have resultantly created the loophole for Pakistan to further strengthen its nuclear hold which was clearly evident after the successful tests of submarine launched cruise missile "Babur III", which enabled Pakistan to possess the nuclear triad capabilities.[43]

Indo-Afghan Nexus against Pakistani Interests

The Pak-Afghan Conundrum

Like India, our relations with Afghanistan has remained strained since the inception of Pakistan. Afghanistan has widely claimed that certain

[42] Michael Krepon and Julia Thompson, "Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia", *The Stimson Center*, 2013. https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/Deterrence_Stability_Dec_2013_web_1.pdf. (accessed on April 25, 2017). See also, Sutirtho Patranobis, "Pakistan Military Strong Enough to Defend Itself Against India: Chinese expert", *Hindustan Times*, February 7, 2017. http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/pakistan-military-strong-enough-to-defend-itself-against-india-despite-cold-start-chinese-expert/story-gctp6gAQDeOIBPGgiaKRRM.html.

[43] Khurshid Khan, "*Deterrence Stability*." 59.

territories of Kyber Pakhtunkhwa should be under the legitimate rule of Afghanistan. This issue between both states can be marked as the first element of their strained relationship. Thus far, Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan have also taken U-turns in accordance to the existing dilemmas i.e. Soviet Afghan War and Post 9/11 scenario. The Soviet Afghan War provided Islamabad with the landscape to enhance bilateral relations with the US, as interests of both coincided to counter Soviet aggression. However, 9/11 forced the international environment to take a 180-degree shift, and the need of time enforced Pakistan to change their policies towards Afghanistan. On the other hand, this shift in policy allowed Pakistan to improve its relations with Central Asian States and Russia.

To enhance its position within the region, New Delhi has actively pursued to have stronger bilateral relations with Afghanistan. In the recent years, it has invested $300 million in Afghanistan for the development of Salma Dam. This project would enable Afghanistan to boost agribusinesses; as the dam would generate up to 42 megawatts electricity to assist the agrarian sector.[44] India in addition, has also provided Afghanistan with high-altitude equipment worth $8 million; they are also providing Afghanistan with shared personnel such as, high-ranking military advisers and helicopter technicians from its intelligence and counter-espionage organization- the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW).[45] Their relations since 2015 have further intensified, while India has also taken several initiatives to enhance Afghanistan's security capabilities. India has also embarked upon the establishment of Afghanistan's new parliament complex in Kabul, while investing approximately $90 million.[46] Another important side note is Afghanistan's accession in the World Trade Organization in 2015, which resultantly has boosted its economic capacities along with aiding its internal dynamics, as reports indicate how its exports have increased since 2013, from $150 to $570 million respectively.[47]

Along with Afghanistan, India has also moved forward to maintain smooth relations with Iran. To balance the development of Gwadar port and CPEC, Chabahar Port transit and trade agreement has been initiated. For many analysts this initiative acts as counter towards Gwadar Port. As mentioned previously, India has moved forward carefully to strengthen its

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[44] M. Ashraf Haideri, "Since 9/11 Afghanistan Makes Progress amid Violence", *The Diplomat,* (September 12, 2016). http://thediplomat.com/2016/09/since-911-afghanistan-makes-progress-amid-violence/.(accessed on May 3, 2017)

[45] Sumit Ganguly, "Sources of Tension in Afghanistan and Pakistan: A Regional Perspective India's Role in Afghanistan", *CIDOB Policy Research Project*, (January 2012). See also, Shashank Joshi, "India's Af-Pak Strategy," *RUSI Journal*, 155:1 (February/ March 2010). 20-29. https://shashankjoshi.files.wordpress.com/2010/02/journal-201002-joshi.pdf.(accessed on May 3, 2017)

[46] Sumit Ganguly, "*Sources of tension*."

[47] M. Ashraf Haideri, "*Since 9/11*."

regional position by maintaining fast/progressive ties with Iran, Afghanistan and the Central Asian states. On the other hand, US strategies towards the region only aids India to bolster their presence within the region. US attempts to counter China's rise as a global power actively involves using India as a strategic tool.[48] Despite the terrorist activities in the region and increasing the security concerns regional projects like Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan-Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TUTAP-500), TAPI, CASA-1000 and Gwadar Port are underway.[49] These projects would surely contribute towards stability and development of the region.

Russian Interests in Afghanistan: Pakistan a Favorable Ally?

To attain greater regional stability, Pakistan and Russia have showed keen interests in developing stronger ties. The stability of Afghanistan appears to be the core agenda of both the states, as both understand the fact that enhanced ties amidst the regional states need to persist to generate sustainable developments, peace, and stability within the region.[50] The stability of Afghanistan is a crucial element in Pak-Russia relations as it would enhance the chances of greater economic cooperation and trade between Pakistan and Russia through Central Asian States.[51] However, the hostilities which persist amidst the triad (India, Afghanistan and Pakistan) complicates the environment. Additionally, the heightened security concerns within Afghanistan has further raised apprehensions about a domino effect due to presence of Non-State Actors. The unstable situation in Afghanistan also indirectly influences the security environment within Central Asian states. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Islamic State of Khurasan (ISK) are considered to be the most lethal militant organizations currently based in northern Afghanistan which is a source of distress for Russia.[52]

Under such circumstances, Pakistan appears to be a more favorable and beneficial partner for Russia to counter terrorist activities in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Essentially, encouraging a high level of cooperation amidst their respective militaries. In Defense Expo IDEAS 2014 in Karachi, the Russian Defense Minister recognized Pakistani defense production

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[48] M. Ashraf Haideri, "*Since 9/11*."
[49] M. Ashraf Haideri, "*Since 9/11*."
[50] "Russia supports China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project: Envoy", *Dawn*, (December 17, 201). http://www.dawn.com/news/1302890.
[51] Khurram Abbas, "Russia's Revival: Opportunities and Limitations for Pakistan", *IPRI*, (February 4, 2016). http://www.ipripak.org/russias-revival-opportunities-and-limitations-for-pakistan/.
[52] Khurram Abbas, "*Russian Revival*,"

capabilities and also appreciated the skills and expertise of Pakistan's military in combatting war against terrorism.[53] In response to these emerging threats, both states have initiated steps to display a united front, and engaged in joint military drills to show steady progress in their developing relations. Though, India and Russia exercises progressive ties with each another, Russia has disregarded India's opposition towards joint military exercises after the Uri Attacks.[54] Additionally, Russian Ambassador to Pakistan Alexy Y. Dedov also stated that Russia is keen to assist Pakistan in fighting terrorism by suppling military equipment.[55] The 2017 military drills would also mark a significant change in relations between both states, as the drills aim to improve combat readiness against terrorism and bolster mountain training.[56]

Regional Integration via China Pakistan Economic Corridor and Opportunities for Russia

Pakistan and China have shared positive history, which ultimately acts as a fundamental agent towards their enhanced bilateral cooperation. Both have interests regarding to regional security and stability, and consequently, China has supported Pakistan in matters related to defense and security.[57] The $62 billion bilateral arrangement of CPEC initiative under the umbrella of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), allows Pakistan and China to expand their scopes or agendas in regards to regional connectivity, economic prosperity and economic security. Therefore, CPEC initiative firstly provides with ample opportunities for involved actors to conduct smoother economic relations via safe economic transit routes, secondly aides in extending their respective regional affiliations, and lastly stimulates or fuels region to region ties as well. The initiative can also be viewed as a critical asset for furthering economic ties and plays a vital card for further footing the Chinese strategic influences within the region, which can also transcend beyond other regions as well.[58] Additionally, it would further enhance Pakistan's strategic position economically, diplomatically and militarily.[59]

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[53] Khurram Abbas, "*Russian Revival*."
[54] Kamran Yousaf, "Pakistan, Russia, China seek to crack Afghan conundrum", *Express Tribune*, (November 21, 2016). https://tribune.com.pk/story/1237886/pakistan-russia-china-seek-crack-afghan-conundrum/.
[55] APP, "Russia Supports China Pakistan Economic Corridor Project: Envoy", *Dawn*, (December 17, 2016). http://www.dawn.com/news/1302890.
[56] Polina Tikhonova, "Pakistan and Russia Boosting Military Ties with 2017 Drills", *ValueWalk*, (December 3, 2016). http://www.valuewalk.com/2016/12/pakistan-russia-army-drills/.
[57] Kinza Arif, "*CPEC: Interdependence means Integration*."
[58] Kinza Arif, "*CPEC: Interdependence means Integration*."
[59] Polina Tikhonova, "CPEC: China, Pakistan and Russia Bringing Multipolar World Order", *ValueWalk*, (April 27, 2017). http://www.valuewalk.com/2017/04/cpec-china-pakistan-russia-multipolar-world-order/.

Many European and Central Asian States have shown desire towards joining the initiative. As it would allow latter to find new markets for their energy reserves, and providing them alternative route to gain access to Indian Ocean. Similarly, for European States, this project opens doors towards newer and greater opportunities and enables them to enhance their influence in Central Asia as they remove themselves from Russian energy dependencies.

For Russia, CPEC initiative provides the ideal opportunity to penetrate into the markets of South Asia. Under the recent EU sanctions imposed upon Russia, it is keen to find alternative markets for its energy reserves and expand across Europe. Russia enjoys the title of being the world's largest producer of crude oil and the second-largest producer of dry natural gas.[60] Pakistan has openly welcomed Russia's investments in the energy sectors. Russian companies such as Rosneft and Gazprom can assist Pakistan in the further development of oil and gas programs.[61] Additionally, it would enhance the economic benefits and developmental avenues for Pakistan. Russia's policy shift aims at establishing newer markets and gaining access to the warm waters of the region. Plus, it would also allow Moscow to re-establish ties with Beijing while retaining their control over the Central Asian states. Pakistan has offered Russia the use of Gwadar port providing them with the access to the regions warm waters and connectivity.[62]

In February 2019, Pakistan and Russia signed an agreement under which 1500 KMs offshore pipeline will be constructed from Gazprom's resources in the Middle East to Pakistan. This project will cost $10 billion for which initial study will be done by Gazprom on its own expenses. An expected 500 million to 1 billion cubic feet of natural gas per day will be provided to Pakistan.[63]Russia also intends to invest into the TAPI pipeline project. According to Inter State Gas Systems, a state owned Pakistani company, it is "executing the pipeline project along with Russia's energy giant Gazprom."[64] President Putin, in an online statement, said "As far as we can, we will contribute to this (Afghan Peace) process, including by developing economic cooperation with Afghanistan, by taking part in

[60] Khurram Abbas, "*Russian Revival*."
[61] Khurram Abbas, "*Russian Revival*."
[62] Uroosa Khan, "*Re-shift in Russian policy*." 4.
[63] Israr Khan, Pakistan Signs $10 billion Gas Pipeline Agreement with Russia," *The News,* (February 7, 2019). URL: https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/428722-pakistan-signs-10-bn-gas-pipeline-agreement-with-russia
[64] Ibid.

various international projects, such as, for example, the TAPI."[65]Russia has signed an agreement to construct a North-South Gas pipeline from Karachi to Lahore. Similarly, Moscow has showed its interest to construct the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline as well.

Russia is a key player in the changing regional as well as global politics. Since Moscow is resurging, it needs regional as well as global allies. It wants to enhance its international trade through exploring new trade routes and markets. Pakistan being one of the largest markets in the world, provides Russia with ample opportunity to do trade with Pakistan and to international markets, especially the Middle East and Africa through Pakistan. One good option for Russia is to do trade through Iran, but international politics of Iran limits Moscow's intentions there. Furthermore, Russia does not want to prefer any single country in the region, which will hurt its regional interest. Therefore, Moscow favors that Gwadar and Chahbahar should complement each other.

Despite having competition on the Eurasian routes, Russia supports BRI project as it will help Russia to broaden its integration with broader Eurasian markets. It also backs CPEC. Russian investment in Pakistan is increasing steadily. Russian telecom company, VimpleCom has purchases Mobilink and is interested in Bank Alfalah as well.[66]Furthermore, one of CPEC's auxiliary corridors is recently initiated Russian-Pakistan Economic Corridor. [67]Although, Russia alongwith India and Iran initiated North South International Corridor in 2002 to which many other states have joined, the project is still not fully operational. Besides other problems, conflicting interest of the signatory states and initiation of East-West Corridor, are the major hurdles for the implementation of North-South Corridor project. [68] Similarly, Indian tilt towards the US has also cooled down enthusiasm towards the project.

Nevertheless, recent months have seen positive development so far this project is concerned. Agreement to resolve the Caspian Sea territory last year, alongwith Moscow's desire to link North-South and East-West corridors with each other, have given high hopes for regional integration. Moscow supports Central Asian Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC)

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[65] Huseyn Hassanov, "Russia Ready to Take Part in TAPI Pipeline Project: Putin," *Trend News*, (December 12, 2018). URL: https://en.trend.az/casia/turkmenistan/2996682.html

[66] Saddam Hussain, "A Possibility of Russia Pakistan Economic Corridor." *CPEC Info*, http://www.cpecinfo.com/news/the-possibility-of-a-russia-pakistan-economic-corridor/NTIxMA==.

[67] Jan Achakzai, "*Pakistan Leverages CPEC to launch Two Auxiliary Corridors: SPEC and RPEC*," (January 11, 2019). URL: https://www.globalvillagespace.com/pakistan-leverages-cpec-to-launch-2-auxiliary-corridors-spec-rpec/

[68] Paul Goble, "Can the Kremlin Finally Realise the North-South Transit Corridor?" *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol. 16, issue. 26, (February 2019). URL: https://jamestown.org/program/can-the-kremlin-finally-realize-the-north-south-transit-corridor/

and Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA) projects. It knows that in order to connect itself with Pakistani markets, stability in Afghanistan is must. CPEC is crucial to Russian interests in the region as it will improve the infrastructure and will integrate Afghanistan into the broader region. CPEC will provide Russia with opportunity to expand its international trade through Gwadar and Karachi port.

Additionally, the current international and regional scenario's paves the way for China and Iran to also further strengthen their bilateral engagements; as China aims at advancing its bilateral engagements with Iran after signing of Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.[69] Iranian officials also travelled to China a week before the agreement between P5+1 was reached, to discuss energy sales to China and investment in the energy sector in Iran.[70] Reports have also suggested China's interests in assisting Iran's economic development via investing in oil and gas projects.[71] The talks about Iran joining the CPEC initiative and route development between Chabahar Port and Gwadar Port are also been discussed.[72] Which will eventually aid in further enhancement of regional cooperation and development.

Prospects for Future Cooperation between Pakistan and Russia

A widely discussed notion in international arena stresses upon the fact that there are no permanent friend and foes in state relations, only interests prevail. Which seems to clearly define the emerging relations between Pakistan and Russia. Considering the geographical proximities and the mutual interests within the region, a true diplomatic relations would always be preferred.[73]

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[69] John Garver, "*China and Iran: An Emerging Partnership Post-Sanctions*", Middle East Institute, (February 2016), http://www.mei.edu/content/china-and-iran-emerging-partnership-post-sanctions. (accessed on July 28, 2017)

[70] Lindsay Hughes, "The Energy and Strategy of China – Iran Relations", *Future Directions International*, (November 17, 2015), accessed on July 28, 2017, http://futuredirections.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/The_Energy_and_Strategy_of_China__Iran_Relations.pdf.

[71] Pavel K. Baev, "The China factor in Russian support for the Iran deal", *Brookings*, (July 21, 2015). https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2015/07/21/the-china-factor-in-russian-support-for-the-iran-deal/. (accessed on 28 July, 2017)

[72] Saleem Shahid, "Rail link planned between Gwadar and Iranian port", *Dawn*, (January 12, 2016). https://www.dawn.com/news/1232397. See also, "China to welcome Iran's inclusion in CPEC, says ambassador", *The News*, (October 17, 2016). https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/157858-China-to-welcome-Irans-inclusion-in-CPEC-says-ambassador.

[73] Sabah Aslam, "Pakistan-Russia joint military exercise."

The convergence of threat perceptions, strategic interests and shared approach towards regional and global developments hinges the emerging relations between Pakistan and Russia. India's ambitions to achieve regional hegemony with US assistance might jeopardize New Delhi's ties with Moscow, nevertheless, it would further open avenues for Pakistan and Russia to pursue stronger ties. To actively counter the contemporary issues, cooperation in fields of defense, economy and science and technology would be essential to develop trust between both actors.[74] Russia can act as a vital source of military and nuclear technology for Pakistan and aid in expansion security capabilities. The Afghan instability, terrorism, drug issues, nuclear safety and other issues call for close cooperation and ensure that a long term engagement amidst both States will prevail.[75] Russia has also suggested to provide Pakistan with counter-terrorism equipment in minimizing terrorism and radicalism. Both entities intend to initiate mechanisms for effective intelligence sharing and joint operations.[76] Positively, Anti-terror cooperation amid both states can also be strengthened at multilateral forums like the SCO, which China is also a member.[77]

Additionally, SCO forum will also provide opportunities for Pakistan and other member states to cooperate in a number of high-tech sectors, "such as biotechnology, aviation and space, climate change adaptation, disaster management, drug trafficking and disease mitigation."[78] With the growing Indo-US relations, Russia has developed a nagging skepticism about India's future role in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Consequently, Russia perceives Pakistan as a supportive hand in assuring regional peace.[79] Expanding bilateral cooperation on energy and infrastructure projects would be essential for both states economic and strategic interests. CPEC initiative provides with forums and prospects for "promotion of trade, investment and joint ventures in the fields of energy, infrastructure development", agriculture sectors, and metal industry.[80]After joining SCO as full members, Pakistan and India participated in the joint military drills under SCO along with rest of the member states, unprecedented throughout India-Pakistan history since 1947. Russian efforts play a key role in this regard. According to Prof Sun Zhuangzhi, "It is a rare opportunity for Pakistan and India, which have long

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[74] Vladimir Moskalenko and Petr Topychkanov, *"Russian and Pakistan opportunities*." 16.

[75] Vladimir Moskalenko and Petr Topychkanov, "*Russian and Pakistan opportunities*." 16.

[76] Khurram Abbas, "*Russian Revival."*

[77] Sarah Akram, "*Pakistan Russia Relations: Future Trends*", Institute of Strategic Studies, (March 24, 2016). http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Final-Issue-brief-Sarah-Akram-dated-24-3-2016.pdf (accessed on May 7,2017)

[78] Khurram Abbas, "*Russian Revival*."

[79]Muhammad Hanif, "Pakistan-Russia Relations: Progress, Prospects and Constraints", *IPRI Journal* XIII:2 (2013). 63-86.

[80] Muhammad Hanif," *Pakistan-Russia Prospects*." 76.

been involved in military conflict, to enhance military exchanges and trust. This could improve regional stability."[81]Role of Moscow during the recent military standoff between Pakistan and India has been remarkable. It pursued both the states not to resort to military means to resolve their tensions.

Russia is eager to maintain peace within the region, to enhance their economic hold. The renewed sanctions upon Russia, also forces it to have a pro-active engagement with Pakistan. The Ukraine crisis alone, resultantly, has been an influential factor in urging Russia to explore new defense and energy markets.[82] In the previous years, both states have pursued to have constructive dialogues regarding Russian-Pakistani civil nuclear cooperation. Such a deal will be similar to the one Pakistan exercises with China and aid Pakistan to meet its rising energy demands.[83] Promotion of people-to-people contacts; pursue student exchange programs, enhancing linkages and exchanges between media persons, academics, parliamentarians, maintain open channels of communication between both state officials to develop trust and understanding, collaboration between entertainment channels and entrepreneurs would essentially assist in enhancing the bilateral cooperation.[84] To meet their respective interests, a stronger bilateral relationship between Islamabad and Moscow deems to be fruitful. The path towards forging stronger ties and new avenues in the fields of economic, energy and defense cooperation are clearly visible. Thus, Pakistan should actively pursue its enhanced relations with Russia on a positive note, and not let these relations be influenced by its relations with other players of the international arena.[85]

Conclusion

Changing relationship between Russia and Pakistan have given high hopes for realignment into the regional politics. US-India Strategic Partnership brought Moscow and Islamabad closer to each other. This closeness has given rise to Russian investments in Pakistan. Initiation of CPEC has also been taken positively by Russia and is very much supportive to this project. Pakistan and Russia have enhanced their military cooperation as well. Both the states are on the right path of cooperation, mutual trust, and

[81] Ashraf Haidri, "The SCO Can Deescalate India Pakistan Tensions," *The Diplomat*, (March 1, 2019). URL: https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/the-sco-can-de-escalate-india-pakistan-tensions/
[82] Sarah Akram, "*Pakistan-Russia trends*." 2.
[83] Sarah Akram, "*Pakistan-Russia trends*." 6.
[84] Sarah Akram, "*Pakistan-Russia trends*." 5.
[85] Sarah Akram, "*Pakistan-Russia trends*." 6.

friendship. Their interests converge on majority of the issues. Pakistan needs energy and investment which Russia is providing gradually. On the other hand, Moscow needs Islamabad's support to its regional and global initiatives, to which later has also given a positive response. The very first time, both states have convergence of interest in Afghanistan.

In case of India, enhanced relations between Pakistan and Russia might assist in reaching settlements with India. Though it seems to be a far-fetched idea. On the other hand, greater chances of a trilateral relationship between Pakistan-Russia-China seems to be emerging. It appears that under the current scenario, their respective interests have coincided with one another especially. With all three actors working towards maintaining regional stability and diminishing US influences in the region. Resultantly, it is evident that under political and economic dynamics of South and Central Asia, old buddies are parting their ways and new economic and strategic alliances are emerging. This regional paradigm shift has brought Islamabad and Moscow closer and this relation will continue to blossom at least for the near future.

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http://foreignpolicynews.org/2016/09/26/pakistan-russia-joint-military-exercise-new-doors-opportunities/.

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INTERDEPENDENCY: A CASE OF SINO-AFGHAN RELATIONS (2002-2016)

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Abstract

In recent past, Sino-Afghan relations have taken a new phase of collaboration and inter-dependency to work jointly to advance their common geo-strategic and geo-economic goals. Being an international power on the global chessboard, China does have a great role in the regional geopolitical setting to ensure peace and tranquility in the region on the one hand and prioritize its own interests on the other. Afghanistan, being an epicenter of the region, draws a special attention of neighboring countries especially China to address threat perception emanating from cross-border terrorism, drug trafficking and promoting insurgency in its region of Xinjiang. This paper attempts to analyze the scope of bilateral collaboration between China and Afghanistan. The paper also intends to ascertain whether Afghan leadership will be wise enough to use Chinese assistance as a trap card to utilize their geographic setting in such a manner in which both Chinese and Afghans can benefit and also to ensure their cooperation for longer period of time for peaceful and prosperous Afghanistan.

Keywords: *China, Afghanistan, Peace and Stability, Terrorism, security, economic development, Regional Cooperation, Political Reconciliation, Investments.*

Foreign relations of a state depicts the framework and a collection of actions, policies, aims, and means to get national interests. It is the combination of various determinants while describing the foreign policy one should keep in mind the three vital and palpable components that play a leading role in its formulation and behavior of state towards others. These three major components are described by different authors in a variety of

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ways. *Firstly*, the actions and behavior of individual state, *secondly,* the internal or domestic or national governing elements of state and *thirdly*, external environment or changing trends in the international arena that produce effects on state's actions like the international law, international organization. [1] While some other authors have squeezed this explanation, and illustrated these components into two main categories: *permanent influencing factors* such as geographical location, size and population, political organization, culture and history and the varying *temporary factors* such as developmental goals, system of government, national security and global politics. [2] Therefore, China's vested interests and vision towards Afghanistan and vice versa are evaluated in this article as one of the effective factors. The aim of the paper is to analyze and evaluate virtual capacities and potentials in Sino-Afghan relations by reviewing Chinese foreign policy in general at first and then shift the focus Chines approach towards Afghanistan and explores different aspects of bilateral relations between them.

Geography plays an important role on the chessboard of global politics. This idea has already been observed as playing its role in case of China that is traditionally viewed as a continental power because of its extended geography. China is one of the powerful members of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) these emerging economies have brought a complete shift in the paradigm of global politics. Their power and strength lie not only in their economic growth but also in their population and land-as 40% of world population live in the BRIC's territories. The Chinese approach is based on utilizing manpower in their policies that are based on the future of the state. [3]

The huge economic ideas such as 'Silk Road' and 'One Belt One Road' (OBOR) show that China's prime ambition is to become a rising economic power in the world. These megaprojects are based on a two-fold strategy: One is internal reforms to regain the economic momentum and the other is to enhance its international position while satisfying its national security needs. [4] In order to achieve these objectives, China pursued an independent foreign policy. According to the constitution of China, the basic principle of Chinese foreign policy is to safeguard its sovereignty, create a favorable international

[1] Marijke Breuning, *Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Introduction*, 1st ed. (Palgrave Macmillan US, 2007), https://www.palgrave.com/gp/book/9780312296193.
[2] Marc Lanteigne, *Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction* (Routledge, 2015).
[3] Nubia Nieto, "The Influence of Emerging Economies in International Affairs," *Estudos Avançados* 26, no. 75 (August 2012): 173–183.
[4] Minghao Zhao, "' March Westwards ' and a New Look on China ' s Grand Strategy," no. November (2013): 1–13, http://d3qi0qp55mx5f5.cloudfront.net/cpost/i/docs/Zhao__Minghao_Workshop_Paper.pdf.

environment for its economic reforms and modernization efforts, as well as to maintain world peace. [5]After 9/11, China has exposed the world to a new approach to reaching out to the world peacefully through its foreign policy. [6] China is striving hard to become an economic power in the region as it deems it necessary for it to balance the pace of its expansion and increasing working age population. This vision has given China a lead against the U.S. in 2014 as the largest economy in purchasing power parity (PPP^2) term. Moreover, it is fairly expected and assumed by an some of the economists that China will also take lead against the U.S. in market exchange term by the year 2028. [7]

Afghanistan is one of the potential and feasible country where Chinese economic ambitions can be, partially, satiated. Situated in the Southwest of China, it is a landlocked country. Both states have a common border of 96 km in the northeastern mountain area. From a historical viewpoint, both states had been connected through old Silk Road which linked Rome to China through Afghanistan around 2000 years ago. In addition, both these states had remained connected with each other through the bond of religion as Chinese Buddhist would visit Afghanistan during 4^{th} and 5^{th} centuries AD. Furthermore, in the past, along with the development of social relations, China and Afghanistan maintained friendly relations with each other on state-level. Kabul and Beijing had established their diplomatic ties in 1922. [8]Both Afghanistan and China had recognized each other as independent states during 1950 and 1955 respectively. [9] During the subsequent years, the Sino-Afghan relations went through several phases with the arrival of successive governments and introduction of rational policies. The traditional passive approach of Chines foreign policy towards Afghanistan has been

[5] Lanteigne, *Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction*.
[6] Li Shijia, "Harmonious World: China's Ancient Philosophy," *Chinese Embassy*, last modified 2014, accessed September 1, 2017, http://sk.china-embassy.org/slo/zt/58v/t363935.htm.
[7] PWC, "The World in 2050: Will the Shift in Global Economic Power Continue?" (PWC, February 2015).
[8] Ghulam Mohammad Sokhanyar, *50th Anniversary of Establishment of Diplomatic Relation between Afghanistan and China* (Kabul: Strategic Studies Center of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan, 2005).
[9] Jonathan Z. Ludwig, "Sino-Afghan Relations in the Twenty-First Century: From Uncertainty to Engagement?," *Grifth Asia Quarterly* 3 (2015): 1–25, https://research-repository.griffith.edu.au/bitstream/handle/10072/340314/628-2056-1-PB.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

turned into an active approach since 2001. [10] The relations between both the states are based on common interest. The campaign for peace and work for prosperity are the two most dominant aspects of this partnership. The mines, trade, and transit are the major areas need private investments in Afghanistan. [11]

China-Afghanistan Foreign Policies towards Each Other

The Chinese modern diplomacy has evolved through different phases during the last three decades. Initially, Afghanistan had not gained central importance in the foreign policy of China but now with the changing political dynamics in the region, it had attained the special attention of China. [12] The geostrategic position of Afghanistan is quite important for China as it can be the part of the OBOR project in near future. It is mentioned in the IMF report (2015) that China has decided to invest $100 million in Afghanistan out of $890 billion- grand OBOR project which is further comprised of over 900 projects- as it is an inevitable part of China's neighborhood diplomacy.[13]

Another important feature of Chinese foreign policy is its historical mindset and philosophy that have been followed by the principles of peaceful coexistence. According to International law, it comes under the right of any country to follow or opt any social system. For economic progress in the current era, it is necessary for all states to cooperate with each other to attain their mutual goals. [14] While keeping in mind the needs of contemporary era justify China-Afghanistan relations. For a long period of time, Chinese policymakers and diplomacy formulate their policies for Afghanistan based on the consistent pattern of cautiousness and vigilance. But this style of policymaking is constantly changing with the changing

[10] Dirk van der Kley, "China's Foreign Policy in Afghanistan," *Lowy Institute. org* (2014): 1–24, http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/chinas-foreign-policy-in-afghanistan_0.pdf.

[11] Alec E Metz, "The Mine at Aynak, The Culture and Conflict Review," *The Washington Quarterly* 2 (2007): 1–2.

[12] Zhao Huasheng, "Afghanistan and China's New Neighborhood Diplomacy," *Chatham House*, last modified 2016, accessed November 12, 2016, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/ia/afghanistan-and-china-s-new-neighbourhood-diplomacy.

[13] Zabihullah Mudabber, "Where Does Afghanistan Fit in China's Belt and Road?," *Cssforum*, last modified 2016, accessed January 6, 2017, http://www.cssforum.com.pk/general/news-articles/foreign-newspapers/109173-where-does-afghanistan-fit-china-s-belt-road.html.

[14] Anil Kumar, "New Security Concept of China: An Analysis," *IPCS Series on Inside China*, no. 1–12 (2012), http://www.ipcs.org/article/southeast-asia/malaysia-mou-with-bangladesh-on-manpower-export-3801.html.

priorities of policymakers for Afghanistan along with the emerging trends in international politics. Therefore, its approaches towards Afghanistan are also modified by four factors such as safeguarding security and stability, developing the economy, improving governance by the model of government suited for Afghanistan while enhancing international cooperation.

Therefore, the core of Chinese policy towards Afghanistan is based on the principles of Afghan-led and Afghan-owned initiatives and processes for upholding the independence of the country, its territorial integrity, and accepting the path adopted by the people of the country for their progress. Beijing has always supported peaceful solution for resolving conflicts and maintaining peace in the region. This is the reason it has employed strict policies for combating terrorism in Xinjiang province. In addition, it has also been a great supporter of non-military solution and establishment of a lasting peace in Afghanistan. Thus, in a nutshell, the two core interests determine China's foreign policy in Afghanistan, security, and economy. [15]

Some expert is of the opinion that four priorities are in forefront of the Afghanistan foreign policy, political reconciliation, war against terrorism and narcotics, good governance and economic development. Afghanistan is facing internal and external pressures and struggling on different fronts simultaneously. On the one hand, the country is faced with challenges such as activities of anti-state actors, militancy and weak law and order situation after 2014 and surge in militants' attack during 2017. However, Kabul policies and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) had tried a lot to take control of the deteriorating situation. While on the other, the international community is forcing it to take responsibility for its national security through its own budget instead of depending on the international aid. It is quite hard for the war-torn country to take control on social problems like human and drug trafficking, ensure national security and economic developments in the country in the absence of international financial assistance and private revenues. In this miserable condition, regional economic integration favors Afghanistan for attracting foreign investment and assets for getting benefits of its vast resources and mineral deposits and transport infrastructures.

On its part, the Afghan leaders have not only given clues but identified China on different international forums for its support for the country and its

[15] Huasheng, "Afghanistan and China's New Neighborhood Diplomacy."

impoverished people. President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani in his remarks at the SCO summit (2015) in UFA said, "We try to create a local push to resolve Afghanistan's problems". [16]

In order to develop a long-term partnership, China and Afghanistan need each other support and assistance to address their needs and to gain their objectives. The only factor that acts as a hindrance to the development of Afghanistan, meanwhile, barring Chinese from investing adequately is the weak security conditions with the presence of NATO forces in the country. Suspicions prevail among the Chinese policymakers about the presence of NATO troops. While Afghanistan expects China to come up with an independent policy based on a clear vision of the country. However, the increasing economic and security interest in China by the Afghan leadership is an indicator of a great rebalancing act of Kabul to China. [17]

Challenges and Avenues for Joint Ventures

Different regional issues and competition in economic front, religious and political dynamics have visibly fluctuated the Sino-Afghan mutual relations in the past. The altering peace and security landscape of Afghanistan after 2014 has impressed upon the Chinese policymakers to think over their policies towards Afghanistan. A significant development in the economic, security and diplomatic sector was observed after the visit of Afghan President Ashraf Ghani to China in Oct 2014 [18].

Each state has vested interests towards other states. No country happens to be interested in utilizing its own resources for the development of another state purely based on humanitarian grounds. There exists scarcity of resources in the world, therefore, no state can progress in isolation. It is necessary for all states to cooperate with each other and share their resources to gain their goals because it's a two-way process. This is what is termed as and win-win situation among states. The same phenomenon is unfolding in the case of China and Afghanistan. China is a resources hungry country and Afghanistan is a resource-rich country, China needs the Afghan resources while Afghanistan needs Chines investment and skills to embark upon the path of development. To gain these tough and formidable goals, China has adopted a proactive approach towards Afghanistan's development. However, development of Afghanistan is a mammoth task as it will ultimately pave

[16] Mudabber, "Where Does Afghanistan Fit in China's Belt and Road?"
[17] Tamim Asey, "China: Afghanistan's New Hope," *Foreign Policy* (Dalian, April 8, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/08/china-afghanistans-new-hope/.
[18] Ahmad Bilal Khalil, "The Rise of China-Afghanistan Security Relations | The Diplomat."

way for peace in the restive Xinjiang province. Thus, by bringing stability in Afghanistan the region of Xinjiang might be secured as well. With peaceful Xinjiang, China will be more strengthened on economic front which will help it in emerging as a biggest economic power in Asia. [19] On the other hand, war-torn Afghanistan will also get advantages from its resources, technological advancements, and infrastructure development by developing good relations with China.

Having an abundance of raw material and resources, Afghanistan still needs to embark upon the path of development in almost all sectors. Having advanced heavy machinery and equipment and engaging its technological advancement in transforming the raw material into refining products and energy production services, China is one of the biggest consumers. Therefore, both these states can offer opportunities to each other. Moreover, China can access a land bridge network, while investing in the infrastructure development of Afghanistan.

Influential key factors that goad the Chinese policymakers attention are the security, the attitude of Chinese enterprises, and Chinese investment in significant undeveloped mineral deposits which had "great capacity for the uplifting the graph of country's development in terms of providing capital, technology, and employment opportunities". [20] States can change their friends and enemies, nature of relations and behavior towards other states but they can't change their neighbors. The secret lies behind the progress of the state is that one should keep good and healthy relations with its neighbors. This is the reason that nature of relationships with neighbors determines the stability inside and outside of the state. Afghanistan is an inseparable part of China's neighborhood diplomacy. Therefore, China needs to be more concerned about its Sino-Afghan adjoining border areas in order to maintain a safe environment, ameliorating its strategic position and expanding its international influence on the regional and international level.

The positive impacts of Chinese investment in the development sector of Afghanistan will give an opportunity to establish and bring stability in economic and political sectors of Afghanistan. Its economy is heavily depended on foreign aid. The Chinese investment in the country will not only support the frail economy of the country, it will also minimize the spread of militancy in the western region of China. [21] Bringing peace and

[19] Huasheng, "Afghanistan and China's New Neighborhood Diplomacy."
[20] Kley, "China's Foreign Policy in Afghanistan."
[21] Lemar Alexander Farhad, "Promises and Pitfalls: Sino-Afghan Relations," *Small Wars Journal* (2018), http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/promises-and-pitfalls-sino-afghan-relations.

security inside Afghanistan is one of the major objectives of Chinese foreign policy towards Afghanistan. Having said that, one fact should always be remembered by both the countries that their bilateral relations are always influenced by external factors and presence of other powers in Afghanistan. For instance, the U.S. presence in Afghanistan is a case in focus which has changed the Chinese approach towards Afghanistan.

China is taking a keen interest in Afghanistan to counter the US. China-Afghanistan propinquity appeared for the first time in 2012 when both states signed a strategic declaration. [22] From 2001 to 2013, almost 13 years China offered US$ 240 million to Afghanistan government for development purpose. It has initiated the new phases of connectivity with Afghanistan in different professions. China is providing technical training to 3,000 Afghan professionals. Moreover, it has offered 500 scholarships in the span of five years from 2015 to 2019. [23] In addition, it reassured its economic assistance to Afghanistan during Ghani's visit to China in the year 2014. It has also announced enormous aids for Afghanistan in 2014 which is 81.4 million USD and 244 million during 2015-2017. [24]China has not only assisted Afghanistan during its economic decline but it has also assisted the country when natural calamity struck. It provided 10 million Yuan in an earthquake in 2015 and Chinese Red Cross Society provided US$100,000 grants in emergency aid to Afghanistan's Red Crescent. [25]

The stability and prosperity of Afghanistan lie in the path from an aid-dependent to the export-oriented economy. [26] It owns a precious wealth of mineral resources. More than 1400 types of minerals are registered have been on record to have been found in Afghanistan. According to the findings of Geodetic Survey report of 2007, the value of minerals evaluated $1 trillion which has been revised by Afghanistan's MoM to $3 trillion of minerals and hydrocarbons. [27] Chines investments in the mining sector in addition to other benefits will bring a huge amount in shape of revenues. Such as, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) agreed to pay royalties generously through the construction of a refinery which are 15% on

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[22] Raja Muhammad Khan, "The Regional Scenario: Soundings From SCO," *FWU Journal of Social Sciences* (2015): 74–87.
[23] Huasheng, "Afghanistan and China's New Neighborhood Diplomacy."
[24] Dr. Hussain Yasa, "60 Years of Sino-Afghan Relations," *Daily Outlook Afghanistan*, January 26, 2015, http://outlookafghanistan.net/editorialdetail.php?post_id=11561.
[25] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the China, "Promote China-Afghanistan Cooperation and Bring New Life to the Silk Road," *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC*, last modified 2015, accessed November 13, 2016, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1312149.shtml.
[26] Asey, "China: Afghanistan's New Hope."
[27] Brian C. James, *China's Interests in Afghanistan: Current Projects and Future Prospects* (California: Naval Postgraduate School, 2013), https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/38955.

oil, 20% on revenue tax, and 50% or more on tax profits, able to approximately generate annual tax revenues of more than US$300 million.

China support through the SCO is of immense importance for Afghanistan. The SCO in different summits supported "Afghanistan's effort in building an independent, neutral, peaceful, prosperous country free of terrorism and drug-related crimes. [28]Close coordination with SCO member is a fundamental need for the national security of China. To ensure its security, China has developed close ties with SCO members as it has faced major ethnic challenges from Xinjiang having borders with Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. [29] Xinjiang has strategic and economic importance for China as it is the hub of trade and the land of deposits of hydrocarbon and subsoil mineral deposits that are "estimated 34% of China's gas reserves, 40% of coal reserves and 30% of oil reserves. Its geostrategic position is quite critical for China as it provides the favorable location for the import of a large amount of gas and oil through pipelines passing from Central Asia to China's east coast markets. Although, apart from the positive side of Xinjiang the separatist rebellious group generates its revenue by means of drug trafficking.

From 2002 to 2010 the biggest foreign investment contract in Afghanistan's history of $3.4 billion have been won by Chinese companies. Afghanistan also presents an opportunity for China to reshape its posture as a responsible global player while securing its hegemony in the region. Moreover, China imports 5.5 million barrels of crude oil a day and 69% of the imported oil comes from Africa and the Middle East while the majority of this oil is imported through tankers. China is the third largest gas consumer in the world and its natural gas consumption in 2013 was approximately 160 billion cubic meters. 80% of China's imported oil passes through the Strait of Malacca.". [30]

In terms of the bilateral trade, according to statistics in 2014, Afghanistan exported $770 million and imported $6. 42 billion, resulting in the negative trade balance of $5.65 billion. Meanwhile, among the top trading partners of Afghanistan, China is in the third position with $709 million. The mutual trade between China and Afghanistan in 2001 was less than $20 million. However, in 2015, it increased to $1100 million.

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[28] Raj Kumar Sharma, "SCO's Role in Afghanistan: Prospects and Challenges," *Mainstream Weekly* (New Dehli, June 6, 2015), http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article5721.html.

[29] Weitz Richard, "China and Afghanistan after the NATO Withdrawal," *The Jamestown Foundation* (2015): 11, https://jamestown.org/product/china-and-afghanistan-after-the-nato-withdrawal/.

[30] James, *China's Interests in Afghanistan: Current Projects and Future Prospects*.

[31] Economic development is the more favored area for both side's joint venture. Active transportation is an important factor for the Afghan government to run the state machinery effectively, which is the primary mean towards the development of its infrastructure. To achieve this purpose, the Chinese projects in the field of transportation have played an active and supportive role. Afghanistan sits at heart of Silk Road where China has invested $100 million in the Silk Road project in Afghanistan. China believes that peace and security can only be achieved through economic development. The infrastructure development is expected to foster trade. The results show that reduction in the cost of transportation can help increase the international trade. Thus 10% reduction in the costs of railway, air and maritime would increase trade by 2%, 5.5%, and 1.1% respectively. [32] As per the previous analysis, China has attempted in many ways to bring economic stability in its landlocked and war-torn neighboring country. Moreover, it has also provided numerous opportunities to Afghanistan to emerge as an important partner in regional energy market. [33]

Beijing has been engaged in Afghanistan on diplomatic and economic front. However, at present, it is gradually increasing its sphere of security and defense affairs as well. During 2014, both states have signed four MoUs in security and defense sector. In the year 2016 Chinese military officials had visited Kabul for the first time in the history of Sino-Afghan military relations and the Central Military Commission (CMC) and allocated $73 million for Afghan Security forces. [34]

China is also working on shaping a new strategy for bringing stability and peace inside Afghanistan. It is developing links with the U.S. in Afghanistan as both, China and the U.S., have a common goal i.e. to bring stability to the war-torn country. [35] The U.S. and China both have decided to opt for cooperation with each other in Afghanistan. [36]China has always held positive views about peace in Afghanistan because it does not support any sector local group ideology. Recently, Beijing has shunned its passive

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[31] OEC, "Afghanistan," *OEC*, last modified 2015, accessed November 12, 2016, http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/afg/.

[32] Ana Blazheska, "Understanding the Narrative behind OBOR Connectivity," *China-CEE Institute*, no. 11 (2017), https://china-cee.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Work_paper-201711.pdf.

[33] Karin Chau, "CfP 'Regional Integration and Disintegration' Contribution: China in Afghanistan," *Mapping China* (2016), https://mappingchina.org/2016/12/13/cfp-regional-integration-and-disintegration-contribution-china-in-afghanistan/.

[34] Khalil, "The Rise of China-Afghanistan Security Relations | The Diplomat."

[35] James, *China's Interests in Afghanistan: Current Projects and Future Prospects*.

[36] Chen Weihua, "US, China Team up in Afghanistan," *China Daily* (Washington, October 30, 2014), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2014-10/30/content_18828693.htm.

policies and got actively involved in Afghanistan.[37] According to different thinkers and analysts, China can adopt various approaches for bringing peace in Afghanistan. Some are of the view that it should opt for traditional non-interfering approach while others favor the active involvement of China in its neighborhood.

Conclusion

Individuals or states help others only for their interests. The trans-border cooperation is one of the top features of a globalized society. Meanwhile, China and Afghanistan have common interests that have joined them. Afghanistan and China both have similar foreign policies towards other states. But Afghanistan is war-torn country and its people aspire for viable peacebuilding processes and economic prosperity on a much greater pace; while, the ground realities in the country do not allow for peace efforts on the desired pace. However, Chinese proactive approach towards Afghanistan and its keen interest in the resolution of all conflicts in the country might become a blessing for Afghanistan. The Afghan government should extend full cooperation to the Chinese government and private investor to gain maximum benefit out of its strategic location. Both countries have enormous opportunities at hand that leading them to a more robust and close cooperation for the achievement of their aims.

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[37] Weitz Richatd, "Assessing China's Afghan Peace Play," *The Jamestown Foundation*, last modified 2014, accessed June 3, 2016, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=43158&cHash=cdf9d3723aea6491802a49aad8f898be.

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AFGHANISTAN IMBROGLIO: IMPACT ON THE CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

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Abstract

This paper attempts to find the dynamism in Afghanistan's relations with Central Asian states. It is explained that prosperity without security is not possible and ongoing imbroglio in Afghanistan is directly affecting Central Asian states. The Central Asian states are surrounded by China, Russia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran. These states (with significant influence of India and Turkey) are the key regional players and their socio-economic and political interests are converged on various issues. The political conditions in Afghanistan would directly impact the interests of Central Asian states. Drug trafficking, illegal migration, religious extremism, a ramified corrupt network, porous border and terrorism are subverting peace in Afghanistan and its spillover effects are dangerous for Central Asian states. The military and security situation in Afghanistan has a direct impact on the production and transport of energy from Central Asia to the rest of the world. The response of the regional organizations, particularly the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), with certain commonalities, towards these issues often contrasts with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This paper focuses on the efforts of major powers (Russia, China, and the US) along with neighbouring countries in the peacebuilding in Afghanistan to avoid its spillover effects over Central Asian states.

Keywords: Afghanistan, Central Asia, Peace, Security, SCO, the US, China.

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Introduction

Afghanistan is an important regional state, surrounded by Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, and Iran. Afghanistan has remained a focus of the great powers during the old 'great game' and it still has strategic importance. Any kind of political developments inside Afghanistan has a direct impact on Central Asia countries. Afghanistan affects the Central Asian countries in many ways. First, the absolute geographic value of the Central Asian states, due to their neighbourhood to nuclear powers, carries a potential of friction between the great powers and even amongst the regional countries. The presence of the United States (US) in Afghanistan is considered, by many scholars, as the part of 'new great game'. If the US extends its presence in Afghanistan (which would be indirect, more likely, as seen in the light of the new South Asia Policy of the Trump administration), the international and regional powers would feel threatened. The possible stay of the US in Afghanistan will verify that the US purposefully intervened and stayed in Afghanistan to become advantageous in the new 'great game'. The second important aspect is the wide range of socio-political issues in Afghanistan and the occurrence of political turmoil, in form of civil war and revolutions, in Central Asian states shows magnetic force between the two regions. The infiltration of extremist elements into Central Asia from Afghanistan, drug trafficking, illegal migration and the possible risk of the replication of Taliban like experiment in Central Asia, are some serious concerns of Central Asian leaders. The third facet is the means of engagement used by great powers in Afghanistan are directly involved in Central Asian states. Stakeholders of state-building in Afghanistan are using Central Asian states as an instrument of their influence. Moreover, the role regional and international organization, including the SCO, CSTO and NATO in Afghanistan is based both on cooperation and conflict.[1]

Central Asia states, being part of the SCO, have an important role in the state building processes in Afghanistan. SCO has a key role in integrating the economic interests of the various countries in the region, particularly member states. Thus, the Central Asian states are also linked with the political developments in Afghanistan, which reflects their concerns towards the internal peace and stability in Afghanistan. The fourth aspect is the security impact of Afghanistan imbroglio over the energy and other trade transport of the Central Asian states with the South Asian countries. For example, some rail transport projects connecting Afghanistan with the Central Asian states are seriously compromised due to the security uncertainty in Afghanistan. Moreover, the TAPI gas pipeline project,

[1]Irina Ionela Pop, "Russia, EU, NATO, and the Strengthening of the CSTO in Central Asia." *Caucasian Review of International Affairs* 3, No. 3 (2009): 278.

originating from Turkmenistan, is at the mercy of security in Afghanistan. The 6+3 proposals by the President of Uzbekistan, back in 2008,[2] revealed the interests and stakes of the Central Asian states in Afghanistan. According to this proposal, the problems of one's own country should be solved by the Afghans themselves with the assistance of all interested parties, which appears suitable even today.

In this backdrop, the study is set to answer the question of how can Central Asian states avoid the spillover effects of the socio-economic instability in Afghanistan? Moreover, how do the security situation of Afghanistan effects the political developments in the Central Asian states? This study will make an important contribution to the issue of peace and stability in Afghanistan as a factor in Central Asian politics. Different perspectives are being examined and possible way outs are suggested to avoid negative effects of instability.

Historical Lens

Afghanistan had been an important neighbour of the Soviet Union, both shared long border which made it a key factor in the security of the Soviet Union during Cold war era and Moscow itself had held an important place in the foreign policy of Afghanistan.[3] After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Central Asian states, viz Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, have emerged as new neighbours of Afghanistan. The porous border of Afghanistan is an important factor adding the prominence of Central Asian states where Tajikistan has almost 1344 KM long border, Turkmenistan 744 KM (approx.) and Uzbekistan shares almost 140 KM long border with Afghanistan.[4] Keeping in view the geographical proximity of Central Asian states with Afghanistan, it appears that Afghanistan was historically linked to the political developments in the Central Asian countries.[5] During the 'old great game', both the British Empire and the Soviet Union tried to influence Afghanistan to safeguard their interests. For that, Afghanistan had to pay a huge price in the form of three Anglo-Afghan wars. Later, Afghanistan was sandwiched between the two superpowers and thus remained a conflict zone for decades.

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[2] 'Six Plus Three Group' on Afghanistan is a coalition of the six states bordering with Afghanistan (China, Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan), plus the United States NATO and Russia.

[3] Shirin Tahir Kheli, "The Soviet Union in Afghanistan: Benefits and Costs", *Strategic Issues Research Memorandum*, (June 12, 1980), 1.

[4] Saima Ashraf Kayani, "Afghanistan and Central Asian States (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan): Post 2014." *FWU Journal of Social Sciences* 1, No. 2 (2015): 44.

[5] Afghanistan remained an important ground for the *Old Great Game* rivalry between the great powers.

At the time of independence of the Central Asian states, the government in Afghanistan (under the president of Najibullah Ahmadzai) started to crumble as it was also backed by the Soviet Union.[6] The Najibullah government could not sustain itself for more than one year after the formation of newly independent states of Central Asia and it became a hurdle in the good bilateral relationships. With the fall of the Najibullah government in Afghanistan, a civil war erupted between Burhanuddin Rabbani and various factions of Mujahideen. Burhan Uddin Rabban, the president of Afghanistan from 1992 till 1996, however, had mere control over parts of the Kabul[7] and major territories in Afghanistan were under the control of Mujahideen. During the civil war, the three neighbouring states including Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have approached the political situation in Afghanistan differently.

The Afghan-Uzbek military commander Abdul Rashid Dostum was supported by the government of Uzbekistan in the Civil war of Afghanistan. The role of Uzbekistan in this war was not welcomed by the central government of Afghanistan and the bilateral relationships remained cold; whereas, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan avoided playing any role in the civil war due to their internal weaknesses. After two years long civil war, the Central Asian states revisited their approach towards Afghanistan.[8] Following the footprints of the international community, the five Central Asian states did not recognize the government of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Pakistan, were the only states gave recognition to the Taliban government. On the other hand, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan were supporting the anti-Taliban movements in Afghanistan.[9] Uzbekistan continued supporting Abdul Rashid Dostum due to the ethnic linkages, and his speeches, which he delivered publically against the Taliban. Tajikistan was also supporting the Rabbani led Northern Alliance (NA) to take back territorial control from the Taliban.

The NA was created after the Taliban's control of the capital of Afghanistan. The organization consisted of all major anti-Taliban groups, including Rabbani, Dostom, Ahmed Shah Masood, Marshall Qasim Faheem, Abdullah Abdullah and the breakaway factions of Mujahideen.[10] The NA was able to retain Panjshir, Takhar provinces and parts of Badakhshan with the support of Tajikistan as these territories were located near the border of

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[6] Anthony Arnold, "Afghanistan." *In The New Insurgencies*: *Anticommunist Guerrillas in the Third World* (New York: Routledge, 2017): 248.
[7] Ibid, 241.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia* (New York: IB Tauris, 2000): 67.
[10] Conetta, Carl. "Strange Victory: A Critical Appraisal of Operation Enduring Freedom and Afghanistan War." *Afghan Digital Libraries* (2002): 6.

Tajikistan. Although the NA was failed to recapture Kabul from Afghanistan, they sustained their bases along the border of Tajikistan due to the support of the Government of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.[11] One hospital was also built in Tajikistan with the assistance of India to extend medical treatment to the wounded of NA. With India, Iran was also supporting NA indirectly, through Tajikistan. This shows that Tajikistan not only supported the Northern Alliance itself but provided logistics' support to other countries who were interested in helping the Northern Alliance against the Taliban rule in Afghanistan.[12]

Turkmenistan's relations with Afghanistan, during the period of the Taliban's rule, were more commercial than political. However, Ashgabat was trying to develop political relationships with the Taliban to safeguard their energy exports into the South Asian markets. It was during the reign of the Taliban government when the foreign minister of Turkmenistan Boris Shikhmuradov with his Afghan counterpart, Mawlawi Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil principally agreed to launch TAPI projects in 1997.[13] Turkmenistan avoided to make any controversial statement about the government of the Taliban and remained neutral in the fight between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance. Turkmenistan maintained its neutrality and offered mediation between Taliban and NA. The foreign minister of Turkmenistan, Shikhmuradov visited Afghanistan in 1999 to meet the Taliban leader Mullah Omar. Shikhmuradov tried to convince Mullah Omar to hold talks with the NA. Complying with the proposal by Turkmenistan, Taliban government met with the NA representatives in December 2000.[14] The United Nations (UN) was also given observatory status during the talks; however, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan were accused of a negative role during the talks between the Taliban's and NA. Consequently, the talks ended with no results. After talks with Mullah Omar, the government of Turkmenistan released 450 out of nearly 5000 Afghan prisoners as a goodwill gesture.[15]Taliban helped, cooperated and patronized terrorist activities in Central Asian states.[16] It was not only Tajikistan and Uzbekistan who played a role inside Afghanistan during the Taliban government but Taliban

[11] Ibid., 5.
[12] William Dalrymple, *A Deadly Triangle: Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India* (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2013): 11-21
[13] Luca Anceschi, "Turkmenistan and the Virtual Politics of Eurasian energy: the Case of the TAPI Pipeline Project." *Central Asian Survey* 36, No. 4 (2017): 409-429.
[14] Farkhod Tolipov, "Toward Conflict Resolution in Afghanistan: The Perspective of the Bordering Central Asian Republics." *In the Regional Dimensions to Security* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013): 300-400.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Jatin Kumar Mohanty, *Terrorism and Militancy in Central Asia* (Delhi: Kalpaz Publications, 2006), 118.

themselves hosted Central Asian militants and provided the training.[17] The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) was used by the Taliban to overthrow the secular government in Uzbekistan. Taliban wanted to ignite the sentiments for the Islamic revolution in Uzbekistan, to install a Sharia-based political system. Taliban also supported the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) in an effort to replace the government.[18]

Initially, the Taliban were not interested in the making of militants in Central Asia, particularly in Uzbekistan. Further, no empirical evidence has found the support of the Taliban in the establishment of the IMU.[19] However, the end of the civil war in Tajikistan 1997 resulted in the relocation of some key members of the IMU, mostly took refuge in the safe havens inside Afghanistan. This was the point when the influence of the Afghan Taliban was increasing over the terrorist groups in Central Asia.[20] One of the key leaders of the IMU, Namangani, was given refuge by the Taliban government, who was the key leader of Tajikistan's civil war. After taking refuge in Afghanistan, Namangani also started establishing bases in key areas of Afghanistan adjacent to the border of Central Asia, with a purpose to organize and execute their activities. The Taliban government had publicly announced their support to the extremist groups of Central Asia, reasoning that, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan supported NA against the Taliban government.

Apart from the role of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in Afghanistan, the Taliban's were accepting people with common ideology from all around the world. Jihadists from the Middle East, Pakistan, India, and even Western countries were welcomed in the Taliban government. The support of the IMU by Afghan Taliban inspired the small-scattered religious groups to join IMU and execute their goals in an organized manner. Towards the end of 1999, the overall manpower strength of the IMU reached around 4000 in number.[21] IMU leader, Namangani had relations with the Taliban high profile leadership, who coordinated all activities with them facilitating illegal trade with the Taliban to Central Asia.[22] This was an explicit show of IMU-Taliban alliance and this stopped both sides' governments to build a good relationship.

Notwithstanding, the logistic support of the Taliban, IMU could not succeed in its objective to prompt people to bring Islamic revolution in Central

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[17] Farkhod Tolipov, "Toward Conflict Resolution in Afghanistan….
[18] Ibid., 400.
[19] Sadibekov, Ulan. "Understanding the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan through social movement theory, and Analyzing and Evaluating its Potential Threat to Kazakhstan*"*. *Naval Postgraduate School Monterey CA Defense Analysis Department* (2014).
[20] Kumar, Jatin and Mohanty, J.K., *Terrorism and Militancy in Central Asia….,* 118.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid.

Asia.[23] Overall, the relationship between Afghanistan and the Central Asian states had been disrupted for almost ten years, however, in 2001, the US toppled the Taliban government and a new epoch of strategic relations started. The post 9/11 era witnessed stable relationships between Afghanistan and the neighbouring Central Asian states but socio-economic and political instability in Afghanistan still hunts the political environment in Central Asia.[24]

Factoring Afghanistan into Central Asia's Policy

Afghanistan appeared as an important actor once again in the new 'great game', its geostrategic importance is largely due to its location at the crossroads of migration and trade routes connecting the West and East of the region. This strategic importance of Afghanistan, allows it to play an important role in regional politics of Central Asia. It is quite natural that any kind of political development in Afghanistan will directly impact the politics of the Central Asian countries.

Afghanistan is going through multifaceted internal as well as external challenges, which are likely to haunt stability and peace in the country near future. Irrespective of the fact that a huge amount of external aid is spent over Afghanistan to resolve the ongoing conflict and establish a stable government, the country remains a highly destabilized and divided region in the world. The existing internal problems in Afghanistan includes insurgency, rentier economy, internal displacement of the population, illegitimate and fragmented government, failed institutions and the problem of repatriation of refugees.[25] These internal challenges in Afghanistan not only pose challenges to the country itself but the region at large. Insurgent groups along with warlords contributed in extremism and internal power struggle between different tribes have steered political instability. Lack of education, rough terrain, hilly areas with no access to roads and unemployment appeared as causative factors of poverty. Taliban took control in 1996, governed the illiterate poor population, and a large chunk of society became wild. The 9/11 incident added fuel to fire, several people, crossed borders to get refuge and entered in neighbouring countries.

The post-2001 war in Afghanistan is staged between the Islamist Taliban and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), supported by the Afghan government and the NA. The operation in Afghanistan namely Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), led by the US was launched in response to the 9/11 terrorists attack. Since 2001, the ISAF operates in

[23] Ibid.
[24] Alisher Latypov, "Understanding post 9/11 drug control policy and politics in Central Asia." *International Journal of Drug Policy* 20, No. 5 (2009): 389.
[25] Strand, Arne. "Afghanistan: Challenges and Perspectives until 2020." *EU Publications* (2017).

Afghanistan under the UNSCR-1386. Though the main targeted group, Al-Qaeda has left Afghanistan, their hosts Taliban are resisting the ISAF operations. The Taliban are also considered as the subsidiary of the Al-Qaeda group and they maintain contacts with the main leadership of Al-Qaeda.[26] The extremist elements in Afghanistan have a spillover effect on the neighbouring countries, particularly Uzbekistan and Tajikistan countries are constantly facing the challenges of terrorists' infiltration from Afghanistan. The situation is serious because the religious freedom of Muslims was long suppressed by the Soviet Union in Central Asia and now they have the capacity to accept religious fundamentalism.[27] There is a fear both within Central Asia and the world that the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) might take roots in the region. Afghanistan, being the safe haven for such terrorist organizations, can serve as the potential threat to the rise of religious fundamentalism in the Central Asian countries.

Hence, the Afghan factor in the politics of Central Asian countries has a significant role, due to its absolute geographical and ideological attachment. The Central Asian countries have an attraction to the world powers due to their juxtaposition to the nuclear countries, China, India, Russia, Pakistan and potentially Iran. The great powers, the US, China, and Russia have a convergence of economic and geographical interests in Central Asia.[28] In a struggle for the great powers to stretch muscles in Central Asia, they need to take into account the political, economic and social conditions in Afghanistan. This means, that the world powers cannot ignore Afghanistan in their pursuit to enhance influence in Central Asia. Afghanistan can either be a catalyst for a country to penetrate in the Central Asian countries, or it could potentially deter the entry into Central Asia.[29]

An additional standpoint of the role of Afghanistan in the politics of Central Asian states is the presence of a wide range of destabilizing factors within Afghanistan, which could possibly infiltrate into the Central Asian countries. These include the religious extremism, illegal migration, drug trafficking, and a ramified corrupt network and terrorism. The presence of these subverting factors is not only a challenge to the Central Asian states but to the entire region. Central Asian states have been involved in Afghanistan and their role was predominantly 'non-neutral, however, the changing geopolitical dynamics in South and Central Asia has convinced all stakeholders to ensure peace and root out the support to terrorist networks.

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[26] Anna Matveeva, "Russia's Changing Security Role in Central Asia." *European Security* 22, No. 4 (2013): 478-499.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Chien Peng Chung, "The Shanghai Co-operation Organization: China's Changing Influence in Central Asia." *The China Quarterly*, 180 (2004): 991.
[29] Ibid.

New regional alliances, such as CSTO and SCO, are equally important for Afghanistan, big powers (Russia, China) and Central Asian states.

Various countries have their positions over the current Afghan issue, which are determined by their geographical location with respect to Afghanistan, length of borders, ethnic similarities and other common interests in various spheres. Some of the common interests of the countries in Afghanistan are proclaimed through regional and international organizations, such as SCO, UN, NATO, CSTO, Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measure in Asia (CICA), Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Certainly, all the mentioned organizations provide a common ground for countries to cooperation against the destabilizing factors inside Afghanistan.[30] Though each of the above-mentioned organizations is important, the establishment of the SCO was a significant event in Afghanistan and Central Asia. The SCO is actively working on anti-terrorism and has established a Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) to both suppress terrorists inside countries and it protects the possible spill-over. The SCO member states are agreed on a point that the outflow of the Afghan terrorist groups will possibly challenge the region. In such an agreed pursuit, they tend to protect the Central Asian borders as well as it is for sure that the possible establishment of the religious fundamentalism in Central Asia will affect the whole region, including China and Russia.

In the broader spectrum, the formation of the SCO is taken as a response to the US increased presence in Central Asia. The role of SCO in establishing an anti-terrorist structure in the region is both cooperating and competing with NATO.[31] This competition and cooperation among the great powers within Afghanistan are considered as a variable of the new 'great game' notion. Today, SCO is engaged in a wide range of activities, which includes regional economic integration and the settlement of the Afghan issue. Indeed, the settlement of the Afghan issue is pivotal for the success of the SCO agenda i.e. better economic and security situation in the region. SCO has highlighted that the settlement of the Afghan issue is not only a political and military issue but an economic issue as well.[32] It is becoming clear to the great powers that the state building process in Afghanistan is not possible without economic incentives and reforms.

[30] Anna Matveeva, "Russia's Changing Security Role in Central Asia."…….
[31] Ibid.
[32] Simbal Khan, "Stabilization of Afghanistan: US/NATO Regional Strategy and the Role of SCO." in *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, vol. 7, No. 3, (2009).

Geopolitical Interests of Great Powers in Afghanistan and Central Asia

Undoubtedly, Afghanistan has become a part of a geopolitical puzzle in Central Asia. Therefore, its adjacent area, Central Asia, is also important for the world's leading industrial powers. They have both security and economic interests in the region. Presently the US, Russia, and China are involved in the region and the political commentators termed it the new 'great game'. Central Asia is a landlocked region, bordering with Afghanistan, and it is located at the heart of Asia.[33] The region is rich in natural resources, which provides an attraction for China, the US and Russia. In the pursuit of energy security, the US is looking for alternative options due to the fact that the Middle East is not sufficient to fulfil the energy demands. Moreover, the US is also concerned with China's geographical connectivity with the world market which would be through Central Asian states. On the other hand, Russia enjoys its historical influence over Central Asia. Russia would never let the Central Asian states fall in the Western camp.[34] In order to curb US influence in the region, Russia is relying more on its eastern partners. It is only the fear of the US influence in Central Asia that Russia is cooperating with China.[35] China is a growing economic power, and there is a nightmare in the US about the possible 'China's rise'; a bulk of literature is being produced over the hypothesis of China's rise in the Western World.[36] Apparently, China is increasing its influence throughout the world under the banner of mutual trade cooperation and its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is becoming popular all over the world. Among the three big powers in Central Asia, China seems to be the winning one, due to the ever-growing economic corporation with the Central Asian states.

Afghanistan, being a historical buffer state between the formal British Empire and the Russian Empire, is facing several challenges to come out of old 'great game'. Since geography cannot be changed, the historical legacy of Afghanistan is still relevant. The regional proximity of Afghanistan with the Central Asian states makes it a fascination for the world powers. The eighteen years of the US long engagement in Afghanistan is often thought as part of the new 'great game'. However, regional actors, Afghanistan and the Central Asian states, must realize that their peaceful survival is subject to the peace in the region. They must not

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[33] Colin S. Gray, "Nicholas John Spykman, The Balance of Power and International order." *Journal of Strategic Studies* 38, No. 6 (2015): 873-877.

[34] Alexander Frost, "The Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and Russia's Strategic Goals in Central Asia." in *China & Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, vol. 7, No. 3 (2009): 85-87.

[35] Ibid., 86.

[36] Chengxin Pan, *Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics: Western Representations of China's Rise* (Cheltenham-UK, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2012): 2.

detach themselves from the ground realities in Afghanistan, reasonable policies need to be adopted for the sake of peaceful settlement of all dispute. The diplomatic settlement of the Afghan problem would be in the greater interest of the Central Asian states.

In the pursuit of the vested interests, the big powers have always been contributing, in one way or the other, to problems in Afghanistan through the Central Asian states. Actually, global power politics have been pushing great powers to use Taliban since long, however, at the critical juncture Central Asian states need to get closer to Kabul. Afghanistan, being the neighbours of the CAR possess a direct threat of extremist's infiltration into Tajikistan.[37] Tajikistan serves as a bridgehead, from where the extremist elements could possibly access the North and it is also considered the mainland where extremists have entered. There is already serious kind of reservations over Kyrgyzstan's situation, due to rising extremism and possible penetration of the extremist elements. The fundamentalists have entered into Tajikistan from Afghanistan, where they align with the homegrown religious fundamentalist groups, which further penetrate into Kyrgyzstan.

Tajikistan has already received (and still receiving) international assistance to enhance its role in fighting the illicit drug trafficking and to stop the inflow of the extremists' elements from Afghanistan. Tajikistan-Afghanistan border is considered to be the weakest in terms of control over the active illegal migration of goods and people. This is the reason; the international assistance is enabling Tajikistan to enhance the control of its Northern Route with Afghanistan. Russians played an active role in supporting the CAR to safeguard from the external threats, has withdrawn its border troops in 2004.[38] The withdrawal of the Russia forces increased the threat of possible infiltration from Afghanistan.[39] Though the leading world powers, including the US and China, have supported Tajikistan, in enhancing border management, the complete control over the cross-border movement is not possible in the existing arrangements. Tajikistan is also working as an active transit route for the Afghan illegal drug (Opium) trade with the rest of the world.[40]

An important perspective of the Afghan role in the political situation of the Central Asian state is the impact of the former on the transport of energy products of the latter. The security situation in

[37] A. H. Mohammadov and Morteza Ashrafi. "Investigating The Challenges of Religious Extremism in Central Asia and its Impact On the National Security of the Surrounding Nations." *Revista Quid* 1, No. 1 (2017): 8.
[38] Anna Matveeva, "Russia's Changing Security Role in…..
[39] Ibid.
[40] Anna Gussarova, "Current Challenges to Central Asia and Afghanistan: Towards a Better World". *Central Asia Institute for Strategic Studies (CAISS) Expert,* (2016): 66.

Afghanistan is directly hindering the transport of energy products from Central Asia to the neighbouring energy deficient countries. For instance, Uzbekistan had constructed a railway line from the Hayraton to Mazari Sharif in 2010,[41] but its operation remained halted due to the security challenges. It would have been a great opportunity to start cargo operations between Uzbekistan and Afghanistan, but the bad security situation does not allow the two countries to do so. Similarly, another important rail network project is near to its completion, connecting the Uzen line in Kazakhstan, Kyzylkava, Bereket, Etrek in Turkmenistan and Gorgan in Iran.[42] So, this important rail project will connect the three countries without relying on Uzbekistan. This tri-nation railway network will also remain under the shadow of extremist's threat.[43] The third important energy project is the Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India (TAPI) gas pipeline.[44] For Turkmenistan, Afghanistan attaches significant importance as it would be the shortest route of import and export with Pakistan and India.

Pakistan and India are the two important competing nations in South Asia and both are energy starved states. Islamabad has signed various agreements with Central Asian states to fetch energy as it is direly needed in industrialized (developed) nations. China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is worth mentioning here through which infrastructure building and industrialization is on its way in Pakistan. On the other side of Afghanistan, Turkmenistan is seeking potential markets to sell its energy in Pakistan and India and working on the TAPI project. However, the success of TAPI lies over the mercy of security and political situations in Afghanistan. Until and unless there is complete political stability in Afghanistan the TAPI project will remain unsuccessful.[45]

Role of Central Asian States in Peace Building

Just like great powers, the Central Asian states have realized the importance of peace and political stability in Afghanistan for their respective development. For this is the reason, some countries have taken initiatives and participated in the resolution of the Afghan issue, the role of Kazakhstan as a non-permanent member of UNSC is pertinent. Kazakhstan does not share a border with Afghanistan, yet it is knotted through historic trading

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[41] Andrew C. Kuchins, Jeffrey Mankoff and Oliver Backes. *Central Asia in a Reconnecting Eurasia: Uzbekistan's Evolving Foreign Economic and Security Interests* (Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield, 2015): 14-25.

[42] Gurt. Marat. "Landlocked Central Asia Gets Shorter Railway Link to the Persian Gulf" (Reuters, 2014).

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ariel Cohen, Lisa Curtis and Owen Graham. "The Proposed Iran-Pakistan-India Gas Pipeline: An Unacceptable Risk to Regional Security." *Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC*, 30 (2008): 37-49.

[45] Ibid.

routes. Kazakhstan has observed its two-year term as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC) to focus on the Afghan situation. In 2018, it has organized a visit of Security Council members to Afghanistan.[46] Moreover, Uzbekistan also remained an active supporter of the peace process in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan, under President Karimov, has proposed the 6+3 formula in 2008 at Bucharest.[47] He suggested that under the guidance of the UN, the Afghan problem should be resolved by the Afghans themselves and interested parties should only provide logistical support to the local people in settling their disputes. The interested parties in Afghan crises include the US, NATO, and Russia, these states are on the background while other countries directly bordering Afghanistan

The president of Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev, at the NATO summit in 2010, provided the directions of its country towards the Afghanistan situation.[48] He insisted on four key areas to uplift the situation in Afghanistan; first, the international coalition support to Afghanistan, be increased; secondly, the need to fight against the drug threat in Afghanistan. Third, the rehabilitation of the socio-economic condition and the fourth point was the utilization of all forms of conflict resolution strategies and relations to resolve the conflict in Afghanistan. Nazarbayev also insisted on abandoning the external influence in enforcing decision over Afghanistan.[49] He supported the maximum role of the local Afghans in the conflict resolution mechanism within Afghanistan.[50]

The Afghanistan peace settlement process also provides an opportunity for the Central Asian states to get rid out of their perennial problems and it would be helpful in making them strong regional states. They can potentially offer good offices for both negotiations among important external stakeholders as well as inter-Afghanistan peace dialogue. Apart from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan due to their controversial relationship with IMU, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan are the most suitable countries to host any possible future negotiations over the settlement of Afghanistan. All of these three countries have minimal stakes in Afghanistan, thus their neutrality, as well as regional proximity, would be an advantage in the negotiations. Kazakhstan carries considerable experience to organize important international forums. The combined efforts of these three

[46] Luke Coffey, "Central Asian Role in the Afghan Peace Process should not be Overlooked", *Arab News*. (September 26, 2018), http://www.arabnews.com/node/1378286.
[47] Simbal Khan, "Stabilization of Afghanistan: US/NATO Regional Strategy and the Role of SCO." in *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, vol. 7, No. 3, (2009): 14.
[48] Kassymzhanova and M. Dutta. "Activities of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the United Nations on international security issues". *Buketov Karaganda State University*, (Kazakhstan 2017): 53.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid.

countries would also introduce them as influential regional countries. The Central Asian states have been passive with no representation in world politics since their independence. Despite the strategic importance of this region, the countries have mostly adopted an inward-looking approach, with minimal external engagement. However, in the age of global interdependence, there is a need to play their part both at the regional and international level and now Afghanistan seems to be a potential test case for the neighbouring countries.

Turkmenistan, with its energy-rich resources and distinctive foreign policy feature, have enjoyed stable relations with Afghanistan even during the Taliban regime, therefore it has the potential to engage Afghanistan in various trade agreements. The TAPI gas pipeline project and Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan electricity transmission (TAP- 500 KV) is significant proof of its endeavours to bringing peace in the region. Moreover, other commercial activities of Central Asian states with Afghanistan are in line to replace harshness into softness. The Central Asia-South Asia power project (CASA-1000), the Lapis Lazuli Corridor to connect Afghanistan with the Caspian Sea, and the railway project aiming to connect nations including China, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Georgia, and Turkey[51] are some of the promising projects in the region. All of the stated developments are showing the intent of regional integration and it can also transform the present day conflicts into cooperation.

Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, despite having no direct border with Afghanistan, remain interested in resolving the Afghan conflict. Kazakhstan has long been active in providing support to Afghanistan in the economic and humanitarian fields. The main concern of the leader of Kazakhstan was combating drug trafficking, restoring the economy and the social sphere of Afghan society.[52] Nazarbayev proposed to strengthen the OSCE's mission in the region, which anticipates the development of the peace process in Afghanistan, particularly in the post-withdrawal period.[53] Nazarbayev was of the opinion that there is a need to address the very root causes of the challenges in Afghanistan by the Afghans themselves, instead of relying on coercive means to overcome challenges. For Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan is a relevant issue because of the activation of militants and drug traffickers who

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[51] Saeed Ahmed, Anzar Mahmood, Ahmad Hasan, Guftaar Ahmad Sardar Sidhu and Muhammad Fasih Uddin Butt. "A Comparative Review of China, India and Pakistan Renewable Energy Sectors and Sharing Opportunities." *Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews*, 57 (2016): 216-225.

[52] Dadabaev, Timur. "We Want a State of Our Own!" Reconstructing Community Space in Bordering Areas of Central Asia." *The Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies*, 2 (2015): 9-32.

[53]Rytövuori-Apunen, Helena ed., *The Regional Security Puzzle around Afghanistan: Bordering Practices in Central Asia and Beyond*. Verlag Barbara Budrich, (2016).

penetrate the territory of Kyrgyzstan from Afghanistan through Tajikistan. Over the past few years, the local Islamist groups, mostly young Uzbeks and Kyrgyz from the southern regions, have been trained in Afghanistan.

Thus, the countries of Central Asia are interested in stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan, which can lead to the rise of their own economies. Since the geo-economic situation of Afghanistan can be used by the Central Asian republics to develop trans-regional interactions with important actors such as India, Pakistan and Iran. In this regard, the initiative of the President of Uzbekistan was the creation of the contact group "6+3". This initiative is based on the idea of the leading role of the Afghans themselves in resolving the conflict. The active support of other regional and extra-regional stakeholders would be extremely helpful.

Recommendations

After 9/11, the world powers have realized the importance of Central Asian states and Afghanistan. It has become obvious that peace in Afghanistan is not possible with the cooperation of its neighbouring states. Therefore, all stakeholders of peace in Afghanistan focus on Central Asian states too. Moreover, the Afghan government needs to learn how to draw maximum benefits from geographical proximity with resource-rich Central Asia. In order to ensure regional peace and prosperity, few recommendations are given below;

- Great powers (US, Russia and China) have a responsibility to respect the sovereignty of Afghanistan and its people. Eighteen years of failed state-building efforts of the US in Afghanistan shows that the sustainable solution lies within Afghanistan and no external power can bring peace with force. However, the economic help, for commercial activities including small businesses, should be continued as this would reduce frustration and terrorist activities.

- Militancy in Afghanistan is barring China and other neighbouring countries to conduct trade through Afghanistan. Direct talks with the Afghan Taliban may be helpful to bring the local population in confidence. Moreover, China and Russia should, directly or indirectly, facilitate the regional countries particularly the businessmen of Central Asian states to forge trade linkages with Afghanistan.

- Turkmenistan and Pakistan, being neighbouring states, enjoy a considerable advantage over the rest of the countries. These two countries can positively use their influence convincing the Taliban’s for negotiations and foreshadowing peace in the region.

- In order to safeguard the Central Asian states from any possible infiltrations of the extremist elements from Afghanistan, joint security

arrangements are of great advantage and its true implementation would be credible.

- Drug Trafficking and the cross-border infiltration of extremist elements have been sources of disruption between the relationships of Afghanistan and neighbouring Central Asian states. However, the way out of these problems lies in the permanent solution to the existing problems of Afghanistan. The representation of different factions in government may be helpful in mitigating skirmishes between local tribes and government.

- The reconstruction and state-building in Afghanistan should be the priority of the regional organizations. Moreover, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) can win the trust of people by ensuring education and health.

- China, as a neighbouring state of Afghanistan and Central Asia, should use its economic leverage to unite all these states because their unity would be the security of other stakeholders.

Conclusion

The security situation in Afghanistan has direct effects on its neighbouring states and it can be anticipated that instability in Afghanistan would halt regional prosperity. Neighbouring states of Afghanistan, particularly Central Asian states have been obstructed by the internal instability and external powers' involvement in Afghanistan. The establishment of political stability in Afghanistan will benefit the whole region. Today, the world powers, the US, Russia and China who have vested interests in Afghanistan, are active with their humanitarian mission in Afghanistan and the local Afghan settlements scenarios are all keen in resolving the Afghan crises. However, it has become clear that the use of military force is not the solution of Afghan crises and comprehensive non-violent solutions (including economic, political and military) need to be explored to deal with the Afghan crises. In order to make Central Asia a prosperous region, Afghanistan must not be dealt as insulator state, it is the time to convert it into a bridge between South and Central Asia. In this regard, economic activities, education and better health facilities can be effective and efficient tools to lessen frustration. Increased trade, road links with Central Asian states, more investments on recreational facilities and infrastructure building will be helpful in shifting Afghanistan from militancy to mildness. China's role has become pertinent in steering peace in Afghanistan and ensuring stability in Central Asia. SCO is an opportunity for all of its members to boost regional interdependency and resolve the problems in Afghanistan. All members of SCO, regardless of differences, should put their efforts to exterminate violence from Afghanistan because peaceful Central Asia would only be a dream without the settlement of

issues in Afghanistan. Central Asia is a proven hub of energy resources; its access to the open market would not be possible without a harmonious environment in Afghanistan. The economic incentives and the availability of alternative trade options can possibly bring a change in the illegal production of drugs. For this, all the active players in Central Asia must promote regional integration, infrastructure developments and trade promotion with Afghanistan.

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AN ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT BETWEEN PASHTO AND DARI LANGUAGES OF AFGHANISTAN*

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Abstract

Since the establishment of Afghanistan State, Dari (dialect of Persian) has remained its dominant and official language. However, in twentieth century, some measures were taken for the development of Pashto language followed by declaration of Pashto as official language in 1936. For the first time a dialect of Persian spoken in Afghanistan was officially renamed as Dari in the 1964 Constitution of Afghanistan. In this constitution as well as in the current constitution of 2004 both of the languages were declared as official languages. Since the emergence of Pashto as official language, a rivalry and linguistic divergence created between the two languages and their respective ethnic groups. As a result of this rivalry an ethnic and linguistic consciousness emerged which led to discussions about language planning policies.

This research article discovers historical evolution and reasons for this linguistic divergence and its implications on future nation building in Afghanistan. It also explores historical development of status, planning and policies regarding these two languages for better understanding of the linguistic divergence and rivalry. Furthermore, the study proposes options for accommodation of different languages through cultural harmonization and multiculturalism.

Key Words: Afghanistan, Languages, Dari, Pashto, Persian, Ethnicity, National Identity, Linguistic Conflict.

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Introduction

After 2001, the new political order in Afghanistan created optimism in linguistic and ethnic minorities. Usually it is said that language is a tool of communication but it is also used as a symbol of power. It means when someone is in power, his or her language becomes powerful and get the official status. Language has always played a dual role: as an agent of unity as well as division. Afghanistan is a multiethnic country. There are many languages spoken in different parts of Afghanistan. According to ethnologue, there are forty one languages in Afghanistan. Pashto and Dari have been declared as official languages in article sixteen of the current constitution [2004] of Afghanistan. After the independence of Afghanistan in twentieth century, it also changed its language policies for the promotion of national identity, political ideologies, national unity and ethnic aspirations.[1]

Two main languages of Afghanistan i.e. Pashto and Dari, are Iranian languages. Pashto belongs to southeastern group of the Iranian branch of Indo-European languages. There are some extinct languages belonging to Eastern Iranian group of languages. They are Avestan, Sogdian and Bactrian. But these are not mutually intelligible. A Pashto speaker wouldn't understand these languages. Similarly Pashto and Dari are Iranian language but they are not mutually intelligible. Both are spoken in same geographical territory and use the same Perso-Arabic script for their writing. Most of the speakers use these languages as their second languages. A short description of the development of status of these languages is given below.

Development of Pashto as National Language

Pashto belongs to southeastern group of the Iranian branch of Indo-European languages. Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan comprising 38 to 44 percent of the population.[2] Another source has mentioned Pashtuns, being the largest ethnic group comprising around 42 percent of the Afghan population and Tajiks, as the next significant ethnic group are 25 to 30 percent of population.[3] Nawid has written that 50 percent of Afghans speak Dari and 35 percent speak Pashto. Although major ethnic group in Afghanistan is Pashtuns but Dari is used by the majority of the people either

[1] Nawid, Senzil. Language Policy in Afghanistan: Linguistic Diversity and National Unity, In, *Language Policy and Language Conflict in Afghanistan and Its Neighbors*, edited by Harold F. Schiffman, Leiden, Boston, Brill, 2012, p. 31
[2] Nawid, Senzil. p. 32
[3] Saikal, Amin, *Zone of Crisis: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq*, London, New York, I.B. Tauris, 2014, p. 17

as first language or as a second language, that is why number of Dari speakers are higher than that of Pashto speakers.[4] It is also said that Pashto is second in prestige.[5] There are three major groups of the dialects of Pashto language. They are: Nangrahar or eastern dialect, the dialect of Kandahar or western dialect and the dialect of Kabul or central dialect. People living in southwest Afghanistan and Baluchistan speak Kandahari dialect. The Khattak dialect, spoken by people living in Kohat etc. also comes under the common name Kandahari dialect. Khattak tribe has effectively established the Pashto literary tradition. Wazirs also have some of the Kandahar features in their dialect. Speakers of the dialect of Kabul or the central dialect mostly live in the provinces of Ghazni, Logar, Kabul and Parawan. Speakers of the Nangrahar dialect or eastern dialect reside in the northeast regions of Afghanistan and in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan. Kandahari dialect enjoys the highest prestige (at least among the Kandaharis) and serves as the basis for the writing system.[6] When we look at the development of Pashto language, we see that Amir Sher Ali Khan (1863-1879) introduced military titles in Pashto.[7] These titles are: *ghūnd* (regiment) *dagarwāl* (Colonel), *tolai* (company), *jagran* (Major) etc. He also ordered that all military commands will be delivered in Pashto. He introduced Pashto title 'Loynab' for Prime Minister. Later on the title *Loynab* was dropped but military titles and commands continued in Pashto language.[8] In Amir Habibullah's era (1901-1919) the language issue got significance. In 1911 Mahmud Tarzai published an article in *Seraj-al-akhbar*, claimed that Pashto is the ancestor of all Aryan (Indo-Iranian) languages. On September 12, 1915, Tarzai published another article stating Persian as official and Pashto as *national language* of Afghanistan. At that time state was using Islam, Afghan history and Pashto language for building one nation and one national identity.[9] During the reign of King Amanullah Khan (1919-1929), Pashto emerged in news papers. In 1924, the first Afghan constitution was ratified by *Loya Jarga*. At this time, *Loya Jarga* also granted the title of *Tolwak* to King Amanullah Khan. *Loya Jarga* also directed the concerned authorities about the translation of the constitution and all other government regulations into Pashto language. It is also to be noted that there is no mention of languages in this first constitution of Afghanistan. In 1927, some scholars from Kandahar formed *Pashto Maraka*

[4] Nawid, Senzil. *Language Policy in Afghanistan: Linguistic Diversity and National Unity*, In, *Language Policy and Language Conflict in Afghanistan and Its Neighbors*, edited by Harold F. Schiffman, Leiden, Boston, Brill, 2012, p. 33
[5] Nawid, Senzil. p. 34
[6] Tegey, Habibullah and Barbara Robson. *A Reference Grammar of Pashto*, Washington, Centre for Applied Linguistics, 1996, pp. 6,7
[7] Nawid, Senzil. p. 34
[8] Nawid, Senzil. p. 34
[9] Nawid, Senzil. p. 34

or Pashto Society with the support and encouragement of the government. Pashto status planning started in the third decade of 20th century. Since 1933 it was required for all civil servants and officials to learn Pashto with Persian language. Salary bonuses had also been paid to the officials who were learning Pashto. Those who spoke Pashto were also being encouraged and favoured for various posts in various departments of the government.[10] King Nadir Shah (1930-1933) took measures for the promotion of Pashto and Dari languages and literature. Nadir Shah, when he was in France, had been inspired by the Academy of France, and on his return, he formed '*Anjuman-e-adabi*', under the supervision of the royal secretariat in 1931.[11] *Majalla-e-Kabul* and *Saalnama-e-Kabul* were being published under this *anjuman*. There were four aims of this *Anjuman-e-Adabi*. First, study and clarification of Afghan history and heritage, second, development of Afghan literature and folklore, third, promotion of Pashto language and the fourth and last one was expansion of the culture and knowledge of Afghanistan.[12] Among the pioneers of modern Afghan Intelligentsia and press are: Sarwar Guya, Fikri Saljuqi, Muhammad Ali Kohzad, Ghulam Muhammad Ghubaar, Sayyid Qasim Rishtiya, Ahmad Ali Durrani, and Qari Abdullah.[13] Pashto got its state patronage and it was declared as official language of Afghanistan in 1936. Later on the Advisory Board of Education, formed rules and laws for making Pashto as medium of instruction in elementary schools in all parts of the country. *Anjuman-e-Adabi* which had been formed by Nadir Shah was renamed as *Pashto Tolana* (Pashto Society) and it was brought under the ministry of education. It was expanded and several other divisions were also included in it. Three main tasks were assigned to *Pashto Tolana*. They were developing Pashto dictionary, writing Pashto standard grammar and standardization of Pashto spelling and pronunciation. In these developments the titles of the magazine Majallah-e-Kabul and the year book Saalnaama-e-Kabul were replaced by *da Kabul Majallah* and *da Kabul Kalanai* respectively. Later on in 1941, the year book of the Kabul was renamed as *da Afghanistan Kalanai*. It is also to be noted that despite of having Pashto titles, the contents were predominantly in Persian language.[14] After declaration of Pashto as official language and as medium of instruction it faced some problems and issues. Major of these problems and issues were that other ethnic groups like Uzbek were conversant in Persian (Dari) and

[10] Rzehak, Lutz (Dr.), *Howto name Universities? Or: Is there any Linguistic Problem in Afghanistan?*, Orient II/2012 (German Journal for Politics, Economics and Culture of the Middle East), p. 84

[11] Nawid, Senzil. *Language Policy in Afghanistan: Linguistic Diversity and National Unity*, In, Language Policy and Language Conflict in Afghanistan and Its Neighbors, edited by Harold F. Schiffman, Leiden, Boston, Brill, 2012, p. 35

[12] Nawid, Senzil. p. 35

[13] Nawid, Senzil. p. 35

[14] Nawid, Senzil. p. 36

resented to learn Pashto, shortage of trained Pashto teachers in non-Pashtun areas. Besides, this policy also affected the administrative, economic and educational aspects of the development. Due to these reasons the policy makers were forced to revisit the policy. In 1946, during the reign of Shah Mahmud Khan as Prime Minister, Persian was restored as an official language. At that time, minister of education, Najibullah Torwayana, who himself was a Durrani Pashtun, was of the opinion that making Pashto as medium of instruction was a mistake and he recommended educational institutions as bilingual. In 1940s and 1950s, the government took measures for the promotion of Pashto language. Ministry of information and culture was given this task. In this connection, Pashto Academy also took some measures. They are: expansion of vocabulary, creation of official orthography, promotion of research about Pashto language and literature. At this time Pashto academy also faced the challenges of the creation of courtesy titles and honorifics in Pashto language.[15]Pashto academy coined *Xāġalay*, *Mermən* and *Peġla* respectively for Mr. Mrs. And Miss. Pashto academy created equivalents of Arabic and Persian terms used in public and academic institutions. Academy also created some academic titles in Pashto as *Pohānd*, *Pohanwāl* and *Pohanyār* respectively for professor, associate professor and assistant professor. Similarly *Pohantun* and *Pohanzai* were created respectively for university and college.[16] During the rise of the issue of Pashtunistan, Pashto was exclusively used for propaganda in press and radio in Afghanistan. In March 1963, when Shah of Iran mediated between Pakistan and Afghanistan on the issue of Pashtunistan at that time Pashtun nationalists felt a fear that these diplomatic relations would weaken the interest of the government in the issue of Pashtunistan and similarly commitment of the government for propaganda against Pakistan would be reduced and thus the commitment of the government for the promotion and development of Pashto language would also be decreased. [17]

That is why during the drafting of the constitution of 1964 the issue of language policy rose again. Pashtun nationalists were trying to declare Pashto as national and official language because they were claiming that this state of Afghanistan has been founded by a Pashtun, Ahmad Shah Abdali. On the other hand, the Dari speaking people claimed Dari to be the official and national language on account of its rich and old literary tradition and history. In article three of the constitution of 1964, Pashto and Dari languages were declared as official languages of Afghanistan. Persian was renamed as Dari for the first time in this constitution.[18] In article 35 Pashto was declared as national language of Afghanistan. Article 35 states that state

[15] Nawid, Senzil. p. 37
[16] Nawid, Senzil. p. 38
[17] Nawid, Senzil. p. 39
[18] Nawid, Senzil. p.40

will take necessary measures for the promotion of national language. To implement this article of the constitution, Dari-speakers were bound to attend Pashto classes after duty otherwise their monthly pay would reduced.[19] At that time a non-Pashtun Prime Minister, Dr. Muhammad Yusuf, in a press conference, said that Pashto had imbedded in the culture and political history of Afghanistan and the large number of people speak it. Therefore, it had always been the national language.

In an article, published in *Siraj-al-Akhbar*, on 12th September 1915, written by Mahmud Tarzi, Persian (Dari) was termed as official language while Pashto as national language.[20] In a book, written in Russian language by Aslanove and later translated from Russian into Pashto in 1968 by Muatamed Shinwari by the name *Da Afghanistan Milli Jaba aw Adab*, Pashto has been named as *milli jaba* or national language.[21] Brain Spooner has also termed Pashto as national language.[22] In article twenty of the 2004 constitution of Afghanistan, it has been stated that national anthem of Afghanistan will be in Pashto language. Although it has also been translated into Dari but still there are reservations are available against this article of the constitution. It is said that it is not an appropriate representation of all Afghans. Before the Soviet Occupation many attempts were made to equalize Pashto with Dari. For this purpose Dari-speaking children were required to study Pashto in the public schools, and Dari-speaking government officials, were required to take Pashto classes.[23] Ethno-linguistic factor played a role in the emergence of political organizations like *Afghan Millat* (Afghan Nation), PDPA, *Sho'la-i-Javid* (Eternal Flame), and an anti Pashtun organization *Setam-i-Milli* (National Oppression). When PDPA was divided into two factions in 1967, ethnic division was also a factor of this factionalism. The PDPA language policy was based on Lenin's egalitarian view about the equality of nation and languages. A bulletin of the Communist Party of Great Britain, *The Weekly Worker*, published in 2003 writes about the language policy in these words.

> Oppressed language groups heard their mother tongue on Kabul radio for the first time. Pushtan (sic) [Pashtun] domination officially ended. Constitutionally, the country became a multilingual state. A

[19] Nawid, Senzil. p.41
[20] Nawid, Senzil. p. 34
[21] Shinwari, Muhammad Muatamid, (Translater from Russia) *Da Afghanistan Milli Jaba aw Adab*, Pashto Tolana, 1968.
[22] Spooner, Brian. *Persian, Farsi, Dari, Tajiki: Language Names and Language Policies*. In H. Schiffman (Ed.), Language Policy and Language Conflict in Afghanistan and Its Neighbors: The Changing Politics of Language Choice. Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2012, p. 89
[23] Tegey, Habibullah and Barbara Robson. *A Reference Grammar of Pashto*, Washington, Centre for Applied Linguistics, 1996, pp. 6

> secular state too. Islam was not subjected to any attack, but the state promised neither to nor interfere with any religion.[24]

Jami'at-i-Islami-i-Afghanistan formed in 1960s was also divided into two factions on ethnic and linguistic grounds. On 15th May 1978, PDPA revolutionary council, vide its decree number four, declared seven languages as national languages of Afghanistan. They are: Pashto, Dari, Uzbeki, Turkmani, Nuristani, Pashai and Baluchi. [25] In 1978-79 PDPA declared Uzbeki, Turkamani, Baluchi and Nuristani as national languages to divide the strong status of Dari into many fractions and thus pave way for Pashto to emerge as sole national and official language.[26] Another reason of PDPA commitment for declaring minority languages as national languages, was getting political support of other ethnic groups.

During Najib's reign, in 1987, a new constitution was introduced. In article thirteen of that constitution Afghanistan was declared as a multinational state. Article fourteen states that languages, literature and culture of all of the nations will be promoted. When government of Najib collapsed and Kabul was taken over by Mujahedin in 1992, Burhanuddin Rabbani was elected by the council of religious leaders in May 1992. He got support of Dari and Turkic-speaking people and the influence of Pashto decreased in his time. In this regard Ahady has written in 1995:

> The Pashto language has also lost status in the government controlled media, radio, television and newspapers. Since the 1920s and before the downfall of the Najibullah regime, the development and popularization of Pashto received preferential treatment in the government's cultural policy, or at least equality with Dari, and 50% or more of radio-tv programs were in Pashto. Since April 1992 Pashto-language programs have decreased drastically, and the official print media allocates even less space to Pashto.[27]

In this period national anthem was also changed from Pashto into Dari. During Taliban regime, in 1996, there was no language policy but majority of Taliban were Pashtuns and majority of them didn't know Dari. So Pashto was the sole official language during Taliban era. In post-Taliban era, in the constitution of 2004, there is no mention of national language but according to the article twenty of the constitution the national anthem would be in

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[24] Nawid, Senzil. Language Policy in Afghanistan: Linguistic Diversity and National Unity, In, *Language Policy and Language Conflict in Afghanistan and Its Neighbors*, edited by Harold F. Schiffman, Leiden, Boston, Brill, 2012, p.44

[25] Nawid, Senzil. p.43

[26] Nawid, Senzil. p.44

[27] Ahady, Anwar-ul-Haq. *The Decline of Pashtuns in Afghanistan*, in Asian Survey, Vol. 35, No. 7 (July, 1995), p. 624

Pashto language. Article sixteen of the constitution has mentioned languages like Pamiri, Nuristani, Baluchi, Turkmani, Pachaie, Uzbeki, Dari and Pashto. Further it has been added that among these mentioned and other prevailing languages of the country Dari and Pashto languages will be used as official languages of the country. But there is also a space for the third official language in those regions where majority of the people speak, except Pashto and Dari, any other language from the list of languages aforementioned. In this case it will be called a third official language and its usage will be regulated by law. According to the above mentioned above article of the constitution, state will launch effective strategy for the development of the languages of Afghanistan. All languages of Afghanistan are freely allowed in mass media, press and publications. Particular terminology related to Academic, national and administrative departments will be preserved.[28]

A few things are less clear in this article of the constitution. Speakers of five different languages have consolidated under one common name Nuristani, while the speakers of Pamiri languages have not been mentioned in the constitution.

Development of Dari as Official Language

Actually Dari is a dialect of Persian language. But Dari has its own distinctions too. Dari signifies the language of court while *Farsi* signifies the language of Fars, a province of Iran.[29] When Ahmad Shah Abdali formed modern state of Afghanistan in 1747, Dari retained its official position. It was necessary to have a competence in Dari for getting a job. That was the reason that Pashtun, Uzbek and other minorities groups learned Dari.[30] Persian (Dari) has remained the second most important language in the Middle East after the Arabic language.[31] As discussed earlier that Dari is a dialect of Persian language. Persian is very rich and vast language. Dari is the linguafrance of Afghanistan.[32] There are some phonological differences between Persian and Dari languages. Among them a few are:

- Long vowels like ē, ī, ō and ū are separate in Dari language while in Persian language these vowels are merged into “ī” and "ū".

[28] https://www.mfa.gov.af/constitution/chapter-one-state.html retrieved 11-11-2018
[29] Spooner, Brian. *Persian, Farsi, Dari, Tajiki: Language Names and Language Policies.* In H. Schiffman (Ed.), Language Policy and Language Conflict in Afghanistan and Its Neighbors: The Changing Politics of Language Choice. Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2012, p.99
[30] Nawid, Senzil. Language Policy in Afghanistan: Linguistic Diversity and National Unity, In, *Language Policy and Language Conflict in Afghanistan and Its Neighbors*, edited by Harold F. Schiffman, Leiden, Boston, Brill, 2012, p. 33
[31] Nawid, Senzil. p. 35
[32] Nawid, Senzil. p. 32

- Two vowels /i/ and /u/ used in Dari language become /e/ and /o/ in Persian language of Iran.
- Short non-final "a" in Dari language of Afghanistan becomes /æ/ in Persian language of Iran.
- Labial consonant (و) which is pronounced as /w/ in Dari language is realized as [v] in Persian language of Iran.
- Voiced velar fricative (غ) and the voiced uvular stop [ɢ] - (ق) are separate in Dari but converged in Persian language of Iran.
- English language and its terminology has influenced Dari language more than the Persian language of Iran.

Various sub-dialects of Dari are spoken in Heart, Hazarajat, Balkh, Ghor, Ghazni, Badakhshan, Panjsher, and in Kabul.[33] The dialect of Kabul (Kabuli) is considered as standard for broadcasting on Radio and TV. Kabuli dialect of Persian/Dari was declared as official in 1930.[34] Persian/Dari was used as official language i.e. in administration and in court etc. from the time of Mahmud Ghaznavi in the eleventh century.[35] Farsi or Persian is the name which speakers of Dari language call to their language. When BBC changed the name of the Facebook page used for Persian language of Afghanistan from Persian to BBC Dari, many Persian speakers in Afghanistan despised this official change of a page from Persian to Dari.[36] Speakers of Persian language living in Afghanistan are of the opinion that they were not willing to accept the term of Dari but the dominant Pashtun ethnic group has forced this term on them for the purpose of creating distance of Persian speaking Afghans from their linguistic, cultural, and historical roots in the other parts of the Persian-speaking world.[37] As mentioned earlier, Dari is a dialect of Persian language. Tajiki spoken in Tajikistan is also is also a dialect of Persian language. In 1928, In the Soviet Republic of Tajikistan, Persian was renamed as Tojiki. Soviet authorities also changed the alphabet of Persian/Tajiki. First of all they started using Roman alphabet and later on in 1940 they started Cyrillic alphabet.[38] With a slight variations of dialects, Persian language is officially used in three different countries i.e. Iran,

[33] Nawid, Senzil. p. 31

[34] https://thediplomat.com/2016/05/afghanistan-war-of-words/retrieved on 8/9/2018

[35] Nawid, Senzil. Language Policy in Afghanistan: Linguistic Diversity and National Unity, In, *Language Policy and Language Conflict in Afghanistan and Its Neighbors*, edited by Harold F. Schiffman, Leiden, Boston, Brill, 2012, p. 31

[36] https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/afghanistans-persian-linguistic-identity/ retrieved 19/7/2018

[37] https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/afghanistans-persian-linguistic-identity/ retrieved 19/7/2018

[38] Spooner, Brian. *Persian, Farsi, Dari, Tajiki: Language Names and Language Policies*. In H. Schiffman (Ed.), Language Policy and Language Conflict in Afghanistan and Its Neighbors: The Changing Politics of Language Choice. Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2012, p. 97

Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Although all of these languages have the same literary tradition but known by three different names in three different countries i.e. Farsi, Dari, and Tajiki. Discussing Persian language in Afghanistan, quoted by Lutz Rzehak, Bert G. Fragner (1999) has stated that Persian has remained a language of culture, education and court in Afghanistan for centuries. It was spoken by all people of Afghanistan and it was not limited to one specified ethnic group but all the ethnic groups of Afghanistan were speaking this language. In the words of Fragner it was an Islamized language and it was not primarily identified with an ethnic group but identified as a language of a specific culture.[39] Here we have concern only with Dari and not with others. Dari is not limited only to a particular ethnic group but people belonging to various ethnic groups speak Dari either their first language or their second language. That is why Asia Foundation, in one of its reports, has mentioned that nearly 80 percent of population speak Dari.[40] Any educated Pashtun in Afghanistan speaks Dari but very few Dari speakers speak Pashto.[41] As mentioned earlier that Dari speakers belong to various ethnic groups but after the introducing of new electronic *tazkiras* (ID Card) every Afghan (Tajik, Uzbek, Baloch etc.) will include his/her ethnicity. Similarly after the completion of this process, exact number of different ethnic groups will come to front. In October 2018 an appointment notification for a high position[42] was issued only in Dari language and on my inquiry it was told that when a Pashtun is being appointed the notification is issued in Dari language and when a non Pashtun is being appointed then the notification is being issued in Pashto language but it does not seem to be right answer because many of the official notifications are issued written only in Dari language. The cabinet of Afghanistan decided on 19/12/1397 (1st March 2019) that onward minutes of the meetings of cabinet will be written in both Pashto and Dari languages.[43]

Language a Divisive Issue in Afghanistan

In multi-ethnic communities, the most significant component which plays an instrumental role in identity formation and nation-building is broadly shared

[39]Rzehak, Lutz (Dr.), *How to name Universities? Or: Is there any Linguistic Problem in Afghanistan?,* Orient II/2012 (German Journal for Politics, Economics and Culture of the Middle East), p. 84

[40] Rahi, Arwin, Afghanistan's Growing Ethnic and linguistic Divides: Time to Address Them, Bishkek, Norwagian Institute of International Affairs, #22 Central Asia Security Policy Briefs, February 2015, p.9

[41] Tegey, Habibullah and Barbara Robson. *A Reference Grammar of Pashto*, Washington, Centre for Applied Linguistics, 1996, pp. 6

[42] Notification of the Director of Academy of Sciences Kabul, Afghanistan issued on 2nd October 2018 written in Dari Language.

[43] Cabinet, Notification No. 22 dated 14/11/1398 (1st March 2019)

language.[44] Language can play a dual role, a separatist and a unifying role. A common, shared or national language is being sought by the policy planners in multilingual societies for the integration of the diverse population. However, it is very sensitive matter. Therefore it should be tackled very carefully. Sometimes it causes ethnic conflicts.[45] As Kelman says;

> Language is a uniquely powerful instrument in unifying a diverse population and in involving individuals and subgroups in the national system. However, some of the very features of language that give it this power under some circumstances may, under other circumstances, become major sources of disintegration and internal conflict within a national system. These considerations should have some definite implications for language policy not only in developing nations but also in long-established nations marked by diglossia….while the development of a national language may be highly conducive to the creation and strengthening of national identity, the *deliberate* use of language for purpose of national identity may__ at least in a multiethnic state __have more disruptive than unifying consequences.[46]

Although language historians and language activists, have termed Pashto, as national language but the situation on ground is on the contrary. Dari, being a dialect of Persian, has its rich, cultural and literary tradition. In past, it has also enjoyed the status of not only official but the sole official language of Afghanistan. In the beginning of the twentieth century, emerging Pashtun nationalism, succeeded in giving the official status to Pashto. Now both of the languages enjoy the same constitutional and official status. At present, emergence of one National Language in Afghanistan seems to be difficult. Sometimes linguistic divergence creates problems for the integrity of Afghanistan.

Pashto-Dari Conflict

When military titles and terms in education and administration introduced in Pashto language, it overshadowed the Dari language. When Pashto was given equal official status with Dari language, the rivalry became stricter. Similarly it grew up with the passage of time. Thus with the politicization of the linguistic issue, a gap was created between the ethnic communities of

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[44] Gill, Saran Kaur; Language Policy Challenges in Multi-Ethnic Malysia, New York, London, Springer, 2014, p. 17

[45] Gill, Saran Kaur; p.20

[46] Kelman, Herbert C., *Language as an Aid and Barrier to Involvement in the National System*, In: J.Rubin & B.H. Jernudd (Eds.), Can language be planned? Sociolinguistic Theory and Practice for Developing Nations, Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii; 1971. P. 21

respective languages. The article of the constitution about the preservation of certain educational terms, also created conflicts. In this regard the issue of writing *Dānišgāh* or *Pohantun* on universities sign board raised in Balkh University and Herat University.[47] The Supreme Court of Afghanistan has issued a verdict for using the terms as *Pohantun*, *Pohanzai*, *Pohanmal*, *Pohānd*, *Pohanyār* etc as official. The Supreme Court said that these are legal properties of official languages and should be used in all languages to avoid confusion. Supreme Court issued this decree in the light of the article sixteen of the constitution which states that "administrative, academic, and national terminology in the country will be preserved."The higher education laws could not pass from the parliament and delayed for nine years due to the linguistic issue of the term *Dānišgāh* or *Pohantun*.[48] *Pohantun* is a Pashto word but it is commonly used in Dari language.[49] In Dari texts we can also see this word.[50]

Language Conflict and Attitude of Afghan Leaders

When we look into the history of Afghan leaders, almost they were speaking two languages i.e. Pashto and Dari. Current President (Dr. Ashraf Ghani) is also using both languages. However some leaders have preferred one language over the other. For example Nur Muhammad Tarakai and Hafizullah Amin preferred Pashto. On the contrary Babrak Karmal preferred Dari. For getting the support of different linguistic communities for the political purpose, some leaders have used native languages of the communities whose support were required. During his election campaign, the present president of Afghanistan, Dr. Ashraf Ghani, in one of his TV statements, used a few Uzbeki words.[51] In December 2018, in an international Conference on Pashto prominent poet Khushal Khan Khattak, the organizers started inaugural ceremony of this conference in Dari language. And in the formal academic sessions two moderators were parallel managing the stage in Dari and Pashto language, although all of the papers presented in this conference were in Pashto language. In the concluding session of this conference, in the president house (Arg0 the current president, Dr. Ashraf Ghani spoke in Pashto as well as in Dari language.

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[47] Rahi, Arwin, Afghanistan's Growing Ethnic and linguistic Divides: Time to Address Them, Bishkek, Norwagian Institute of International Affairs, #22 Central Asia Security Policy Briefs, February 2015, p.10

[48] https://thediplomat.com/2016/05/afghanistan-war-of-words/retrieved on 8/9/2018

[49] Bulkin, Carleton, Dari Practical Dictionary. 2nd edn., New York, Hippocrene Books, 2012.

[50] Arman, Rahman, Dari, An Elementary Textbook. Bloomington, CelCAR, 2012.

[51] https://thediplomat.com/2016/05/afghanistans-war-of-words/ retrieved on 8/9/2018

Language Conflict and Attitude of People

In the context of language conflict, looking into the attitude of the common people towards each other languages, the following points have been noted.

1. Native Pashto speakers have a tendency towards Dari language. That is why they learn and speak Dari as their second language but on the other hand, only few people who speak Dari as their first language learn or speak Pashto as their second language.
2. In past there were many obstacles in the learning of Pashto. The one among them was the contents of Pashto courses which were not according to the requirements of getting language skills. There were also cultural and psychological problems.
3. In some important offices like foreign office about ninety five percent letters are written in Dari even in Pashtun majority province like Nangrahar the case is also the same.[52]
4. Dari as a dialect of Persian, has standardized official style while Pashto still lacks unified orthography.[53] Before Russian invasion in 1979, major attempts had been made for standardization of Pashto. Although to some extent these efforts have succeeded but still problems exist. In this connection, Pashto academy was established in Kabul. One of the reasons of this lack of standardization is the varieties in spelling. These varieties in spelling not only occurred from one writer to another but often exist by the same writer in the same document.[54]
5. Pashto is prolific in dialects and there is no standard variety in written and spoken Pashto.
6. In rural areas when a person speaks colloquial standard Dari, it is considered as speaking in a modern way but no spoken variety of Pashto has such attribute.[55]
7. Dari has influenced Pashto. Many lexical items used in Pashto have their roots in Dari but the case of impact of Pashto on Dari is quite different. Only a few words have been incorporated in Dari having their roots in Pashto e.g. *kezhdi* (nomad tent)*gadwad* (‘mixed’), , or *powanda* (‘nomadic tradesmen’) etc.

[52] Rzehak, Lutz (Dr.), *How to name Universities? Or: Is there any Linguistic Problem in Afghanistan?*, Orient II/2012 (German Journal for Politics, Economics and Culture of the Middle East), p. 87
[53] Rzehak, Lutz (Dr.), p. 87
[54] Tegey, Habibullah and Barbara Robson. *A Reference Grammar of Pashto*, Washington, Centre for Applied Linguistics, 1996, pp.7,8
[55] Rzehak, Lutz (Dr.), *How to name Universities? Or: Is there any Linguistic Problem in Afghanistan?*, Orient II/2012 (German Journal for Politics, Economics and Culture of the Middle East), p. 87

8. When we are looking into the partners of these two languages outside of Afghanistan, Pashto is spoken in Pakistan but there is no official status of Pashto in Pakistan. But there are more publishing houses in Pakistan. In the past more Pashto books were being published in Peshawar[56] than in Afghanistan.[57] On the other hand, we see Iran, where Persian is an official language and those Dari-speakers who sought refuge in Iran got influence of Persian.[58] There is an inflow of various Persian books to Afghanistan that have assisted Persian as popular language among students and authors.[59]

Linguistic Divergence: Creating Distance Between Pashto and Dari

As discussed earlier that Dari is a dialect of Persian language and Persian has been a language of culture of Afghanistan for centuries. That is why Dari or Persian has influenced Pashto language. There are lexical, phonological and morphological influences of Dari language on Pashto language. Being two rival languages in Afghanistan, the speakers and writers of Pashto are trying to distinguish Pashto from Dari and they are trying to make phonological changes in those words which have been borrowed from Dari. Dari has no retroflex sounds and Pashto has retroflex sounds. Pashto writers try to modify Dari words phonologically by converting non retroflex sounds into retroflex sounds to let them appear as original Pashto words. In this regard Pashtun writers are trying to bring changes in retroflex/ḍ/ and /ṛ/. For example they write *pand* with retroflex /ḍ/ as *paṇḍ* and similarly they write *Pārsi* with retroflex /ṛ/ as *Pāṛsi*.

Growing linguistic divergence and conflict creates distance between Pashto and Dari languages.

Linguistic Behavior towards Pashto and Dari

Language is not the main identity marker for being a Pashtun. But tribal belonging and following the codes of *Pashtunwali* are most important. There

[56] Presently the exact number of publishing houses in Peshawar and Afghanistan not known.
[57] Tegey, Habibullah and Barbara Robson. *A Reference Grammar of Pashto*, Washington, Centre for Applied Linguistics, 1996, p.6
[58] Rzehak, Lutz (Dr.), *How to name Universities? Or: Is there any Linguistic Problem in Afghanistan?*, Orient II/2012 (German Journal for Politics, Economics and Culture of the Middle East), p. 89.

[59] https://thediplomat.com/2016/05/afghanistans-war-of-words/ retrieved on 8/9/2018

are many Pashtun sub-ethnic groups who have forgot their language but they are considered Pashtuns not only by themselves but as well by other ethnic groups. On contrary, there is a different situation among Dari speaking groups. Dari speaking people are not considered as a single group. They have different criteria of their identity. Among them one is their place of settlement for example they are called Kāboli, Herāti, Mazāri etc. it means that those who are living in Kabul are called Kabuli and similarly those who are living in Herāt and Mazār Shari are called respectively Herāti and Mazāri etc. Dari people are also identified through their way of life. For example Tajik are Dari/Persian speaking people who are Sunni peasants and living in cities, Aimāq are considered semi-nomadic tribesmen. Likewise they are also identified though their ethnic origin like Hazara, Arab, Jugi etc. No generic name is existed for the different groups of Dari language. A few years ago the word Pārsiwān was used as a group term but actually never this term has been applied to the speakers of Dari language. These days the term Tajik is used for almost all Dari speakers except the Hazara. Many government agencies also officially apply this term to Dari speakers. [60]

Culture as a Factor of Linguistic Convergence

There are three traditional models of integration in multicultural societies. The first one is segregation. In this model geographical distance is kept for staying apart. Sometimes they live in same area but having few relations. The second model is assimilation which aims that people belong to minority groups and cultures follow and adopt the culture of the majority group. When the minority adopts the culture of majority group, in turn, the majority group also adopts some components from the culture of the minority. These features can be in the form of certain beliefs, values, vocabulary and dishes. Following this way they become a unified whole. The third model is integration model which we can apply to Afghanistan. This model is also called multiculturalism. According to this model, to some extent cultural diversity are encouraged and expected to keep their distinctive cultural traits in form of their values, worldviews, and habits etc. Critics have also criticized this model by stating that it very easily may create a sort of spontaneous segregation. As we know that Afghanistan is an abode of various ethnic groups. That is why there is no inclusive Afghan culture to represent every Afghan properly.[61]Language issue has always been used by people who have power. It is not an issue of ordinary people. If it is assumed

[60] Rzehak, Lutz (Dr.), *How to name Universities? Or: Is there any Linguistic Problem in Afghanistan?*, Orient II/2012 (German Journal for Politics, Economics and Culture of the Middle East), p. 86.

[61] Rahi, Arwin, Afghanistan's Growing Ethnic and linguistic Divides: Time to Address Them, Bishkek, Norwagian Institute of International Affairs, #22 Central Asia Security Policy Briefs, February 2015, p.6

that language is not an issue of ordinary people but it is politicized by a particular class of that language community, in such circumstances, culture plays its role in bridging the gap, created by the politicization of language. According to similarities in human nature, various cultures also have many shared features. These shared features can be utilized for bridging the gap among different ethnic groups. For example Pashtun's hospitality is a cultural component which can remove the language issue to some extent. For example, when a Dari speaker visits a Pashtun, Pashtun tries to communicate with his guest in his language. Although multicultural societies have their own challenges but all of these challenges can be addressed through deliberations and discussions. These challenges can be overcome by the joint efforts of both, the state and the society. Multicultural education should be promoted and a public policy should be introduced. Shared roots of common social solidarity should be pointed out. Similarly religion and a shared language can also play its positive role in bridging these gaps. Main indicators of social divergence and conflicts are: linguistic, political, social and economic. State should introduce guiding principles for promoting pluralism and multiculturalism. State should provide all members of each group equal opportunities so that they may realize their full potential. Cultural diversity should be encouraged and promoted. Every person is allowed to maintain his or her culture without prejudice or disadvantage. Multiculturalism laws should be introduced and implemented. Racism and discrimination should be combated. Government should give equal opportunities for the equal representation of diverse cultures. Cross-cultural understanding can also enhance the tolerance and pluralism. For cultural integration and pluralism, intercultural strategies should be adopted. The dominant cultural groups can help in accommodating the other groups in the society. Shared or multicultural ideology can also play its role in social and cultural harmony. Multicultural policy arrangements are needed for the reflection of the extant cultural diversity and a willingness to accept equity. Public good well and welfare activities can also help in this regard. People need education about the benefits of cultural diversity. These benefits for the common people are: enhanced gastronomy, increase in cross cultural competencies, mental flexibility, tolerance, artistic development and blossoming, innovations in social and political dimensions, economic growth, increase in learning, promotion of social peace through mutual respect and lore. Efforts for the promotion of the cultural diversity not only bring these benefits for the people but also can overcome to some extent the challenges of cultural conflicts. These challenges are: discrimination, feeling of alienation means they feel themselves as foreigners in their own country. To sum up, promotion of common cultural elements can decrease linguistic divergence. Amir Abdur Rahman, under his rule, at the end of the nineteenth century, consolidated the Uzbek Principalities (*khanates*) and enforced resettlement policy that resulted in Pashtun inroads into traditionally Uzbek

areas. His intention was to promote national unity by intermingling people of different linguistic backgrounds in the north.[62] In establishment of diplomatic relations between Iran and Afghanistan odes of those poets were used as a tool that had depicted the common cultural heritage of the two countries.[63]

Findings

Afghanistan is a multiethnic and multicultural country. In the article four of the present (2004) constitution of Afghanistan, these ethnic groups have been mentioned: Pashtun, Hazara, Uzbek, Tajik, Turkaman, Baluch, Qirghiz, Pachaie, Aymaq, Nuristani, Qizilbash, Arab, Gujur and Brahwui. Although there is no ethnic group mentioned in the constitution by the name 'Afghan' and in article four of the constitution, it has been written that this word (i.e. Afghan) will be applied to all of the citizens of Afghanistan but still Pashtun and non-Pashtun are of the opinion and they unanimously believe that this word Afghan is synonymous with Pashtun.[64] Many other ethnic groups are also living in Afghanistan that have not been mentioned in the constitution. Ethnic groups like Pamiri, Sikhs and Hindus have not been mentioned in the constitution. Speakers of Pamiri languages not only have linguistic distinctions but also follow Ismailism and thus belong to a religious minority. Speakers of five different languages (Ashkun, Bashgali, Prasun, Gambiri, and Waigali) have been consolidated under a common name Nuristani. Besides the description of these ethnic groups, article sixteen of the constitution of Afghanistan describes languages of Afghanistan. In article sixteen these languages have been mentioned: Pashto, Turkamani, Dari, Uzbeki, Baluchi, Nuristani, Pachaie, and Pamiri. The same article also states that Dari and Pashto both are the official languages of Afghanistan. It is also mentioned in the constitution of Afghanistan that in those regions where most of the people speak Uzbeki, Baluchi, Turkamani, Pachaie, Pamiri, and Nuristani, a third language will also be included as official language.

In article sixteen it has also been written that national, academic and administrative terminology will be preserved. This part of the article is

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[62] Nawid, Senzil. Language Policy in Afghanistan: Linguistic Diversity and National Unity, In, *Language Policy and Language Conflict in Afghanistan and Its Neighbors*, edited by Harold F. Schiffman, Leiden, Boston, Brill, 2012, p. 33.

[63] Ashraf Ghani, *The Persian Literature of Afghanistan, 1911-78*, In:Iqbal Afghan and Afghanistan, edited by: M.Ikram Chaghtai, Lahore, Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2004, p. 243

[64] Rahi, Arwin, *Afghanistan's Growing Ethnic and linguistic Divides: Time to Address Them*, Bishkek, Norwagian Institute of International Affairs, #22 Central Asia Security Policy Briefs, February 2015, p.12

disputed because some researchers are of the opinion that national, academic, and administrative terminology does not exist at all.[65] It is also said that in Afghanistan, neither anyone has codified the terminology nor any agency in Afghanistan, like Academy of Sciences, has defined these terms. After a long debate and disputes, the Supreme Court of Afghanistan, in its *verdict, retained this national, academic and administrative terminology.*

According to 'Ethnologue', world's languages database, Dari and southern Pashto are principal languages of Afghanistan.[66] Ethnologue has listed forty one languages in Afghanistan. In these forty one languages two varieties of Pashto and sign language have also been included.[67]

Before the declaration of Pashto as official language, Persian was official language of Afghanistan. At that time Persian was not considered a language of a particular ethnic group rather it was considered a language of culture and esteem. Even the Pashtun aristocracy considered Persian as a language of culture. For the first time Zahir Shah declared Pashto as official language in 1936. Later on it was confirmed in the constitution of 1964. Official status of Pashto and Dari has been once again confirmed in the 2004 constitution of Afghanistan. For the first time officially, the word 'Dari' was used for the Persian language (dialect) of Afghanistan in the constitution of 1964. It is also said that main concern in Afghanistan in renaming Persian with Dari in the constitution of 1964 was reducing cultural impact of Iran on Afghanistan.[68]

Although Pashto and Dari both are official languages of Afghanistan but they are unequal partners in many regards. Firstly, Pashto is a language of the identity of a particular ethnic group i.e. Pashtuns[69] but Dari is not the language of a particular ethnic group but many ethnic groups speak Dari as their first language. Secondly, majority of those people whose mother tongue is Pashto can fluently speak Dari as second language while many of those who speak Dari as their first language don't have full command on Pashto language. Thirdly, both the languages are different with regard to their degree of standardization. There is a standardized and sophisticated

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[65] Rahi, p. 3

[66] https://www.ethnologue.com/country/AF retrieved on 5/9/2018

[67] https://www.ethnologue.com/country/AF/languages retrieved on 5/9/2018.

[68] Spooner, Brian. *Persian, Farsi, Dari, Tajiki: Language Names and Language Policies*. In H. Schiffman (Ed.), Language Policy and Language Conflict in Afghanistan and Its Neighbors: The Changing Politics of Language Choice. Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2012, p.99

[69] Although language is main factor in preserving one's ethnic identity but it is not the sole factor of ethnic identity. Because in Afghanistan a few Pashtun tribes have lost their language. They are speaking other languages from the time of their ancestors but still not only they call themselves but the others also recognize them as Pashtuns.

official style of Dari while Pashto is still lacking a unified orthography. Fourthly, in rural places when someone speaks colloquial standard of Dari, it is said that he or she speaks the modern way but Pashto doesn't have such an attribute.[70] Fifthly, Pashto has only lexical influence on Dari while Dari has influenced Pashto not only lexically but also phonologically. Last but not the least both the languages have unequal partners that are out of Afghanistan. On the one side Pashto is a regional language in Pakistan but it has no official status. On the one side Dari has a partner like Iran, where Persian is an official language which has influenced and is influencing Dari to its maximum level. Iran is providing, at large scale, backdoor support to Dari language to expand its cultural influence to Afghanistan.[71]

All these mentioned and other factors show an ethnic and linguistic consciousness in Afghanistan. This article particularly discovers the implications and prospects of the conflict between Pashto and Dari languages of Afghanistan. This article will also describe status, planning and policies regarding Dari and Pashto languages in Afghanistan. Furthermore, it has also been tried to find out the ways of integration of different ethnic and linguistic groups through cultural harmonization, multiculturalism and pluralism.

Conclusion

Language and ethnicity are correlated in Afghanistan. Persian/Dari, as a language of culture has united all the people of Afghanistan for centuries. The emergence of Pashtun nationalism in twentieth century resulted the declaration of Pashto as official language of Afghanistan in 1936. A competition and rivalry started between these two languages which increased linguistic and ethnic consciousness subsequently led to discussions about language planning policies. Dialect of Persian language spoken in Afghanistan was officially renamed for the first time in the constitution of 1964 of Afghanistan. As a result of these linguistic consciousness and discussions both of the languages were given official status in the 1964 and current 2004 constitution of Afghanistan. Both of these languages have played their role in the twentieth century developments in the politics of Afghanistan and both of them have influenced different movements in Afghanistan. Language issue has become rather politicized in Afghanistan and this politically intended linguistic divergence has created many ethnic

[70] Rzehak, Lutz (Dr.), *Howto name Universities? Or: Is there any Linguistic Problem in Afghanistan?*, Orient II/2012 (German Journal for Politics, Economics and Culture of the Middle East), p. 87

[71] Rahi, Arwin, Afghanistan's Growing Ethnic and linguistic Divides: Time to Address Them, Bishkek, Norwagian Institute of International Affairs, #22 Central Asia Security Policy Briefs, February 2015, p.11

and other problems in Afghan state and society. Competition or conflict between these two languages is still going on and each linguistic group is trying to get more space for their language. On official level government provides equal status and opportunities for the development of these languages.

Both Pashto and Dari languages have the capability for the unification of Afghan society but need impartial and unprejudiced attention of the state. Political, social and economic factors have added more to the linguistic divergence in Afghan society. At this time Afghan state and society should be very careful about ethnicization and language politics. Both of the languages have a maximum amount of positive language transfer. There are a lot of common linguistic, literary, cultural, religious and historical elements in Dari and Pashto which can be used as a source of unity for further developing nation building. Shared history and common cultural elements can help in converging the linguistically divided groups. Cultural diversity has its benefits as well as its challenges. Its challenges can be overcome through honest efforts of the state and society. In the present time internal linguistic, cultural, and ethnic differences can be resolved to some extent through shared history, religion, shared linguistic and cultural features. Efforts should be made to bring the people of various linguistic, ethnic and cultural backgrounds closer to one another so that they may see each other cultures.

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https://thediplomat.com/2016/05/afghanistans-war-of-words/ retrieved on 8/9/2018

https://thediplomat.com/2016/05/afghanistans-war-of-words/ retrieved on 8/9/2018

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https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/afghanistans-persian-linguistic-identity/ retrieved 19/7/2018

https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/afghanistans-persian-linguistic-identity/ retrieved 19/7/2018

https://www.ethnologue.com/country/AF retrieved on 5/9/2018

https://www.ethnologue.com/country/AF/languages retrieved on 5/9/2018.

https://www.mfa.gov.af/constitution/chapter-one-state.html retrieved 11-11-2018

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THE EFFECT OF MALAKISM ON ELECTORAL BEHAVIOUR IN BAJAUR, TRIBAL DISTRICT OF KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA

Farmanullah [*] & Jamal-ud-Din [**]

Abstract:

Malakism is a known phenomenon in Pakhtun society in general and the tribal districts in particular. The Malaks, in tribal districts are exercising a dominant status in social, political and economic spheres. In elections, Malaks are too instrumental in moulding electoral preferences of the voters in favour of their electoral candidates. The threat of dislodge from the house, the creation of problematic situation for the subordinates, the provision of jobs and development are some of the effective tools that are applied by the Malaks for obtaining the electoral support of the voters. The present study tends to explore that how Malaks happen to be the major determinant of electoral behaviour in tribal districts in general and Bajaur in particular. Data analysis have been made via descriptive statistics including frequencies, percentage, valid percentage and Cumulative Percent and inferential statistics comprising of regression, coefficient of regression and ANOVA.

Keywords: Malakism, Malak, tribal district, Bajaur, Electoral Behaviour.

Bajaur Tribal District: A Brief Description

Geographically, the Bajaur has its strategic location. It joins border with district Dir on the North-East, Malakand division on the South-East, Afghanistan on the North West and the Mohmand on the South-West. The district headquarter is located at Khar. The Bajaur has area of 1273 square

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kilometers. The area lies between latitudes 34° 36' to 34° 56' North and longitudes 71° 15' to 71° 35' East[1]. (See Figure 1)



Source:
http://www.rlcipfata.gov.pk/images/agencies_map/bajaur_agency_map/bajaur_agency_map.jpg

Bajaur is a mountainous area. Nawagai and Barang are its two large valleys which are surrounded by mountains with an average altitude of about 3000 meters. The altitude of the plain area is about 2500-2900 feet above the sea level. The mountainous region constitutes about forty percent of the total area[2]. It has a long border of about 120 kilometers on the North-West with Afghanistan. The four important passes between Pakistan and Afghanistan in Bajaur are Loegram pass (Salarzai), Kaga Pass (Mamond), Ghakhi Pass (Mamond) and Nawa Pass (Chamarkand)[3].

According to the population census of 2017, the total population of Bajaur is 1093684 in which 557160 are male, 536520 females while 04 are

[1] Mian Sayed Badshah, "Geology of Bajaur and Northern Part of Mohmand," *Geological Bulletin*, Vol.11 (1979): pp.163-164; *Socio-Economic Profile of Bajaur* (Islamabad: Prepared by USAID, 1992), 1
[2] *Socio-Economic Profile of Bajaur* , 2
[3] *Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India: Selected from Government Record*, Vol.I (Quetta: Nisa Traders, 1982), pp.502-503

transgender.[4] Bajaur is inhabited by two main tribes, namely the Tarkalani and the Utman Khel. The Tarkalanis lives in the areas of Salarzo, Mamund, Charmang, Nawagai and part of Khar. The Tarkalani Tribe is divided into four sections, Salarzai, Mamund, Ismailzai and Essazai[5]. Uthman khel tribe is divided into eight branches, Ismail Zai, Mandal, Ali Zai, Matakai, Pegho Zai, Gurai and Seen Zai[6].

The Deputy Commissioner (Former Political Agent) is the head of all administrative departments working in Bajaur. Khar and Nawagai are its two sub-divisions which are administered by Assistant Commissioner. The offices of the Assistant Commissioner are located at Khar, which have been further sub-divided into eight tehsils. The Nawagai Sub-division has been further divided into five tehsils, namely, Nawagai, Loi-Mamund, Ware Mamund, Barang and chamarkand. The Khar sub division has been further sub-divided into three tehsils, namely, Khar, Uthman Khel and Salarzai. Each tehsil has a Tehsildar, who supervises the whole area.[7]

The Deputy Commissioner has a force in the form of Khasadars or Levies. These Khasadars are recruited from each tribe. The F.C (Frontier Corps) force also helps the local Administration. The role of the Deputy Commissioner (Former PA) has been described as "Half-Ambassador or half-Governor" [8].

The Pakhtuns

The Pakhtuns are the ethnic group residing as a large racial faction in Afghanistan, merged area (formerly called FATA), Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan.[9] The social structure of the Pakhtuns is based on segmentary lineage system which is based on hierarchical set up. The lowest hierarchy is the group at local level proceeding to various upward levels making whole ethnic group at the highest level.[10] The Pakhtuns are further divided into various tribes. Some of the Pakhtuns tribes in Pakistan are Kakaṛ, Sheraani, Ustarana, Maḥsud, Darwesh Khel, Waziri, Biṭani, Turi,

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[4] *FATA Development Statistics* (Peshawar: FATA Secretariat, 2012), 4.
[5] Ibid., 116
[6] Allah BakhshYusufi, *Yusufzai Pathan* (Karachi: Sharif Art Press, I960), 353
[7] Sher Mohammad. Khan Mohmand, *FATA: A Socio, Culture and Geo Political History.* Peshawar: University Book Agency, 2000), 134-135
[8] Akbar S. Ahmad, *Social and Economic Changes in the Tribal Areas* (London: Oxford University Press, 1977), 310-311
[9] Farooq Yousaf, "Pakistan's "Tribal" Pashtuns, Their "Violent" Representation, and the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement," *Sage Open* (January-March 2019): pp.1 –10
[10] Joseph A. Tainter and Donald G. MacGregor, *Pashtun Social Structure: Cultural Perceptions and Segmentary Lineage Organization* (USA: MacGregor-- Bates, Inc., 2011), p.01

Bangash, Orakzay, Afridi, Shinwari, Mahmand, Utman Khel, Tarklani, Yusufzay, Banuchi, Khaṭak, Khalil etc.[11]

Elite Politics in terms of Malak and Malakism:

The concept of Malik and Malakism can be best explained in terms of theory of elitism. This theory asserts that there are fewer people or families in the society who have the power and social influence. These elites control the society and utilize its influence for gaining political power. They are called political elites.[12] These political elites play an important role in influencing the electoral preferences.[13] In Pakhtun society 'Malak' (the Tribal Chief) exercise a dominant role in all social and political activities. The Malaks in tribal districts of Pakistan are the local elders with land power in acres. They are patronizing agricultural activities which are mostly done by the peasants or tenants, who live at a subsistence level. In Pakistan, the landlords are known by different names according to their geographical distribution such as these people are called Malaks in Pakhtun society, Chaudhry in the Punjab society, Wadera in Sindh and Saii in Baloch society[14].

Mostly, the Malaks in tribal districts keep the tenants for their own purposes such as for agricultural production, serving the guests in *Hujra* and also to help them fight against their opponents. Economically, they are strong enough having more land and access to all the resources. Mostly, the educational institutions (schools and colleges) are located in these Malaks' land; so they have full control over these institutions. They don't want the children of their tenants to be educated because they consider these children a threat to their (Malaks) future. Before 1996, the Malaks were so strong because only they were entrusted with the right to vote and the local people had no power to exercise this basic human right in the form of casting vote. Prior to 1996, the tribal districts parliamentarians were to be selected for the National Assembly seats through a limited number of *Lungi* holders/Malaks. However, in 1996, the government of Pakistan gave the rights to the people of tribal districts to elect candidates of their own choice for the National Assembly[15].

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[11] Haroon Rashid, *History of the Pathans* (Islamabad: Brig (R) Haroon Rashid SI (M), 2002), vol.I, pp.iii-vi.

[12] Jack L. Walker, "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 60, No. 2 (Jun., 1966):, pp. 285-286; Hashmat Ullah Khan etal., "Role of Elites in Pakistan," *International Journal of Applied Economic Studies,* Vol. 6, Issue 1, (2018): p.19

[13] Thomas A. Henderson and Walter A. Rosenbaum, "Prospects for Consolidating Local Government: The Role of Elites in Electoral Outcomes," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Nov., 1973): pp. 695-719

[14] Jean L, Mckechine, ed. *Webster,s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary* (New York: World Publishing Company, 1098), 679

[15] Mohmand, 15-25.

Malakism is a type of feudalism. The term feudalism is used worldwide while Malakism is limited to the tribal districts only. Malakism is a local term used instead of feudalism in the tribal districts of Pakistan. They are the feudal who dominate the Pakhtun community. Feudalism is a worldwide system which is prevailing in different forms in the world. In the tribal areas of Pakistan the term Malakism is used for feudalism[16]. Feudalism (Malakism) was a system of government, whose outstanding feature was the possession and centralization of political authority among a landed aristocracy with a pattern of land holding in which power was shared by the feudal lords[17].

Karl Marx has referred to feudalism in the form of capitalism. Marx has defined feudalism, "as the power of ruling class rested on their control of arable land leading to a class society based upon the exploitation of peasants who farm these lands, typically under serfdom. Marx thus considered feudalism within a purely economic model"[18]. In industrialized society the individuals are divided between the capitalist (bourgeois) and working class (proletariat). The bourgeois exploits the proletariat class.[19]

Pakhtun's society has two famous traditions, tribal chiefs (Malaks) and code of honour (Pakhtunwali). These two traditions are un-written but in practice they are observed. These two codes of honour differentiate the Pakhtun society from the other societies. *Pakhtunwali* is a traditional code of Pakhtuns' society which covers all aspects of Pakhtuns' life[20].

After the annexation of the frontier region in 1849, the British got the control of the area. The British introduced Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) in 1901, wherein enough powers were exercised by the Political Agent and Malaks. After the creation of Pakistan, the FCR was retained hence retaining Malakism. Malaks were instrumental in keeping the border

[16] Muhammad Akbar Malik, "Role of Malik in Tribal Society: A Dynamic Change after 9/11", *Pakistan*, Vol. 49, (2013): 102-104.

[17] Umbreen Javaid and Tahmina Aslam, "Feudalism in Pakistan: Myth or Reality/Challenges to Feudalism," *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan*, Vol. 54, No. 1, (2017): 227-228

[18] Claudio J. Katz, "Karl Marx on the transition from feudalism to capitalism," *Theory and Society* 22 (1993): 363-389

[19] Lars-Henrik Schmidt, "A Marxist Theory of Class Struggle," *Acta Sociologica*, Vol. 20, No. 4, (1977): pp. 385-392

[20] Ghulam Shams-ur-Rehman, "Pashtunwali and Islam: The Conflict of Authority in the Traditional Pashtun Society," *Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences* (PJSS), Vol. 35, No. 1 (2015), pp. 297-307

passes open for trade and strategic purposes and in return granted allowances and subsidies which they could distribute among their tribes[21].

Malaks play a multi-dimensional role in Pakhtun society. Their role is very influential in various aspects of life. They play a key role in resolving the local disputes through an informal judiciary system called *Jirga*. The decision announced by these Malaks is final which must be accepted by both the parties.[22] The local administration fully supports these Malaks in their decisions. They receive a type of payment called *Lungi*. Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC), Domicile Certificate or any other witness's certificate of local people must be signed from these Malaks. All the developmental projects from the government agencies are implemented under the supervision of these Malaks.[23].

Thus, Malaks enjoy a dominant position in the social set up of tribal districts. He is powerful, economically, socially and politically.[24] The present article discusses the dominant role of Malaks in the electoral politics of Tribal built in general and Bajaur district in particular.

Scope and Methodology:

This is an empirical research based on quantitative and analytical methods. Primary data have been collected in the form of questionnaire. Keeping in view the nature of the problem and study, purposive / judgmental sampling method is used in this research. The data obtained through questionnaires have been classified, arranged and analyzed in various tables through SPSS software. Secondary data have been studied in the form of reports, journals, theses and books, used for understanding the Malakism and Malak's role. Data was collected from various categories of people as key informants. Much care was taken while collecting the data from such respondents, who were able enough to talk and present their views on this issue of Malakism and its impacts on the people of local community. Hence respondents were selected from various walks of life including Malaks, peasants, common people, businessmen, teachers, students and traders.

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[21] Benjamin D. Hopkins, "The Frontier Crimes Regulation and Frontier Governmentality," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol.74, Issue 2, (May 2015): pp.369-75; Altaf Ullah, "Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) of Pakistan: Study of a Special Model of Governance," *Pakistan Journal of History and Culture*, Vol. XXXIV, No.2 (2013): pp.65-71

[22] Umbreen Javaid and Muhammad Akram Ul Haq, "Political Challenges and Security Issues in FATA and its impact on Economic Development," *A Research Journal of South Asian Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 1, (January – June 2016): pp. 367 – 370

[23]Matthew W. Williams, A Monograph on The British colonial experience in Waziristan and its applicability to current operations, (USA: Department of Defense, 2004-05), pp.5-6; Danish Ahmad and Anwaar Mohyuddin, "Role of Malik in Pukhtoon Tribal Areas," *Journal of Studies in Social Sciences*, Volume 5, Number 2, (2013): 239-253

[24] Ibid.

Informal discussions were also held randomly with about three hundred persons which helped in comprehending the problem in detail.

Universe of the Study:

The universe of the study is Bajaur district. It has two sub-divisions, namely Khar sub-division and Nawagai sub-division under the administration of two Assistant Commissioner. The Khar sub division has been further sub-divided into three tehsils, namely, Khar, Uthman Khel and Salarzai. The Nawagai Sub-division has been further divided into five tehsils, namely Nawagai, Lowi-Mamond, Wara-Mamond, Barang and Chamarkand. The data was collected from various walks of life in the targeted area. The data is collected from male respondents only because the researcher has no access to females.

Sample Size and Procedure:

In order to get representative sample size, over 210 respondents have been selected on the basis of purposive sampling in the targeted area by the following stages.

Stage 1: There are two Sub-Divisions in Bajaur i.e. Khar and Nawagai sub-divisions. The Khar sub-division has three tehsils, namely, Khar, Uthman Khel and Salarzai while the Nawagai sub-division has five tehsils, namely Nawagai, Lowi-Mamond, Wara-Mamond, Barang and Chamarkand. From Khar subdivision the tehsils of Uthman Khel and Salarzai were randomly selected while from the Nawagai subdivision the tehsils of Nawagai, Lowi Mamond and Wara-Mamond were randomly selected.

Stage 2: In this stage, 42 respondents were selected from each tehsil, 14 were commoners, 14 were Malaks and 14 were peasants' families. Respondents were selected through judgmental sampling. Data was collected from male respondents because the researcher has no access to female respondents. Out of a total 210 questionnaire administered, the researcher could get only 204 duly filled and returned.

Statistical Techniques for Measurement

In this study, the descriptive and inferential statistics have been used for analysis with the help of SPSS software. The descriptive statistics refers to frequencies, percentage, valid percentage and Cumulative Percent. The inferential statistics have been based on regression, coefficient of regression and ANOVA.

Econometric Model

$IIPAE = \beta_0 + \beta_1(Age) + \beta_2(Education) + \beta_3(Profession) + \beta_4(Monthly\ Income) + e_i$ (1)

$MPOS = \beta_0 + \beta_1(Age) + \beta_2(Education) + \beta_3(Profession) + \beta_4(Monthly\ Income) + e_i$ (2)

$MTTHS = \beta_0 + \beta_1(Age) + \beta_2(Education) + \beta_3(Profession) + \beta_4(Monthly\ Income) + e_i$ (3)

$MPFHS = \beta_0 + \beta_1(Age) + \beta_2(Education) + \beta_3(Profession) + \beta_4(Monthly\ Income) + e_i$ (4)

$MDBS = \beta_0 + \beta_1(Age) + \beta_2(Education) + \beta_3(Profession) + \beta_4(Monthly\ Income) + e_i$ (5)

Where

IIPAE	=	Interest in Politics and Elections
MPOS	=	Malak's Pressure on Subjects
MTTHS	=	Malak's Treatment towards his Subjects
MPFHS	=	Malak's Promise for his Subjects
MDBS	=	Malak's Delivering Benefits to his Subjects
β_0	=	The intercept point of the regression line.
β_1	=	Coefficient of Regression for Age.
β_2	=	Coefficient of Regression for Education.
β_3	=	Coefficient of Regression for Profession.
β_4	=	Coefficient of Regression for Monthly Income.
εi	=	Random Error/ Disturbance term

Variables of the Study

Dependent Variables

The following five close-ended questions have been taken as dependent variables for measuring the influence of Malak on the voting behaviour in Bajaur.

1. Do you have interest in politics and elections?
   1) Yes 2) No
2. In your opinion, to what extent does a Malak pressurize his subjects for voting to his favourite candidate in elections?
   1) To Great Extent 2) To Some Extent 3) To Limited Extent 4) Absolutely Not
3. What do you think, if a subordinate casts vote to the opponent of Malak, what would be the treatment of Malak towards him?
   1) Drives them out of home 2) Annoys them 3) Assign them more work. 4) None of them
4. If a person casts vote the candidate of Malak, in your opinion, what is promised to him by Malak in return?

(1) Employment (2) Developmental work (3) Educational and Health facilities (4) Nothing

5. In your opinion, if the supported candidate wins the elections, does Malak deliver benefits to his subordinate people?

1) Yes 2) No

All these five questions have been symbolically represented as IIPAE, MPOS, MTTHS, MPFHS and MDBS respectively.

Independent Variables

For this study, Age, Education, Profession and Monthly Income have been taken as independent variables.

Data Analysis

Data analysis is divided into two parts i.e. the descriptive and the inferential statistics. The descriptive part provides data analysis in the form of frequencies, percentage, valid percentage and Cumulative Percent. The interferential part includes tests in the form of regression, coefficient of regression and ANOVA. This type of data analysis is carried out with regard to each dependent variable after making an association with independent variables of Age, Education, Profession and Monthly Income.

Model No.1

Descriptive Statistics

Table 1

Frequency Distribution

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Yes	152	74.5	74.5	74.5
No	52	25.5	25.5	100.0
Total (N)	204	100.0	100.0	

Inferential Statistics
Table 2
Coefficient of Regression and ANOVA

	Coefficients[a]					**ANOVA[a]**					
	Unstandardized Coefficients		**Standardized Coefficients**								
Model 1	**B**	**Std. Error**	**Beta**	**T**	**Sig.**	**Model 1**	**Sum of Squares**	**Df**	**Mean Square**	**F**	**Sig.**
(Constant)	1.409	.151		9.310	.000	Regression	7.241	4	1.810	11.434	.000[b]
Age	-.125	.033	-.241	-3.759	.000	Residual	31.504	199	.158		
Education	-.176	.058	-.195	-3.041	.003	Total	38.745	203			
Profession	.086	.022	.258	3.884	.000						
Monthly_Income	.108	.034	.211	3.177	.002						

a. Dependent Variable: IIPAE
b. Predictors: (Constant), Monthly_Income, Education, Age, Profession

Results & Discussion:

Table 1 shows that majority of the respondents (74.5%) are interested in politics and elections. In informal discussion they added that in the presence of FCR, the dream of true democracy is not possible. They added that electioneering process and right of an independent vote can change their destiny. But in the presence of this black law such efforts are futile. They asserted that their parliamentarians have powers to make laws for other parts of the country, but have no powers to make law for their own area tribal districts. Informal discussion with Malaks shows that they were too interested in politics and elections but at the same time they supported FCR because they are its direct beneficiaries.

The ANOVA test applied in table 2 indicates the overall fit of the model at a significance level of 0.05. It provides significant values for all the independent variables i.e. Age, Education, Profession and Monthly Income. The signs of coefficient show that Age and Profession are inversely related to IIPAE. As the age decreases the interest for politics and elections will increase. On the other hand, Profession and Monthly Income are directly associated with IIPAE i.e. as the Monthly Income increases, the interest for politics and elections will increase. In other words, one can say that high income families have more interest for politics and elections as compare to low income families.

Model No.2
Descriptive Statistics
Table 3
Frequency Distribution

	Frequency	**Percent**	**Valid Percent**	**Cumulative Percent**
To Great Extent	144	70.6	70.6	70.6
To Some Extant	24	11.8	11.8	82.4
To Limited Extant	21	10.3	10.3	92.6
Absolutely Not	15	7.4	7.4	100.0
Total (N)	**204**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

Inferential Statistics
Table 4
Coefficient of Regression and ANOVA

	Coefficients[a]			**ANOVA[a]**							
	Unstandardized Coefficients		**Standardized Coefficients**								
Model 2	**B**	**Std. Error**	**Beta**	**T**	**Sig.**	**Model 2**	**Sum of Squares**	**Df**	**Mean Square**	**F**	**Sig.**
(Constant)	.781	.327		2.385	.018	Regression	35.178	4	8.795	11.871	.000[b]
Age	.222	.072	.198	3.097	.002	Residual	147.425	199	.741		
Education	.306	.125	.156	2.442	.015	Total	182.603	203			
Profession	-.179	.048	-.246	-3.718	.000						
Monthly_ Income	.199	.073	.180	2.715	.007						

a. Dependent Variable: MPOS
b. Predictors: (Constant), Monthly_Income, Education, Age, Profession

Results & Discussion:

All the above tables show that a large number of respondents (70.6%) are of the view that Malak, to a greater extent, pressures their subordinates in elections to support his electoral candidate. The respondents who did not support the above contention were (7.4%).

In informal discussion with respondents they added that Malaks have strong control over the electioneering, because they do not want the success of their opponents which upholds the analysis that right to vote of a layman is being violated at the hands of Malaks which is unconstitutional and against the fundamental rights of the people. However, informal discussion, the Malaks denied such type of allegations.

The ANOVA test applied in table 4 indicates the overall fit of the model at a significant level of 0.05. It provides significant values for all the independent variables i.e. Age, Education, Profession and Monthly Income. The signs of coefficient show that Profession is inversely related to MPOS. On the other hand, Age, Education and Monthly Income are directly associated with MPOS i.e. as these variables increase, the MPOS will also increase.

Model No.3
Descriptive Statistics
Table 5
Frequency Distribution

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Drives him out from home	114	55.9	55.9	55.9
Only annoyes and do nothing	12	5.9	5.9	61.8
Assign him more work as a punishment	22	10.8	10.8	72.5
Creates problems on various occasions	56	27.5	27.5	100.0
Total (N)	**204**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

Inferential Statistics
Table 6
Coefficient of Regression and ANOVA

	Coefficients[a]					**ANOVA[a]**					
	Unstandardized Coefficients		**Standardized Coefficients**								
Model 3	**B**	**Std. Error**	**Beta**	**T**	**Sig.**	**Model 3**	**Sum of Squares**	**Df**	**Mean Square**	**F**	**Sig.**
(Constant)	1.065	.473		2.250	.026	Regression	50.188	4	12.547	8.111	.000[b]
Age	.230	.104	.146	2.215	.028	Residual	307.851	199	1.547		
Education	.404	.181	.147	2.228	.027	Total	358.039	203			
Profession	-.187	.070	-.184	-2.690	.008						
Monthly_Income	.298	.106	.192	2.810	.005						

a. Dependent Variable: MTTHS
b. Predictors: (Constant), Monthly_Income, Education, Age, Profession

Results & Discussion:

These tables show that most of the respondents (55.9%) affirm that Malak force his subjects to vacate the house if they vote to his opponent. They added that if a delay is brought about, then force is used against them for vacating the house. While (27.50%) respondents asserted that Malaks tease the people one way or another by creating various problems for them if they do not cast vote to their favourite candidate. For example, they are not being supported in Deputy Commissioner office; their domicile is not signed by them, they are not supported in a *jirga* (assembly of the elders) etc. Some of the respondents (10.8%) asserted that if a subordinate vote the candidate other than the Malak, then the Malak increases work load on him. A lesser number of the respondents (5.9%) opined that Malaks only annoy and do nothing against his subjects if they cast voting to the opposing candidate. The Malaks in informal discussions denied these opinions and added that the voters are free to vote according to their sweet will.

The ANOVA test applied in table 6 indicates the overall fit of the model at a significant level of 0.05. It provides significant values for all the independent variables i.e. Age, Education, Profession and Monthly Income. The sign of coefficient show that Profession is inversely related to MTTHS. On the other hand, Age, Education and Monthly Income are directly associated with dependent variable. As these variables increases, the certainty of ill-treatment by Malak with his subjects (MTTHS) increases.

Model No.4
Descriptive Statistics
Table 7
Frequency Distribution

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Employment	80	39.2	39.2	39.2
Developmental works	52	25.5	25.5	64.7
Education and Health	35	17.2	17.2	81.9
Not Anyone	37	18.1	18.1	100.0
Total	**204**	**100.0**	**100.0**	

Inferential Statistics
Table 8
Coefficient of Regression and ANOVA

	Coefficients[a]					**ANOVA[a]**					
	Unstandardized Coefficients		**Standardized Coefficients**								
Model 4	**B**	**Std. Error**	**Beta**	**T**	**Sig.**	**Model 4**	**Sum of Squares**	**Df**	**Mean Square**	**F**	**Sig.**
(Constant)	2.283	.397		5.756	.000	Regression	42.696	4	10.674	9.826	.000[b]
Age	-.251	.087	-.188	-2.889	.004	Residual	216.182	199	1.086		
Education	.442	.152	.189	2.909	.004	Total	258.877	203			
Profession	-.167	.058	-.192	-2.858	.005						
Monthly Income	.296	.089	.224	3.327	.001						

a. Dependent Variable: MPFHS
b. Predictors: (Constant), Monthly_Income, Education, Age, Profession

Results & Discussion:

These tables show that (39.2%) of the respondents claim that Malaks want vote from the dependants for their electoral candidate and in turn ensure them jobs. While (25.5%) of the respondents have the views that Malaks take vote for their candidate from the subjects on the behalf of developmental work. While (17.2%) respondents opine that Malaks demand vote from the subjects in elections for their candidate and take the responsibility of health & educational progress in the area. A lesser number of the respondents (18.1%) have the opinion that Malaks do not make promise during the election campaigns. The Malaks in informal discussion denied that view that they do not ask for vote from their subjects on the basis of provision of jobs or anything else.

The ANOVA test applied in table 08 indicates the overall fit of the model at a significant level of 0.05. It provides significant values for all the independent variables i.e. Age, Education, Profession and Monthly Income. The signs of coefficient show that Age and Profession are inversely related to MPFHS. As the age increases, the certainty of the provision of benefit by Malak to the subjects, decreases. On the other hand, Education and Monthly Income are directly associated with MPFHS. As these variables increases, the certainty of the provision of benefit by Malak to the subjects increases.

Model No.5
Descriptive Statistics
Table 9
Frequency Distribution

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Yes	57	27.9	27.9	27.9
No	147	72.1	72.1	100.0
Total	204	100.0	100.0	

Inferential Statistics
Table 10
Coefficient of Regression and ANOVA

	Coefficients[a]					**ANOVA[a]**					
	Unstandardized Coefficients		**Standardized Coefficients**								
Model 5	**B**	**Std.Error**	**Beta**	**T**	**Sig.**	**Model 5**	**Sum of Squares**	**Df**	**Mean Square**	**F**	**Sig.**
(Constant)	1.516	.158		9.614	.000	Regression	6.880	4	1.720	10.010	.000[b]
Age	.122	.035	.230	3.535	.001	Residual	34.194	199	.172		
Education	.191	.060	.205	3.156	.002	Total	41.074	203			
Profession	-.069	.023	-.199	-2.958	.003						
Monthly Income	-.118	.035	-.225	-3.345	.001						

a. Dependent Variable: MDBS
b. Predictors: (Constant), Monthly Income, Education, Age, Profession

Results & Discussion:

All the above tables show that majority of the respondents (72.1%) asserted that after winning the polls, neither the Malak nor his successful candidate pays any attention to the development of the area. The respondents who did not support the above contention were (27.9%).

In informal discussion, the respondents added that if their wining candidates start some developmental works in their area, unfortunately it smells nepotism, irregularity, favouritism and corruption.

The ANOVA test applied in table 10 indicates the overall fit of the model at a significant level of 0.05. It provides significant values for all the independent variables i.e. Age, Education, Profession and Monthly Income. In this table, the variables of Profession and Monthly Income are inversely related to MDBS. As the Monthly Income increases, the certainty of providing benefits by Malak to the subjects after elections, decreases. On the other hand, Age and Education are directly associated with MDBS. As the age increases, the certainty of providing benefits by Malak to the subjects after elections, increases.

Conclusion

Malaks are exercising a dominant position with reference to social, political and economic status in Tribal districts. As such, Malakism is one of the leading factors in determining the electoral behaviour in tribal areas including Bajaur. Due to the influence of Malakism, the electoral candidates are always in contact with the Malaks for winning in the polls. Malaks use local people as well as peasants for their own purposes during the elections in Bajaur. Malaks compel the subordinates in elections to cast vote for their nominated candidates, and in the case of opposition by these subordinates, the same Malaks make their lives miserable and dislodge them from their houses or creating problems on various occasions ranging from non-signing of the domicile certificate to the lack of support in the office of Deputy Commissioner and *jirga*. Although peasants cast vote to the candidate of Malaks and in return make some promise with peasants. However they forget all these promises after winning the polls. Moreover, it is observed that after their success, the concerned Malak does not provide any sort of benefits to their electorate. Thus, majority of the respondents asserted that Malaks do affect the voting behavior in Bajaur.

All the people are interested in holding general elections in Tribal districts. However, the respondents asserted that in the presence of FCR, elections and democracy have no meaning for them. Since FCR is giving a dominant status to Malak, therefore, the influence of Malak on common voter in inevitable in making the electoral preferences. So FCR is a big hurdle in deciding a true electoral choice and installing a true popular democracy.

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CONCEPTUALIZING NUCLEAR SECURITY OF PAKISTAN: A RESPONSE TO INTERNATIONAL REGIMES

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Abstract

Terrorism is a challenge to international peace and stability, but nuclear terrorism risks the existence of entire world. Nuclear safety poses another challenge that remained priority on the agenda in all nuclear security summits (NSS). Nuclear Security Summit established a forum for cooperation among international nuclear actors. International mainstream media often created hype of nuclear insecurity in the wake of terrorism in Pakistan. Pakistan's proactive nuclear diplomacy at all Nuclear Security Summits (2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016) not only highlighted Pakistan's concerted efforts to safeguard nukes but also extended support to those who are struggling to improve nuclear security. International Atomic Energy Agency's acknowledgement of Pakistan's ramped up efforts increased its credibility and enlists Pakistan as a potential candidate for membership of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). These NSS provided a platform of cooperation to nuclear actors and ensured relative nuclear security. This paper analyses the institutional response of Pakistan's nuclear security to international concerns and highlights measures to beef up security of nuclear assets. It also dispels any chance of nuclear terrorism in Pakistan. It also argues to dispel misapprehensions about Pakistan's strategic assets.

Key words: Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Security, Nuclear Terrorism, Nuclear Suppliers Group

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Introduction

Nuclear weapons changed war dynamics after their invention and usage at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Since then nuclear weapons have been the priority of nations to acquire them to increase their respective security. Major Powers were prompt to develop this capability to attain insurmountable security. United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France and China, the permanent members of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) developed nuclear weapons during either at the beginning or the peak of cold war with the exception of the United States. The United States was the first to declare nuclear weapons by testing them during war times. Nuclear weapons basically were developed by those states that had strong enemies and wanted to aggrandize their security against potential enemies as USSR developed against the U.S., United Kingdom being the U.S. ally and a former empire had the privilege to maintain them against any future threat. France had faced Germany in World War II. China was a communist power and wanted survival against the threat of capitalist bloc. India developed weapons against China and Pakistan. Pakistan acquired nuclear technology to defend itself against Indian threat and to maintain the balance of terror with India.[1] Those strategic weapons which were unquestionably a source of security for nations at some point also became insecure at a later stage. Wave of terrorism across the globe in post 9/11 era led policy makers to think that these nuclear weapons may fall into the hands of terrorists and they may either seize control of nukes or be able to procure a crude nuclear weapon. It was Barack Obama's brainchild to establish a regime which could oversee the security measures of nuclear weapons and also provide a platform to nuclear actors to cooperate in achieving high levels of security against any possible threats of nuclear terrorism. There was much concern and speculations in international community about the nukes of Pakistan.[2]

The former U.S. President Barack Obama in 2009 made a speech at Prague about the threat of nuclear terrorism. Al-Qaida and other terrorist groups are struggling to get control of nuclear weapons and they surely would terrorize the world once they obtain it. Large stockpiles of nuclear weapons, smuggling of sensitive nuclear technology and materials by black market pose a massive threat that terrorist organizations may acquire them if not secured.[3] He urged world leaders to respond to such an imminent threat

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[1] Rizwan Naseer Musarat Amin, "Sino-Pakistan Maneuvering to Balance the Power in South Asia," *South Asian Studies* 30, no. 2 (2015): 2

[2] Michael Clarke, "Pakistan and Nuclear Terrorism: How Real Is the Threat?," *Comparative Strategy* 32, no. 2 (2013): 98-111

[3] NPR, "Nuclear Posture Review Report April 2010," https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture_Review_Report.pdf, April 1, 2010

by securing loose nukes around the world.[4] Obama formalized this effort by announcing Nuclear Security Summit (NSS). First Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) was held in Washington on April12-13, 2010 that summit brought 46 nations and three international organizations on a single platform to hammer out solution to the risks of nuclear terrorism. It was for the first time that major powers and nuclear armed nations adopted an advanced common approach to maximize nuclear security. Participating countries agreed to take their own measures to safeguard their respective nuclear materials, civil nuclear reactors and also boost international cooperation concerning that.[5]

Conceptualizing Nuclear Security of Pakistan

Pakistan's nuclear program still is a secret that rest of the world knows very little about the program. It is primarily because of the security concerns and the flagitious propaganda against it. Even the leading think-tank or research institutes have mere estimates about the amount of weapon-grade Highly Enriched Uranium and Plutonium. There are also estimates about the number of nuclear weapons that Pakistan possesses and is likely to make in the years to come. Because of the dearth of information available to outside world there are many misapprehensions about the nuclear security of Pakistan. Such misapprehension about the Pakistan nukes provide blurred picture to international regimes and rest of the international community. Among many other some critiques question Pakistan's nuclear security without any credible data. Sajid Farid Shapoo (Inspector General of Indian Police) published a piece in *The Diplomat* on February 01, 2017 which exaggerated the risk to Pakistan's nuclear assets that the gravest threat to Pakistan's nuclear weapons is posed by insider-Jihadi collaboration.[6] He also referred to Mehran Naval base attack in 2011 which was allegedly done by the 313 Brigade (An affiliated terrorist group of Al-Qaeda). He also claims that in the past five years, there have been at least half a dozen attacks on the facilities that presumably store nuclear weapons. Mentioning three terrorist attacks on Kamra Air Base near Islamabad, he maintains that Pakistan is vulnerable to nuclear terrorism. Another op-ed published in *The New York Times* on April 20, 2017 by Rahmatullah Nabil who served as a head of the Afghanistan's National Directorate of Security. In his piece "The World Must Secure Pakistan's Nuclear weapon" he levels allegations that Pakistan is the hotbed of global Jihadism where military and intelligence

[4] Council on Foreign Relations, "Loose Nukes," https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/loose-nukes, January 1, 2006,

[5] Mary Beth Sheridan, Obama Secures 47-Nation Pact at Nuclear Summit, *Washington Post*, April 14,2010,

[6] Sajid Farid Shapoo, The Dangers of Pakistan's Tactical Nuclear Weapons, *The Diplomat*, February 1,2011,

agencies use terrorist networks to advance their regional interest.[7] He also urges international community at the platform of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations Security Council to take action to prevent catastrophe of possible nuclear terrorism.[8] Similarly another scholar Joseph V. Micallef, author of the best selling "Military History and World Affairs" published in *Huffington post* that instability in the region raises risks that Pakistan's nuclear weapons may either fall into the hands of rogue elements or international jihadist groups.[9] Such critiques of Pakistan's nuclear security aid misconceptualising nuclear safety and security in Pakistan. In fact Pakistan has entered into final phase of combating terrorism. Through the decisive *Raddulfasad operation* it successfully smashed strong terrorist networks and achieved better levels of security and stability in the country. Even when Pakistan was fighting war against terrorists in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) between 2002 and 2013, no terrorist network ever hit strategic sites of Pakistan. Now the chances of nuclear terrorism in Pakistan are minimal. Not mere based on speculation one can assume that Pakistan's nuclear security standards are better than India instead the credible data may validate the veracity of such statement. Ankit Panda who covered *The 2014 Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) Index* for *The Diplomat* commented that "India's low ranking, which placed it below both China and Pakistan for nuclear materials security" speaks volumes of Pakistan's nuclear security.[10] Based on the available data, it may be conceptualized that Pakistan has achieved sufficient levels of nuclear security and other misapprehensions about the nuclear program are false and baseless. Pakistan's proactive participation in Nuclear Security Summits has increased its credibility in international community as a responsible nuclear actor.

Nuclear Terrorism: A Real Danger?

Nuclear terrorism is a real threat in the contemporary times. According to the Pentagon review, nuclear terrorism is the most immediate and extreme danger that United States is facing today. To inflict massive devastation only 25 kilogram of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) is sufficient that can fit into a small suitcase.[11] It means that terrorists may steal

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[7] Rahmatullah Nabil, The World Must Secure Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons, *New York Times*, April 20,2017,

[8] Ibid

[9] Joseph V. Micallef, The Other Bomb: Pakistan's Dangerous Nuclear Strategy, *Huffington Post*, December 06,2017,

[10] Ankit Panda, Just How Secure Are India and Pakistan's Nuclear Security Materials, *The Diplomat*, January 21,2016,

[11] Centre for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, "Nuclear Terrorism: a Clear and Present Danger," https://armscontrolcenter.org/nuclear-terrorism-a-clear-and-present-danger/, August 1, 2016,

the stuff of a bomb like HEU or plutonium; though they cannot make a nuclear bomb but could construct a crude bomb. Such crude bomb exploded into an urban target may kill hundreds of thousands.[12] Graham Allison answers to the question that could terrorist steal HEU or Pu? "The answer is 'Yes' ".[13] The number of incidents from 1993-2008 involving theft of nuclear or other radioactive material are 421 which were reported to IAEA. According to Mathew Bunn the only way that can minimize chances of nuclear terrorism is consolidating nuclear weapons and radioactive material. To him nuclear security will increase after the implementation of Nuclear Security Implementation Initiative agreed upon by all the participating states to have regular reviews of their nuclear security arrangements.[14]

Pakistan's Concerted Cooperation on Nuclear Security

In the first Nuclear Security Summit (2010) held at Washington D.C Pakistan's Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gillani met the U.S. President Barack Obama and the latter acknowledged better standards of Pakistan's nuclear safety and security. After the 2010 NSS, a non-binding communiqué was issued recognizing nuclear terrorism as one of the most pressing challenges to international peace and security.

In the NSS (2010) all the participants reaffirmed the fundamental responsibility to advance the agenda of nuclear security. Nuclear related material (highly enriched uranium and plutonium) requires special precautions to store and secure. It was agreed that all states should implement nuclear security commitments and also urged others to join it. It also reaffirmed the role of IAEA in nuclear security framework. Much needed capacity building for nuclear security was agreed upon at multilateral, bilateral and regional level. The NSS 2010 also underlined the importance of effectively preventing illicit nuclear trafficking. Participants expressed to support implementation of strong nuclear security practices. After the NSS 2010, Iran hosted a conference on *Disarmament and Non-Proliferation* in April, 2010 and another conference in May, 2010 on *Treaty*

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[12] Joe Cirincione, "Nuclear Terrorist Threat, Bigger Than You Think," https://edition.cnn.com/2016/04/01/opinions/nuclear-terrorism-threat-cirincione/index.html, accessed March 21, 2018,

[13] Graham Allison, "Nuclear Terrorism Fact Sheet," Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs, April 1, 2010, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/nuclear-terrorism-fact-sheet.

[14] Matthew Bunn,Martin B. Malin,Nickolas Roth,William H. Tobey, "Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Continuous Improvement or Dangerous Decline?," Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs, accessed July12, 2018, https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/PreventingNuclearTerrorism-Web.pdf.

on the non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was held at the United Nations.[15]

The National Command Authority (NCA) is the apex decision making body of nuclear weapons as Pakistan's Prime Minister is the chairman of this strategic body. Basically the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) acts as a secretariat of NCA. The SPD supports NCA in multiple ways as it provides technical solutions, personnel reliability program and intelligence capabilities to deal with issues like nuclear security, non-proliferation and accidents. The NCA control matters related to policy, procurement and nuclear security. To augment Pakistan's nuclear security, Pakistan's nuclear security regime is based on multi-layered defence i.e. threat from insider, outsider or cyber-threat. "Pakistan's nuclear security regime is guided by five Ds – deter, detect, delay, defend and destroy". The Special Response Force (SRF) ensures security of nuclear assets.[16]

Pakistan being a responsible nuclear state welcomed Obama's initiative for securing nuclear weapons and bewaring international community about risk of loose nukes falling into the hands of terrorist organizations. Already established regimes and organizations have been focusing on the matters of nuclear proliferation, disarmament and the issues of danger of nuclear terrorism. The NSS (2010) claimed to strengthen nuclear security to eliminate the chances of terrorists' acquiring nukes. That summit also brought stakeholders on a single platform where they could interact about maximizing cooperation in the field of securing nuclear technology. Pakistan chose to be the part of this summit because of the non-obligatory nature of this regime. Pakistan and India have not signed Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), but they could still be engaged in dialogue with the permanent members of United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Pakistan hoped to dispel misperceptions about the nuclear safety and security of Pakistan that western mainstream media often hyped about it. International mainstream media often made headlines about the fear of nuclear terrorism in Pakistan and possible India-Pakistan nuclear exchange.[17] But through this forum Pakistan got an opportunity to present facts about the standards of its nuclear safety and security. Obama's rationale of establishing NSS was based on the

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[15] Matthew Berger Eli Clifton, "Ngos Praise u.s. Leadership On Nukes," Internet Archive, April 12, 2010, https://web.archive.org/web/*/http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=51015..

[16] Nuclear Security Summit 2014, "National Statement Pakistan," Harvard University, accessed March 22, 2018, http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/nuclearmatters/files/pakistan_national_statement_0.pdf.

[17] David Leigh, Wikileaks Cables Expose Pakistan Nuclear Fears, *Guardian*, November 30, 2010, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/30/wikileaks-cables-pakistan-nuclear-fears.

preventing theft of nuclear weapons and related materials and nuclear sabotage.

Former Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Mohammed El-Baradei author of *The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times (2011)* and *Atoms for Peace: A Pictorial History of the International Atomic Energy Agency* (2007) stated "Nuclear terrorism is the most serious danger the world is facing"[18].For terrorist, if they get control of nuclear material, only with an amount of 25 kg, Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), they could possibly make an improvised nuclear device. That can work as nuclear weapon and may have capacity to wreak massive destruction.[19] Graham Allison, a Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at Harvard Kennedy School and a former Director at Belfer Center writes that responsible nations of the world can prevent nuclear terrorism with a simple approach, the UNSCR 1887 calls upon all the member states to improve the standards of nuclear security by securing nuclear materials. The UNSCR 1887 seeks progress for further steps towards disarmament.[20] The UNSC is the diplomatically rigorous platform to cooperate on this issue of global concern. Pakistan being a non-signatory of NPT and CTBT does not encourage any steps at international forums towards disarmament, because it follows the footmarks of other nuclear actors. Secondly, these strategic weapons ensure security of Pakistan against any external threat and also play pivotal role in maintaining credible minimum deterrence against India.

Pakistan and India are strong contenders for Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) membership and the criteria is that a country with better non-proliferation record and better levels of nuclear security may get entrance to NSG. India as an aspiring state to get permanent membership of the UNSC with 'veto power', became a proactive contributor to safety and security of nuclear weapons by implementing 1540 United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR).Adopted in 2004 under 'Chapter VII' of the United Nations Charter, UNSCR 1540 formally establishes the proliferation and possession of WMD by non-state actors as "a threat to international peace and security."[21] To project efforts in compliance with UNSCR 1540, India has conducted training courses on physical protection of nuclear weapons

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[18] Graham Allison, "Nuclear Terrorism Fact Sheet," Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs, April 1, 2010, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/nuclear-terrorism-fact-sheet.

[19] Carson Mark,Theodore Taylor, Eugene Eyster,William Maraman, and Jacob Wechsler, "Can terrorists build nuclear weapons.," http://www.nci.org/k-m/makeab.htm, accessed May 17, 2018,

[20] United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1887 (2009)," United Nations Security Council Resolution, September 24, 2009, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/1887.

[21] United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1540 (2004)," United Nations Security Council Resolution, April 28, 2004, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1540(2004).

and nuclear installations; under the aegis of IAEA .Now New Delhi is willing to offer the training course on the protection of nuclear weapons and their installations as a regional training centre in future.[22] It goes one step further by offering legislation on Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (OPNW).

Indian diplomacy at international level got more vivacious to project its image as a responsible nuclear state that has a strong track-record of nuclear non-proliferation and no incident of proliferation ever surfaced. Indian leadership envisages it as global player including membership of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).[23] The initiative of NSS has not only improved Pakistan's security but also India's as well which augurs well for regional peace and stability.

Drivers of Nuclear Security Summit

Director General of the IAEA in 2008 stated that terrorist organizations were struggling to acquire nuclear weapons and if they succeed, they will not wait to use it. The IAEA reports also pinpointed that some of the components of nuclear weapons were in black market and about fifteen such cases were reported in 2008 alone.[24] Osama Bin Laden tried to buy nuclear material from black market in February, 2001.A Saudi fugitive provided trail in U.S. court about Bin Laden's intention to buy Uranium worth of $1.5million in Sudan.[25] Al-Qaeda is not alone in attempts to acquire nukes but other transnational terrorist organizations made similar attempts to gain access to nuclear technology. A terrorist group from Japan, Aum Shinrikyo has also been involved in clandestine efforts to acquire nuclear technology.[26] The NSS has been an attempt to avert any such accidents or proliferation incidents which can threaten regional peace and lives of millions.

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[22] Nuclear Threat Initiative, "India 1540 Reporting," Nuclear Threat Initiative, September 14, 2015, http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/india-1540-reporting/.

[23] TNN, Nsg Still Unsure On India's Membership, *Times of India*, June 25,2017, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/nsg-still-unsure-on-indias-membership/articleshow/59304868.cms.

[24] Tanya Ogilvie-White and Jack Boureston, "Seeking Nuclear Security through Greater International Coordination," Council on Foreign Relation, March 19, 2010, https://www.cfr.org/report/seeking-nuclear-security-through-greater-international-coordination.

[25] Julian Borger, Ewen MacAskill, Bin Laden Is Looking for a Nuclear Weapon: How Close Has He Come?, *Guardian*, November 07,2001, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/nov/07/afghanistan.terrorism.

[26] Matthew Bunn,Martin B. Malin,Nickolas Roth,William H. Tobey, "Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: Continuous Improvement or Dangerous Decline?," Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs, accessed July12, 2018, https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/PreventingNuclearTerrorism-Web.pdf.

Some of the critiques of Pakistan's nuclear program express dissatisfaction over Pakistan's nuclear safety and security. They fear nukes falling into the hands of terrorists. The counter-argument for such propaganda is to understand about the safety and security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons. In fact, very limited information about Pakistan's nuclear weapons is known to other countries. Even the leading research organization in the world, do not know the exact size of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and its capacity. There are only estimates that help other countries make assessment about Pakistan's nuclear program and their numbers. Pakistan's strategic weapons are under the control of military's Strategic Plans Division (SPD).There were fears during the time of war against terrorism and political instability in the country. The SPD launched a public relations offensive to counter scaremongering over nuclear assets' security. Pakistan rules out any fear of nuclear weapons falling into hands of militants.[27]
Nuclear terrorism is a nightmare because of its risk of massive destruction. The first Nuclear Security Summit was an attempt to secure nuclear materials and about 1500 kilogram of highly enriched Uranium was eliminated within the span of 6 years. Other hallmark steps were also taken by states including establishing centers of Excellence, education, research and training. The NSS in the very early phase because of the training and research centre managed to make countries Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) risk free.

Japan's nuclear emergency has been a precedent that safety of nuclear reactors was also a challenge even a natural disaster could risk populace of nuclear state. Fukushima's nuclear disaster as a consequence of Tsunami in March, 2011 caused disabling of power supply to three Daiichi nuclear reactors. Cores of three reactors melted and caused radioactive release. For Japan the task was to cool off and prevent the release of radioactive materials. There were about 100,000 people evacuated from the areas to avoid any deaths and sickness from radiation.[28] Fukushima incident had greater impact on other states with nuclear reactors as many states took initiatives to strengthen nuclear safety measures.

The objective of NSS was to secure the material throughout the world in four years. The removal of fissile materials and safety efforts were the early focus of NSS, but the NSS broadened its scope to include the nuclear safety, international governance issues and radiological sources.[29]

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[27] Reuters, Q A: Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons,safe or Not?, *Reuters*, May 23,2011, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-attack-nukes/qa-pakistans-nuclear-weapons-safe-or-not-idUSTRE74M07J20110523.

[28] Bettina BF, Wittneben, "The Impact of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident On European Energy Policy," *Environmental Science and Policy* 15, no. 1 (2012): 3,

[29] Bowen, W., M. Cottee, H. Christopher, L. Lentini, and M. Moran, *Nuclear Security Briefing Book* (London: King's College London, 2016), 15.

Threat of Nuclear Terrorism in Pakistan

The Nuclear Security Summit 2012 held at Seoul, focused on 11 areas including role of the IAEA, global nuclear security architecture, nuclear materials, radioactive substances, transportation of Nuclear material, nuclear safety and security, nuclear forensic, preventing illicit trafficking, international security cooperation, information security and nuclear security culture. Inferred from the previous NSS 2010 main issues of 2012 Summit were:[30]

- Cooperative measures to prevent threat of nuclear terrorism
- Protecting nuclear and related materials
- Preventing illicit trafficking of nuclear materials.

Seoul Communiqué advanced agenda for securing nukes and preventing radiological terrorism by taking sufficient measures.

Bunn, Harrell and Malin (March 2012), put forth in their research entitled "*Progress on Securing Weapons and Materials*: *The Four-Year Effort and Beyond"* that put more emphasis on the primary task of the world to avoid theft of nuclear materials. Pakistan, undeniably took measure to secure nuclear materials but chances of nuclear terrorism are not zero all over the world. If terrorists could hit Pentagon in 2001, then any country on the planet, irrespective of power is prone to nuclear terrorism. By adopting stringent measures Pakistan also reduced risk of nuclear theft. Barack Obama, the former President of the United States acknowledged that Pakistan's nuclear program is secure but U.S. government still showed greater concern over the security of Pakistan's nuclear assets.[31] At the same time some concerns like some insider may help terrorists to make the bomb or another unwarranted fear that terrorists may take over Islamabad and new Taliban-like government would pose greatest challenge to world through nuclear blackmail. Taliban-like government in Islamabad is highly unlikely and Pakistan's nuclear establishment keeps a stricter control of the secrecy of the matter. But risk of nuclear sabotage from India is more realistic than hypothetical Taliban-style government in Pakistan. India has been proactive stalling Pakistan's research and development and also maligning Pakistan's image internationally as an agent of proliferation. Though Pakistan is in cooperation with the United States but the former does not permit even the U.S. experts to physically visit Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Secrecy of Pakistan's nukes is also upmost concerning Pakistan's nuclear doctrine.[32]

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[30] Nuclear Security Summit 2014, "National Security Summit," Nuclear Security Summit 2016, accessed June 27, 2018, http://www.nss2016.org/past-summits/2014/.

[31] Pakistan's Steps for Nuclear Security Appreciated by Obama, *Pakistan Today*, April 04,2016, https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2016/04/04/pakistans-steps-for-nuclear-security-appreciated-by-obama/.

[32] Sadia Tasleem, "Pakistan's Nuclear Use Doctrine," Carnegie Endowment, accessed August 01, 2018, http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/pakistan-s-nuclear-use-doctrine-pub-63913.

Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris in "Pakistan's nuclear forces, 2011" quote International Panel on Fissile Materials on inventory of Pakistan's nuclear weapons by late 2010 that "Pakistan's inventory of nuclear weapons was approximately of 2,600 kilograms (kg) of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and roughly 100 kg of weapon-grade plutonium (International Panel on Fissile Materials, 2010).This amount is enough to produce 160 to 240 warheads".[33] According to Arms Control Association, Indian Nuclear Arsenal is estimated to have at least 520 kilograms of plutonium which is enough to make between 100 and 120 nuclear devices.[34] Given such a hostile nature of relations between both countries and abundance of nuclear weapons, fear of escalation alerted international community. Therefore, Participation of both the countries in the NSS was welcoming step towards achieving nuclear security in South Asia.

After the hunting of Osama Bin Laden in Operation Neptune Spear by U.S. navy SEALS in Abbottabad, Pakistan it was a perception among international community that Osama Bin Laden was residing in Pakistan's strategically important area, very close to Pakistan's military academy and therefore potential terrorists may steal nuclear weapons or related technology. Observers also wondered that U.S. had done operation deep into Pakistan and if Pakistan's Nuclear weapons were safe from any possible U.S or Indian incursion. To dispel that concern it is argued that Pakistan's nuclear weapons are dispersed in the country and installed on various unknown locations that are under extreme security and secrecy. But the weapons are not installed in a ready to launch form rather unassembled form with the cores separated from weapons and also stored separately from delivery system.[35] Such an arrangement of nuclear security provides a foolproof security to Pakistan's nuclear weapons which make it impregnable to any infiltrator.

Some of the critiques pose questions that during 2009 Pakistan experienced surge in terrorist attacks even Pakistan army's general headquarters also came under attack from terrorists, Pakistan's naval base Mehran also was attacked, in the light of such events critiques opine that any undesirable incident is likely. Any nation combating terrorism certainly bears loss of lives as well as material. The U.S. and allied forces are under multiple attacks in Kabul since 2001 and there is no end in sight. Indian outposts in Pathankot and Uri were attacked by terrorists in 2016. Therefore, it may not be established that the U.S. and India may not secure nuclear weapons. Japan's Fukushima incident (2011) revealed that Japan needs to bolster its nuclear safety against any natural disaster but it may not be assumed Japan is

[33] Hans M. Kristensen,Robert S. Norris, "Pakistan's Nuclear Forces, 2011," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 67, no. 4 (2011): 92,

[34] Kyle Mizokami, This Is Why the World Should Fear India's Nuclear Weapons, *The National Interest*, May 27,2017,

[35] Kristensen(2011), 93

incapable of guarding nuclear reactors. There is a common perception that major threat to nuclear assets comes from physical threats but cyber one is also potential to breach nuclear security.

Dr. Andrew Futter of Leicester University in an article answered important questions about vulnerability of U.K's nuclear arsenals from cyber attack. He answered "We must assume the answer is yes," He also highlighted that the most vulnerable system are modern and complex .The nuclear software can be altered during process of their building and hackers could manipulate the information of the system that states solely rely on. Futter underlines that three things surprised him

I. Overwhelming confidence of governments about their capability to protect nuclear weapons
II. Cyber debate was hindered by lack of common understanding about what cyber meant?
III. Human-computer interface are easier target in cyber operations.[36]

Pakistan faced less cyber attacks than other advanced countries. Pakistan's nuclear weapons are less vulnerable to cyber-threats than U.K. U.S. France, Russia, China and India. The Evan Braden Montgomery in his report "*Nuclear Terrorism Assessing the Threat, Developing a Response"* argues that Pakistan's leadership is not safer from assassination attempts. Musharaf faced multiple assassination attempts while Benazir Bhutto was killed by terrorists. It can be argued that security of an individual does not match with security of a nuclear arsenal. It would be naïve to draw a comparison between both.

Pakistan's Vivacious Response to NSS

After initiation of Obama's Nuclear Security Summit, Pakistan welcomed Obama's initiative and took several steps advancing towards more betters standards of nuclear security. Pakistan set up "Pakistan's Centre of Excellence for Nuclear Security" in 2012 to offer education and training on nuclear security in collaboration with international networks.

The IAEA acknowledged that Pakistan's first line officers are in better position to curtail risk of trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials because of using advanced radiation detection and monitoring equipment. This is the major benefit that Pakistan reaped from the centre and also building its national capacity through technical and scientific support programs. Pakistan's Centre for Excellence also extends support to personnel involved in maintenance and up gradation of the nuclear facilities. Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority Chairman Muhammad Anwar Habib claimed that with an integrated capacity building program in place, Pakistan

[36] "Cyber Threats to Nuclear Weapons: Should We Worry? A Conversation with dr. Andrew Futter," Nuclear Threat Initiative, January 25, 2017, http://www.nti.org/analysis/atomic-pulse/cyber-threats-nuclear-weapons-should-we-worry-conversation-dr-andrew-futter/.

can offer capacity building and training to other countries for physical protection of nuclear power plants and their security.

Abha Dixit in her research "Pakistan's National Centre of Excellence contributes to sustaining nuclear security" highlights three institutes in Pakistan committed to aggrandize nuclear security. Pakistan's measures to demonstrate its consolidated efforts include best practices through three affiliated institute in Pakistan,

- Pakistan Centre of Excellence for Nuclear Security (PCENS)
- Pakistan Institute of Engineering and Applied Sciences (PIEAS)
- National Institute of Safety and Security (NISAS).

Three of these institutes offer training in nuclear security. The PCENS particularly imparts training in nuclear security and response. The PIEAS being an institute conducts academic courses whereas NISAS conducts courses on providing comprehensive training for regulatory operations.[37]

The IAEA Director General in March 2014 stated "It is very impressive that you organize the training in a very systemic and operational manner."[38] Pakistan is also implementing Nuclear Security Action Plan (NSAP) in cooperation with IAEA to manage radioactive sources and prepare to handle any emergency situation.

The Strategic Plans Division (SPD) has a very credible procedure that runs strict reliability personnel program. It has launched intelligence to counter internal and external security threats, risk of proliferation, preventing fear of nuclear terrorism and any other related accidents. Pakistan's nuclear program's essential part is safeguarding these strategic assets from any danger whether from terrorists or from other inimical states.

The SPD is the secretariat of National Command Authority that reinforces nuclear security as well. Based on safety and security measures taken by Pakistan, it is also contributing to promote agenda for nuclear safety and security. In addition, Pakistan, being member of the IAEA security commissions, contributes to IAEA's goal of promoting nuclear related safety. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) developed the Nuclear Security Support Centre (NSSC) aimed at strengthening sustainability of nuclear security in countries with following stated objectives

I. Developing of human resource through specially designed training programs
II. Establishing a network of experts

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[37] Aabha Dixit, "Pakistan's National Centre of Excellence Contributes to Sustaining Nuclear Security," *IAEA Bulletin (Online)* 57, no. 4 (2016): 22, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/magazines/bulletin/bull57-4/5742222.pdf.

[38] Najam Rafique, "Pakistan's Role in Nuclear Security Summit," *Institute of Strategic Studies* (March 25,2016): 2, http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Report-Roundtable-NSS-March-25.pdf.

III. Response to nuclear security events by offering technical support for equipment management.[39]

Organizations and Institutions

Research laboratories under the control of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) which played a pivotal role in development of Pakistan's nuclear program are responsible for research and development of nukes. Pakistan's nukes are heavily guarded under layered defence system, electronic sensors and counter-intelligence teams.[40]

In 23rd meeting of the National Command Authority (NCA) held on 21 December, 2017 and chaired by Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, NCA was briefed on strategic environment. The NCA also took stock of regional security environment especially Indian acts to destabilize regional stability in South Asian region. The NCA reiterated to avoid any arms race with India but adherence to Pakistan's full spectrum deterrence in line with credible minimum nuclear deterrence.[41] In that meeting nuclear scientists were congratulated upon new additions into defence capability of Pakistan. Most importantly, NCA took a detailed review of Nuclear Security Regime and expressed its confidence in command and control of nuclear weapons. The NCA also re-affirmed that Pakistan is a responsible nuclear state and would continue contributing towards security of nuclear weapons under IAEA domain.[42]

Pakistan's nukes are guarded through multi-layered security that takes place via land, air and sea. Multilayered system detects any sort of radiation on places like borders, airport, and railways crossing to curb chances of proliferation. Cargos that pass through such passages can also be scanned through to prevent smuggling of nuclear technology and materials.

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is a transnational terrorist group which has expanded its network from Iraq and Syria to Afghanistan and Pakistan. According to an assessment of National Nuclear Security Administration (NSSA), this group is vying to acquire nuclear technology through sympathetic operatives who may belong to organizations dealing with nuclear weapons. Though Pakistan's nuclear security has increased substantially but this group is active through its skillful operatives in cyber-crime. Barack Obama speaking on 2016 Nuclear Security at Washington D.C. warned of ISIS' lethality and David Cameron (former U.K PM) offered

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[39] Aabha Dixit, "Pakistan's National Centre of Excellence Contributes to Sustaining Nuclear Security

[40] Naeem Salik, Kenneth N. Luongo, "Challenges for Pakistan's Nuclear Security," Arms Control, January 14, 2018, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2013_03/Challenges-for-Pakistans-Nuclear-Security.

[41] ISPR, "Press Release, "inter Services Public Relations," ISPR, accessed August 01, 2018, https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&id=4459#pr_link4459.

[42] Ibid.

British help to other countries to ensure that terrorists could not get hold of radioactive materials.[43] Regional states have started cooperation in curbing any chances of nuclear smuggling leading to nuclear terrorism. Constant cooperation of member states with (NNSA) and Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) is indispensible to increase security of nuclear technology and related materials.

Augmenting Nuclear Security through Training Programs

Pakistan is making unrelenting efforts to secure nuclear weapons globally as it ratified Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) in 2016 and also established Centre of Excellence (COE) on nuclear security by cooperating with IAEA. It also did host the annual meeting of International Network of Nuclear Support Centers as a proactive member of international community to dope up global challenge of nuclear security. Other steps include up-gradation of security measure of medical center's nuclear security system, nuclear power plant and civilian nuclear power plants to add to better security practices. Among other practices of securing nukes, Pakistan also established nuclear emergency management system to prevent smuggling of radiological materials, India also took several steps to increase its nuclear security because India and Pakistan are contenders for Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Both the countries are non-signatory of Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the criteria for entrance into NSG is that a country with better track record of non-proliferation and support of NSG members has brighter chances of getting entry into exclusive group. India also established national counter smuggling team to prevent the threats of nuclear materials smuggling through sea and air routes.[44]

Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) is the competent and independent body for the regulation of nuclear safety, physical protection, and radiation protection. It also deals with transportation and waste safety of nuclear materials. The PNRA established a modern and well equipped school for radiation and nuclear safety. To respond to any radiation accidents or nuclear emergency it offers courses, tabletop exercises and workshops to train the personnel. Pakistan's Strategic Export Control Division in ministry of foreign affairs has revised export control list by

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[43] Charlie Cooper, Isis Nuclear Bomb Is a Serious Threat,warns Barack Obama, *Independent*, April 01,2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/isis-nuclear-bomb-is-a-serious-threat-warns-barack-obama-a6964621.html.

[44] "Nuclear Security Summit 2016 –highlights from the National Progress Report," The White House Archives, accessed January 09, 2018, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/04/nuclear-security-summit-2016-highlights-national-progress-reports.

consulting concerned departments. Its ultimate objective is to improve the implementation of Export Control on Goods, materials, technologies and equipment related to nuclear and biological weapons and their delivery system under the control of Delivery System Act (Strategic Export Control Act - 2004). The Act of revising list of Export Controls is up to following organizations i.e. European Union, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime and Australia Group. These steps are highlighting Pakistan's stringent measures at international forums which would benefit Pakistan's entry into NSG and also improve Pakistan's image as a responsible nuclear state.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) holds that all of the states in international community shall refrain from sharing any sort of technology to non-state actors particularly terrorist groups, which may help them manufacturing any biological, chemical or nuclear weapons. This resolution requires all member states of the United Nations to take appropriate measures to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons and their delivery system.[45] Pakistan is already complying with UNSCR 1540 by submitting reports to a committee that it has taken ample measures on radiological security and control of sensitive information and materials particularly WMDs.[46]

Development on Counter Radiological and Nuclear Smuggling

Based on Pakistan's practices of nuclear safety and security, the IAEA acknowledged that no single incident of nuclear trafficking has been reported whereas European nations are technologically advanced but some of the incidents of illegal trafficking have been reported there. According to an annual report published by James Martin *Centre for Nonproliferation Studies*, there have been 325 reported incidents across 38 countries, in which nuclear material was either lost or outside regulatory control. Weapon-usable material was identified only in a single incident with less than a gram of highly enriched Uranium. Overall, only 5 % of the cases involved high risk radioactive materials.[47]

Another report on nuclear trafficking revealed that about 827 incidents of nuclear trafficking occurred between 1993 and 2005 but Pakistan was not involved in any of those incidents. Pakistan is set to meet international standards on regulating nuclear materials.[48] Pakistan's

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[45] "UN Security Council Resolution 1540(2004)",

[46] "Press Information Department," Press Information Department, accessed June 10, 2018, http://www.pid.gov.pk/?p=3053.

[47] " Annual Report-2014, CNS Global Incident and Trafficking Database," *Nuclear Threat Initiative*, Accessed January 5, 2018, http://www.nti.org/media/documents/global_incidents_and_trafficking_2014.pdf

[48] Pakistan Not On Iaea N-Trafficking Database, *DAWN*, September 08,2006, https://www.dawn.com/news/209490

multifaceted strategy to aggrandize nuclear safety and security incorporated improvement of national control structure for the advancement of physical protection of nuclear power plants in Karachi.

Improving Radiological and Nuclear Security

There is an extensive use of radioactive material in medical sciences and Pakistan upgraded its radioactive sources in collaboration with IAEA. In line with that Pakistan established more than dozen medical centers across the country. Now Pakistan voluntarily is willing to share its expertise with other nations about power generation and research for civil purposes under the supervision of IAEA.

India is watchful of its strategic interest concerning security of nuclear weapons. Indian parliament was attacked in December, 2001; Mumbai's hotel Taj Mahal came under terrorist attack in 2008, Uri and Pathankot attacks 2016 are the incidents that reflect Indian nuclear arsenals may also come under possible terrorist attacks. Despite the risk of nuclear terrorism in India, United States agreed to offer civil nuclear deal to India(Indo-US Nuclear deal 2005).Under the Indo-US civil nuclear deal, India agreed to separate its civil nuclear from military nuclear facilities. India also opened civil nuclear facilities for inspection of the IAEA and placed all civil nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. In exchange for this reform, the United States agreed to extend fullest civil nuclear cooperation to India

But India is keener to get entry into Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). United States supports Indian campaign for NSG membership. Pakistan faces fierce opposition from India and United States to get NSG membership. Some senators in congress of the United States raise concerns about Pakistan's membership of NSG. A worst possible scenario would be when India gets entry and Pakistan is stalled, it will exacerbate regional stability. China through shrewd diplomatic ventures tries to maintain strategic balance between India and Pakistan.

That single deal turned India from energy deficient country to energy surplus country. India has not taken even extraordinary steps to ensure nuclear safety but to favor India; U.S. put international norms on backburner and clinched a deal with India. Being non-signatory of NPT and CTBT India may not be offered any civil nuclear deal that is in direct contravention to IAEA statues.

Major concern of both South Asian nuclear neighbors is that NPT is discriminatory. Though Pakistan is not a signatory of NPT but it has established stringent control on export control to demonstrate a character of responsible nuclear actor. Belfer Centre and Arms Control released a report in March, 2016 about Pakistan authenticating Pakistan's foolproof security

measures of its nuclear arsenals even better in standards than neighboring India.[49]

Risk of External Threats to Nuclear Security

Some of the issues concerning Indo-Pakistan nuclear clash may not be properly dealt with under the NSS. Such issues need to be resolved through political leadership of both nations and should avoid any confrontational posture. Indian army Chief Gen. Bipinn Rawat made a strong statement about Pakistan that "We will call the (nuclear) bluff of Pakistan. If we will have to really confront the Pakistan, and a task is given to us, we are not going to say we cannot cross the border because they have nuclear weapons."[50] Indian Air Force commander, Air Chief Marshal Birender Singh Dhanoa also made a similar statement that Indian Air Force (IAF) has the capability for locating and destroying Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. "As far as IAF is concerned, it has the ability to locate, fix and strike and that is not only for tactical nuclear weapons but also for other targets across the border".[51]

Former U.S. Senator Larry Pressler went much forward than India to suggest a joint Indo-US preemptive strike to destroy Pakistan's nuclear sites. While talking to *Times of India* he termed Donald Trump as the best president of the United States who put Pakistan on a notice for harboring terrorists' networks on its soil.[52] Larry Has a history of anti-Pakistan struggle as he has been senator in three terms and twice as member of House of Representative. He introduced Pressler Amendment in 1990 to block U.S. military aid to Pakistan because of the development of Pakistan's Nuclear weapons. He also was behind barring delivery of 30 F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan and regarded as hero in India.

To catch the attention of International media, India lodged extensive propaganda campaign against Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, as terrorist targeted Kamra Aeronautical Complex 45 miles away from capital city Islamabad .Even the credible news paper *The Telegraph*, reported with the caption that

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[49] Hassan Abbas, Deciphering the Attack On Pakistan Army's Headquarters, *Foreign Policy*, October 11,2009, http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/11/deciphering-the-attack-on-pakistans-army-headquarters/.

[50] "Ready to Call Pakistan's Nuclear Bluff," *DNA India*, January 12, 2018, http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report-ready-to-call-pakistan-s-nuclear-bluff-if-needed-army-chief-rawat-2575021

[51] Naveed Ahmad, "Can India Destroy Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal?" *The Express Tribune*, October 12,2017 https://tribune.com.pk/story/1529367/can-india-destroy-pakistans-nuclear-arsenal/

[52] Vaibhav Purandarel, India-Us Should Go for Preemptive Strike, Destroy Pakistan's Nuclear Assets, *Times of India*, September 26,2017, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-us-should-go-for-pre-emptive-strikes-destroy-paks-n-assets-ex-us-senator/articleshow/60834852.cms.

"*Militants attack Pakistan Nuclear Air base*".[53] Whereas Pakistan Air Force officials claimed that the Kamra attack was aimed at destroying American fighters plane used for bombing Taliban militants in restive tribal areas of Pakistan.[54]

India and the United States raised serious concerns that terrorists may get control of Pakistan's nuclear weapons in such attacks against Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, whereas all such claims of India and United States were mere a propaganda. Pakistan's nuclear installations are heavily guarded which are invincible to such terrorist attacks. Pakistan's nuclear establishment has designed flawless management to deal with internal and external security risks to nuclear assets.

The Nuclear Security Summit 2014 was held at The Hague on March 24-25, 2014. Fifty eight world leaders gathered there to continue efforts for securing nuclear weapons across globe. Chinese President Xi Jin Ping and U.S. President Barack Obama also attended the Summit which reflected seriousness of the U.S. and China to avert risk of proliferation and safety and security of nuclear weapons. The NSS 2014 was basically reiteration of world leaders to enhance cooperation on nuclear security and assessing standards of global nuclear security. Once again all the participating states reiterated adhering to reduce dangerous materials especially Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and plutonium. Among the other top agenda of NSS 2014 was to increase international cooperation on preventing nuclear terrorism and securing all radioactive materials.

The concept of 'gift basket' was more encouraging for participants to take special measures to contribute towards international cause of peace and security. Gift basket meant extra initiatives of states to present themselves as role models for other states. The Netherland developed gift basket by improving expertise regarding nuclear forensics with the help of the Netherland Forensic Institute (NFI).But unfortunately these talks were overshadowed by Ukrainian crisis, also Iran and North Korea were absentees of the NSS 2014.Pakistan's National Statement of NSS 2016 reiterated strong commitment to objective of nuclear security through its sustained efforts. Pakistan's the then Foreign Secretary Aizaz Cahudhary stated that Pakistan has been proactively engaged with international community to promote nuclear safety and security. Mr. Aizaz at *International Conference on Nuclear Security: Commitments and Actions* held at Vienna on December 5-9, 2016 clarified that Pakistan's export control regime is at par with the standards maintained by Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Regime and the Australia Group. He also urged to remove barriers for

[53] Dean Nelson , Tom Hussain, Militants Attack Pakistan's Nuclear Air Base, *The Telegraph*, August 16,2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/9479041/Militants-attack-Pakistan-nuclear-air-base.html

[54] Ibid

equitable and nondiscriminatory access to civil nuclear cooperation that ensures to safe and responsible nuclear trade among member states for peaceful purposes. Pakistan's nuclear program has achieved higher standards of security equivalent to great powers and all those unfound fears of critiques stand invalid.

Conclusion

Nuclear safety and security are the gigantic challenges that need attention of international community. Without the cooperation of all nuclear actors particularly Pakistan such efforts to secure nuclear weapons are in vain. Some terrorist groups tried to acquire nuclear technology through smuggling and black market but such efforts were curbed through intelligence based operations and efforts of International Atomic Energy Agency. Pakistan's nuclear assets are much safer than India as claimed by Harvard University Report, despite that Pakistan is making unrelenting efforts to contribute much to reach at a level where international propaganda against Pakistan's nuclear assets may not undermine its repute globally. Pakistan government needs to extensively launch diplomacy on dispelling misapprehensions about Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. It should also underline training programs and educations courses designed for nuclear safety and security. Pakistan's export control regime is at par with the standards of NSG. The United States may not adopt discriminatory policy in awarding NSG membership to India whereas Pakistan has contributed more than the latter. Given Pakistan's multi-layered security system, it is unlikely that terrorists may attack Pakistan's nukes or acquire some technology for making crude-nuclear weapon. Pakistan's strategic assets are hard to target by India and the United States. Nuclear Security Summit ended with conclusion of NSS 2016, but International Atomic Energy Agency may continue that manifestation by organizing similar conferences on annual basis. Such an inclusive approach may end risk of nuclear terrorism by providing safety and security to nuclear weapons.

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THE LANGUAGE OF WAR: LOSS GAIN METAPHORICAL FRAMING IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WAR ON TERROR

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Abstract

War has always been an important issue in philosophy. Very many philosophers have discussed different aspects of war. This paper, using Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) as theoretical frame work, focuses on the language of war. It discusses 'War is Business' metaphor that ensues Loss Gain framing - informing public/audience that going into conflict/war is gain and not going is loss; winning war is gain and losing war is loss; status quo is risk; enemy's loss is our gain and our gain is enemy's loss. Moreover, helping the refugees and providing aid to the victims is narrated as, Corporate Social Responsibility. Loss gain framing, like other framings, blocks criticism on the pretext that critics don't want our gain and if we accept their arguments then there would be losses. This paper explains the way loss gain framing works in times of war and conflict. It focuses on the way this framing was instrumental in the context of the War on Terror in Afghanistan. The argument is: in the context of 9/11 leaders of both sides, especially Tony Blair, defined and framed the War on Terror in a way that it appeared that not going into war would entail great future losses.

Key Words: Language of War, Metaphor, Frame, Framing, War on Terror, Loss Gain

Introduction

Wars bring mass human suffering, murder and destruction, mass displacement of people, economic recession and a great harm to the environment; therefore, it has always been an important issue in philosophy. From Plato to modern times very many philosophers have discussed: What is war? What causes war? What moral values should be followed in war?

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What makes a war just? However, there are many other aspects of war and philosophers should explore and discuss those aspects too[1]. This paper using conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) discusses the use of language that evokes Loss Gain Framing in the context of war in general and the War on Terror (WOT) in Afghanistan in particular.

The paper is purposefully divided into two parts. The first part, discussing the methodology, briefly explains metaphors and framing. It delineates War is Business metaphor and Loss Gain framing. Moreover, it explains the way this framing can be instrumental in explaining a situation, specially war and conflict, as business activity. The second part of the paper argues that this framing was instrumental in the War on Terror. Leaders of the both sides were using this framing to persuade their followers for war. It mainly focuses on the narrative of the Prime Minister Tony Blair that he puts forth soon after 9/11. The reason is that a lot of people/critics were arguing that Britain has nothing to do with the war on terror, for the 9/11 attacks were not carried out on England. However, since England is a very close ally of United States of America, therefore they had to be very active partner of the grand alliance. In such a situation the Prime Minister informed the people of Britain about the future losses connected to not helping the partners and not fighting against the Taliban and Osama.

Metaphors, Frames and Loss Gain Framing

Lakoff, Johnson, Zoltan and other cognitive linguists argue that we are not consciously aware that the cognitive system we live by is mostly metaphorical- metaphor/ metaphorical understanding means,"…understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another."[2] For example, we do not know consciously that we understand Love in terms of a Journey, Arguments in terms of War, Life in terms of Purposeful Journey, Time in terms of Money/ Precious things. Similarly we, unknowingly, understand and conceptualize Banks in terms of Trees and Countries in terms of Families or Persons etc.

Since, concepts and ideas are expressed in language; therefore, a careful understanding of language reveals the way our conceptual structure looks like[3]. The following metaphorical expressions will make this point clear.

1. I have *lost* her- Life is a Journey- Now the person we think we have lost may be around us, we may see her everyday- still we say, 'I have *lost* her'. The reason is that we see life as a journey- we *meet* people in this journey;

[1] Moseley, Alexander, *A Philosophy of War*, (Algora Publishing New York, 2002): 1-5
[2] Lakoff, George and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, (The University of Chicago Press, 1980): 5
[3] Ibid p.4

we *lost* them; we *go along* with them; *part ways* with people; meet *strangers*; *miss* the bus or train; *wait* for someone that she will *come back*.

2. I have *given* you enough time- Time is Money- although we are normally not aware of the fact that we understand time in terms of money, but it becomes evident when we listen to metaphorical expressions such as: *budget* your time, *spend* your time carefully, *no more* time for you.

A metaphor consists of two domains: A Target domain and a Source domain. We understand target domain in terms of the source domain.[4] In, A Country is a Family- Target domain is Country and Family is the source domain. Our *children* are dying in war; the great scientist is proud *son* of this nation- the metaphor is A Country is a Family. For rich concepts such as Time, Life, Love, War, we have more than one conceptual mapping. For example: 'Do not *waste* my time'- Time is Money; but, 'Time has *come'*, 'Time will *decide'*- Time is a Person.

The metaphors originate and become part of our consciousness by doing different activities in life. For example, Journey, when we travel we clearly know that this activity has a goal/ destination. We have to follow a route. We meet people when traveling. Some of them have same destinations. Sometimes the road is smooth and sometimes it's difficult and bumpy. We have guides in a journey who keep on telling us about the right directions. 'Journey', is a delineated and clear concept. It, as a source domain, can help us understand less delineated concept such as life (target domain). Similarly, we have a clear and delineated concept of Family that we have gathered through our experiences. We live in a family, have siblings, and parents. We have a set of values our families live by. People sacrifice their lives for their families. Sons/daughters do big things and make their families proud and bring honor to their families. Family can be a good source domain and can help us understand target domains such as Country.

Fillmore explains a frame as,

> By the term 'frame' I have in mind any system of concepts related in such a way that to understand any one of them you have to understand the whole structure in which it fits; when one of the things in such a structure is introduced into a text, or into a conversation, all of the others are automatically made available.[5]

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[4] Zolthan Kovecses. *Metaphor: A Practical introduction*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010): 4

[5]Fillmore Charles J. *Frame Semantics*: Cognitive Linguistics: Basic Reading: edited by Dirk Geeraerts, (New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2006): 273, (originally published in 1982 in *Linguistics in the Morning Calm*, Linguistic Society of Korea (ed.), 111-137. Seoul: Hanshin publishing. Reprinted with permission) (accessed June 22, 2009)

For example: War- it is not just another word. It is a frame, a system of many concepts connected to each other such as: army, tanks, enemy, drone attacks, destroy, friendly fire, refuges, internally displaced people, missiles, surrender etc. When any of these concepts are introduced in a conversation the frame of War gets evoked. For instance, if we get the information, "10 people died in the drone attack", the frame of war gets evoked and different concepts related to war by design/ unconsciously comes in our mind.

Lakoff and Johnson reveal, "… the conceptual frames that inhabit our cognitive unconscious *contribute semantically* to the meanings of words and sentences."[6] Lakoff defines a frame as a conceptual/mental structure that shapes our world view. Consequently, he argues, "…they [frames] shape the goals we seek, the plans we make, the way we act, and what counts as a good or bad outcome of our actions."[7]

In political discourse framing plays a very important role. While talking about an event, politicians/ leaders consciously select some developments, images and facts about the event promoting a specific interpretation about the event and ordinary audience do not notice this. They use specific metaphors that don't let the audience think about other dimensions of the event.[8] And when they successfully frame a specific interpretation of an event in the minds of their audience it becomes very difficult to erase that framing from their minds.

> Framing is critical because a frame, once established in the mind of the reader (or listener, viewer, etc.) leads that person almost inevitably to the conclusion desired by the framer, and it blocks consideration of other possible facts and interpretations.[9]

This reveals that the response of ordinary public towards any event depends on how the event has been framed. This is how framers can control the thinking of their audience. They can make them infer conclusions of their choice- they can make them think and argue about an event the way they want them to. Once a frame gets established in our minds it's very

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[6] Lakoff, George and Mark Johnson. *Philosophy in the Flesh- The Embodied Mind and its Challenges to Western Thought*. (Basic Books, A Member of the Perseus Books Group, 1999): 116

[7] Lakoff, George, *Don't think of an Elephant!*. (Chelsea Green Publishibg, White River Junction, Vermont, 2004): xv

[8] Norris Pippa, Montague Kern, and Marion Just; Framing Terrorism*:* Published in, *Framing Terrorism- The News Media, the Government and the Public*, Edited by Pippa, Montague Kern, and Marion Just. (New York: Routledge, 2003): 11 (accessed April 6, 2009)

[9] Lakoff George, https://changethis.com/manifesto/show/5.GeorgeLakoff (accessed on July 7, 2018)

difficult to change and replace it; it blocks critical and rational thinking since one cannot think anything that is against the framing.

Most of our day to day metaphors and frames originate from business and economic activities and transactions in the world. In a business activity we have two or more than two parties. The purpose/goal/aim of any business activity is gain. Loss is considered to be very highly undesirable outcome. We have partners in business and have rivals and enemies. Our partners help us towards gain and we help them reciprocally. Our rivals/ enemies work for their own gain. So, business and economic activities are clear concepts that we develop while having experiences in the world. They help us understand those concepts that are less delineated. We use this as a metaphor in our day to day life. That is why we listen to metaphorical expressions such as: he is an *ATM*; *Moral accounting*; this person is *indebted* to another person (not in terms of money but in terms of some favor); Non state actors can be strategic *assets* for a state etc. Besides *credit, debit, balance sheet, accounts, assets,* one of the central things in all business and economic transactions and activities is Loss Gain- One can say the whole activity revolves around it.

While doing business one has to look for gain and has to work on a strategy to avoid losses- therefore, one has to be very careful in making decisions such as: when to invest, whom to invest with, about business partners, about rivals, about timing of a business transaction. Moreover, your gain may be your rival's/ enemy's loss- their gain can be your loss- if your business partner is in danger then you are also vulnerable. Furthermore, big businessmen/companies have to show that they have a concern for the social good and environment i.e., they fulfill their Corporate Social Responsibility.

Loss gain framing is a very effective way to portray a situation as a business or economic transaction. The target audience of this framing are people who see and understand different activities in the world as business activities. In times of war and conflict leaders/ people at the helm of affairs use Loss Gain framing to portray war/ conflict as a business or economic activity. In order to persuade people for war they inform them that going into conflict/war is gain and not going is loss; winning war is gain and losing war is loss; status quo is risk; if one of the partner is in danger, all of us are in danger; not helping the partners in times of danger will expose us to future losses; enemy's loss is our gain and our gain is enemy's loss. Moreover, innocent people who suffer because of the war should be taken care of.[10]

[10] Interestingly, in 'he attacked my argument', the metaphor is 'Argument is War', War is the source domain and 'Argument' is the target domain. However, this paper reveals that in times of war and conflict, leaders can frame war as a business activity. This way they

Loss Gain Framing in the Context of the War on Terror

In war and conflict the most common framings are: Good versus Evil, Believers versus Infidel, Us versus Them. Since, a big population of the world believes in the existence of Good and Evil forces. Most of the movies, dramas, stories and cartoons revolve around a struggle between good and evil. Believer versus Infidel is another available framing. It is mostly present in religious societies. It requires more religious diction. Similarly, any conflict can be framed as a struggle between Us and Them and the audience may have to choose one of the sides, "Either you are with us or with enemies" is an example in the context of 9/11. President Bush declared that the world has been divided in to two sides, US and the Terrorist, and the world was asked to choose one of the sides- Remaining neutral was not an option. Taliban and Osama framed the events of 9/11 as divine retribution and declared that the world has been divided into two sides, Believers and Infidels- Obviously there was no neutral ground. But not all people see the world as a place where there is a struggle between good and evil or between believers and infidels. Their world view sees and understands the world as a marketplace. They see different activities in the world as economic transactions- such people do not buy Good versus Evil, Believer versus Infidel or Us versus Them framing. For instance The Prime Minister Tony Blair on October 2, 2001 addressing the concern of such people and persuading them for war said,

> I know that here in Britain people are anxious, even a little frightened…They worry about the economy and talk of recession. And, of course there are dangers; it is a new situation. But the fundamentals of the US, British and European economies are strong.[11]

Obviously, here he is neither referring to the people who are afraid of Evil taking over the world, nor he is addressing to a world view where there is a struggle between believers and infidels. He is specifically talking to the people who think in terms of economy and business. Leaders and framers in order to persuade such people for war use metaphors that evoke Loss Gain framing. Gain and loss framing, writes Wolfe, influences the way people define situational outcomes. For example, objectives of Operation Enduring Freedom, he opines, were to eliminate terrorist targets in Afghanistan to prevent future losses.[12] Similarly, in case of Iraq war, public was told that Iraq has WMDs and is a threat to USA and to rest of the world. Not attacking Iraq would mean great losses in future. Moreover, War on

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portray 'War' as a target domain which is understood in terms of a source domain 'Business activity'.

[11] Blair, Full Text: *Tony Blair's Speech*, www.gurdian.co.uk, October2 , 2001

[12] Wolfe, Mackiewicz Wojtek, *Winning the War of Wards- Selling Terror from Afghanistan to Iraq* (Praeger Security International, 2008): 45

Terror was framed as a war that will end future wars making the world, particularly America, a safer place; moreover, it would promote democracy and freedom- Gains of the war.

According to Wolfe, Positive self- concept and positive national or social identity are psychological needs of human beings. Most of the human beings like to think of themselves as good people doing things for right reasons. This may explain, Wolfe argues, the use of loss/gain framing in justifying war. Loss framing works since we, being rational, want to protect ourselves, and gain framing persuades us on emotional level justifying war to save and help other human beings and to spread democracy.[13]

Use of loss gain framing is very common in war and political discourse. For instance, Lakoff argues that the First Iraq war was a panorama of metaphors. Iraq was portrayed to be 'sitting on the economic life line' by the then secretary of state- President Bush (Senior) portrayed Saddam as 'Stranglehold' on the economy of USA. Moreover, he writes that normally decision about going into war or not is like a 'cost- benefit' analysis- where war is justified on the bases of its gains and it is argued that going into war is gain and not going into war is loss.[14]

President Bush, in order to persuade citizenry for the war on Iraq argued on January 29, 2002 and informed the world that some regimes were seeking Weapons of Mass Destruction and the danger was growing,

> They could provide these arms to terrorists…. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic.[15]

The President informed people that terrorist regimes were seeking WMD. If they 'gain' WMDs then the 'loss' of USA and the rest of the world will be catastrophic. They could hand over these weapons to other terrorists (Read partners). Losses would include: an attack on USA or an ally with WMD, blackmailing of America. Blackmailing, in this context, also evokes a frame: enemy is trying to get strength which will become our weakness. They will exploit us and make us do whatever they want to- in the business of war they will have an upper hand. We will have to surrender before them. The entailment effects are that if we remain indifferent and do not fight them there will be a big loss in the future. But if we fight and win this war we can avoid losses, which obviously is a gain. Besides other gains, President Bush and his allies informed the world that the war would not only save America

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[13] Wolfe, Mackiewicz Wojtek, *Winning the War of Wards- Selling Terror from Afghanistan to Iraq* (Praeger Security International, 2008): 46

[14] George Lakoff, Metaphor and War: The Metaphor System to Justify War in the Gulf (Part 1) *Viet Nam Generation Journal & Newsletter* 3(3), (November 1991)

[15] Bush (January 29, 2002)

and her allies, but also the people of Afghanistan and Iraq, since, people of these countries are ruled by tyrants and living a very miserable life- social and moral responsibility of good businessmen would be fulfilled.

The President informed about the return of the money he wants to 'invest' in the war that would be reflected in the budget which he intends to send to the Congress,

> My budget supports three great goals for America: We will win this war; we'll protect our homeland; and we will revive our economy.[16]

The return/gains of the investment are clear: The United States of America will win the war on terror, the homeland will be protected and the investment will refresh the economy of the country. Obviously, it is a good strategy from a business point of view.

A pro Taliban News Paper, besides other framing, framed the discussion as the loss of our enemy is our gain i.e., if our enemy is suffering losses especially financial then it is getting weaker and weaker and finally it will be defeated. Following are some excerpts to exhibit how the news paper framed the discussion. Words at work had been: 'declined', 'shocked', 'bankrupt', 'unemployed', 'bearish', 'destruction', 'indebted' etc.

> American oil reserves have declined up to 246 million barrels. America experts are shocked to notice a decline of 37 million barrel of refined oil.[17] (Translation, mine)

One of the effects of attacking Afghanistan is that American economy is going down; their oil reserves have declined up to 246 million barrels. Lakoff and Johnson argue that truth is something related to our framing and if truth doesn't fit in a frame then it is the frame that stays, truth bounces off.[18] They whole discussion in Afghanistan was framed in such a way that people believed in all such false information.

> America could not absorb the shock of 9/11. American company World Com bankrupt, 85 thousand unemployed. [19](Translation, mine)

Again a great loss; the attack of 9/11 have shaken the foundations of American economy and now we are noticing 'bankruptcy' and 'unemployment'- enemies' loss is our gain.

American, European and Asian markets show bearish

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[16] Bush (January 29, 2002)
[17] *Zarb – e- Momin*, Dated: December 6-12, 2002
[18] Lakoff, *Don't think of an Elephant! Know your Values and Frame the Debate* (Chelsea Green Publishing Company , 2004): 17 (accessed April 6, 2009)
[19] *Zarb – e- Momin*, Dated: July 26- August 1, 2002

> trend. London, Tokyo, Frankfurt, Paris, stock markets cannot be saved from destruction.[20] (Translation, mine)

This explains that not only America, but all the allies of USA are facing severe economic losses. The present situation will result into crash of the stock markets- one can notice the level of disinformation and propaganda.

> After 9/11 western world is facing the problem of unemployment. French Telecommunication Company has fired 13 thousand employees and next year it will fire another 39 thousand.[21] (Translation, mine)

> Effect of America policies- American export declined 94 billion dollars.[22] (Translation, mine)

Imagine- 94 billion dollars loss is the effect of American policy. This narrates that enemy is suffering serious financial losses because of their own polices.

> America will lose 10 trillion dollars in Iraq war.[23] (Translation, mine)

> America has lost 2 trillion dollar in Iraq war. Another news says, America is the most indebted country- debt is 1400 billion.[24] (Translation, mine)

All these excerpts demonstrate that America and allies are facing great financial losses. These losses were somehow connected to 9/11. The framing effects are: if someone is losing money then he/she is getting weaker. If a country is losing money and her citizens are getting unemployed then the country is getting weaker day by day. Her citizens will criticize the policies. This situation is a gain situation for the enemy. The more the enemy gets weaker the easier it is to defeat it.

Tony Blair's Version

There exists abundant literature that reveals that the Prime Minister Tony Blair used metaphors that evoked loss gain framing. This framing was instrumental in the context of the War on Terror to persuade people for war.

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[20] *Zarb-e Momin* July 26- August 1, 2002
[21] *Zarb-e Momin*: September 27- October 3, 2002
[22] *Zarb-e Momin*: July 11-17, 2003
[23] *Zarb-e Momin*: February 28- March 6, 2003
[24] *Zarb-e Momin*: November 5-11, 2004

Following scripts from some speeches, delivered soon after 9/11 by Toney Blair are taken into account to demonstrate that he used loss gain framing to provide a strong justification for Britain to go into the war.

Tony Blair, informed British citizenry on October 2, 2001:

> The biggest drugs hoard in the world is in Afghanistan, controlled by the Taliban. Ninety per cent of the heroin on British streets originates in Afghanistan. The arms the Taliban are buying today are paid for with the lives of young British people buying their drugs on British streets.[25]

This reveals that one of the justifications Tony Blair presented before British citizenry had been: we are in loss. Taliban are in gain in two ways: they sell drugs and make our youth suffer and then they buy arms from the money earned by selling these drugs. This highlights Taliban as businessmen/ enemies of British people who deal in drugs. Britain is paying the price of heroin in the form of lives of British youth. Taliban buy weapons from drug money and kill innocent people and threaten British people. This framing highlights the losses to Britain because of Taliban. It provides a very good justification for Britain to actively participate in the war

On October 8, 2001, the Prime Minister said:

> We in Britain have the most direct interest in defeating such terror….if not stopped, the terrorists will do it again, this time possibly in Britain. We know that it was an attack on economic confidence…eradicating this threat is crucial to global economic confidence …the Taliban regime is largely funded by the drugs trade, and that 90 per cent of the heroin on British streets originates in Afghanistan.[26]

Perhaps, it was difficult for the Prime Minster to persuade British citizenry to enter into a war that had nothing to do with them directly. The Prime Minster framed the war on terror as something that has 'intimate' effects on British people in their everyday concerns; for once again he informed that Taliban are responsible for the 90 percent of the heroin that British people are addicted to, since it originates in Afghanistan. The list of losses after 9/11, besides other losses, includes an attack on 'global economic confidence'- 9/11 attacks were framed as an attack on global economy. Highlighting, again, how 9/11 is closely related with ordinary British citizens, for an attack on 'global economy' will surely affect British people. Moreover, if Taliban are not defeated, they will hit the world again. The PM informed, possibly the next target of terrorists is Britain- a great

[25] Blair, Full Text: *Tony Blair's Speech*, www.gurdian.co.uk, October2 , 2001
[26] Blair, Prime Minister's Statements to the House of Common, October 8, 2001, www.number10.gov.uk

future loss. Gains after waging a war and defeating Taliban includes: global economic confidence will be regained; drugs will go away; our country and our economy will be protected. Not going into war will risk them all. Moreover, critics of war do not want to avoid future losses. Perhaps, they want the enemy to gain. They are not patriots and do not want to save British youth etc. The entailment effect is- do not listen to them.

The Prime Minister framed Taliban and al Qaeda as business partners. He informed the people that Taliban have provided safe heaven to Osama to establish camps to train terrorist under an agreement,

> They jointly exploit the Afghan drugs trade. In return for active Al Qaida support the Taliban allow Al Qaida to operate freely, including planning, training and preparing for terrorist activity. In addition they provide security for the stockpiles of drugs.[27]

Since, Taliban and Al Qaeda are business partners working for each other's profit; obviously, they cannot go against each other's interest. Their business of drugs is flourishing. They are gaining from the business; their gain is Britain's loss since this business is killing British people.

This gives a very sound justification for war. Therefore, on 8 October, 2001 he narrated: to protect ourselves from these losses the United Kingdom has to take active part in the war by sending troops for military action

> [The military action] is to protect our country, our people, our economy, our way of life. It is not a struggle remote from our everyday concerns. It touches them intimately.[28]

The metaphorical understanding is that the military action, as a business activity, is a necessary action since if not conducted then there would be losses such as: loss of people, loss of economy and loss of the way of life people of Britain are enjoying. Most importantly, the war is going to affect our routine daily activities, it is not far- as if the attacks were on Britain. The Prime Minister's framing effectively made the war on terror Britain's war. The obvious entailment effects have been: Not fighting the war is not an option since the consequence will be great future losses of the British people.

The Prime Minister also disclosed that the good forces of the world are very well aware of the Corporate Social Responsibility. He informed about the appeal of the UN for $584m to protect the needs of people of who are vulnerable in and around Afghanistan.

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[27] Blair, Full Text of the *Tony Blair's speech to the parliament*, October 4, 2001 www.theguardian.com

[28] Blair, Prime Minister's Statements to the House of Common, October 8, 2001, www.number10.gov.uk

> The British government has contributed £25 million, nearly all of which has already been allocated to UN and other agencies. We have also made available a further £11m for support for the poorest communities in Pakistan, especially those most directly affected by the influx of refugees…We will do what we can to minimise the suffering of the Afghan people as a result of the conflict; and we commit ourselves to work with them afterwards inside and outside Afghanistan to ensure a better, more peaceful future, free from the repression and dictatorship that is their present existence. [29]

The metaphorical understanding is Britain is fulfilling her social responsibility in times of war. The prime Minister has contributed 25 million pounds for the people who will suffer because of the war. He has also provided another 11 million pounds for the refugees and poor communities in the neighboring country Pakistan. Fulfilling the social responsibility he has pledged to minimize the sufferings of the innocent Afghan people that are going to suffer because of the war. Above all, a commitment to work for future gains that include: a peaceful future and freedom of Afghan people from dictatorship and repression.

Conclusion

Politicians have to use different metaphors and frames to persuade people of different world views. For example, they use language that evokes religious frame to persuade religious people. People, who think in terms of morality and politics, are framed by moral politics and war metaphors. Those who get influenced by movies and stories, villain versus hero frames are used and for those who believe in evil, good versus evil frames are there. For those who do not believe in evil and think in terms of economics, they have to use loss-gain metaphors- War is an Economic/ Business Activity.
The entailment effects of Business metaphor and loss gain framing, in the context of war, are:

> War is an Economic Activity/ Business.
> Enemies are Business rivals and competitors.
> Our friends are our partners.
> Enemy's friends are also our business rivals and competitors.
> The purpose of the activity is to gain as much as one can.
> One should act on a strategy that helps in avoiding present and future losses.
> Enemies' gain is our loss and vice versa.
>
> If one of the partners is under attack than all the partners are exposed to losses- therefore, we cannot leave our partners in times

[29] Blair, Full Text of the *Tony Blair's speech to the parliament*, October 4, 2001 www.theguardian.com

of war, conflict and threat.

Dictators, Taliban and leaders of Al Qaeda in the context of 9/11, are the businessmen who work only for their personal gains. Their business is dangerous and harmful for the civilized world. It is the duty of good people to close their business.

While one should work for gain and avoid losses, one should not forget the social responsibility- helping refugees, providing them aid, food, medicine and shelter. Moreover, if a country is ruled by dictators then it is the responsibility of the good people to liberate them.

Words that evoke loss gain framing are: price, *budget, declined, shocked, bankrupt, unemployed, bearish, destruction, indebted recession, economic confidence, global economy, employees, minimize, poor, contribute, support, pounds, dollars, fund, drugs, trade, paid, company, exports, goal, revive, oil reserves, shocked, debt, bearish, market, selling and buying* etc.

The above discussion reveals that there exists literature that demonstrates that politicians and leaders, especially Tony Blair, in the context of 9/11 used metaphors and words that evoked Loss Gain framing. The purpose was to influence and shape the perceptions and judgments of the people who think in terms of money and economy. This framing was also instrumental in silencing the critics; since, critics were dubbed as people who neither see the gains that would follow if the enemy was attacked nor losses (both present and future) that would follow if the enemy was not attacked and eliminated.

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USES AND ABUSES OF FM RADIOS BY MILITANTS IN FORMER FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREAS (FATA) AND PROVINCIALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREAS (PATA), PAKISTAN (2003-2018)

Yousaf Ali[*] & Ijaz Khan[Ψ]

Abstract

This research deals with the uses of abuses of FM radios in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and the recently merged districts – former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) during the period ranging from 2003 to 2018. Radio is the most effective mean of mass communication. The rapid increase in FM radios and its cheap and easy operation was a source of attraction for many to disseminate their message. The use of FM radio has been on the rapid rise for the last nearly two decades, both for propaganda, political and commercial purposes. The government, private entities and some anti-state elements have made effective use of this media tool. This study analyses the role of government and non-state actors' launched FM radio stations, which include both the legal stations and the pirated or illegal ones. The objectives and functions of Government run FM radio have been discussed. The use of the FM radio for promotion of Islamic teachings has also been thoroughly looked into. Its use by different militant outfits for propagating their message has also been covered. The commercial use of the tool by private entities has also been taken into account.

Key Words

FM radio, communication tool, propaganda, education, information, entertainment

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Introduction

The government launched several FM radio channels after 2000 for what it called education, entertainment and information. But it was observed during this study that the government owned FM channels were mostly used to counter the propaganda of non-state actors and promoting the government version on different issues. Some leading religious scholars in the province also started delivering sermons based on Quranic teachings which gained much popularity among the common masses and they are still considered as the most listened to channels. Impressed by the easy connectivity, not-so-costly installation and massive impact of the FM radios, a number of commercial entities also jumped into the field and launched FM channels, which mostly play music and other entertainment programmes. Limited airtime is allocated for transmission of news and current affairs on these privately-owned FM radios.

The most effective use of this mean of communication was made by the militant outfits during the prolonged wave of militancy in this region. They found FM radio as the most valuable tool for spreading their messages, making announcements and issuing threats to people. This study is significant as it looks into different kind of the FM radios both official and non-official. Before, this no such comprehensive research has been done on the topic.

This study collects data of the number and kinds of FM radio channels established in the KP. It further makes content analysis of the FM radios run by different entities. The aim is to know to know and understand how is this tool of communication used for information, education and entertainment especially by the militants in KP and its new districts for propagation of their cause. It analyzes how this very important tool of communication has been used or misused by promoting a specific version/interpretation of religion, creating hate and terrorising people.

Theoretical Framework

Bullet theory, which is also referred to as 'hypodermic-needle theory' or the 'transmission belt theory' of communication has been applied to this study.[1] The theory, one of the initial theories of communication, actually deals with the general impact of the tools of mass communication especially radio and television on the general public especially those prone to it.[2] The

[1] DeFleur, M. L. and S. Ball Rockeach. *Theories of Mass Communication*. 4th ed. (New York: McKay, 1982)

[2] Severin, S. J., & Tankard, Jr., J. W. *Communication theories: Origins, methods, and uses in the mass media* (3rd ed.). (NY, USA: Longman, 1992).

title of 'bullet theory' had, however, not been used by the early thinkers of mass communication.[3]

The bullet theory has been interpreted that the message aired by a television or a radio is like a bullet fired from a gun at the audience and it affects them tremendously. They don't use their own knowledge and they don't believe other voices than the one they have heard on the radio and especially from the broadcaster of their choice.[4]

This theory, though not been considered as appropriate by the modern day communication experts, could be perfectly applied to the use and impact of the FM radio in this part of the world during the past more than one decade. Every FM radio launched in different areas of KP and former FATA had a specific target of audience and they were deeply affected by this tool of communication.

Methodology

This is an empirical research. The observations and experiences have been properly analyzed both qualitatively and quantitatively. Data pertaining to different FM Channels has been collected and analyzed. The content of different radio stations has been examined. The articles, reports and surveys pertaining to FM radios have been accessed. In-depth interviews have been conducted with those directly involved in the operation of the FM radios. Senior analysts, researchers and journalists have also been approached and interviewed.

FM Radios

Radio is the most important and lone accessible media tool in former FATA. It is also the only tool on which the people in some districts of KP rely for getting information and entertainment. Radio is still the most effective media tool in this part of the world. This is the reason international broadcasters like the Voice of America (VoA) and British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) focused their attention in this region and opened new projects like Deewa and Mashal here besides strengthening their already established stations (Rahmanullah, personal communication, May 13, 2018). Apart from the international broadcasters, the government set up three FM radio centers in former FATA, one each in Khyber, North Waziristan and Bajaur Agencies, under the names of Radio Khyber FM 91, Radio North Waziristan FM 96 and Shamal Radio FM 98 in Bajaur Agency respectively.

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[3] Chaffee, S.H., and J. L. Hochheimer. The beginning of political communication research in the United States: Origin of the 'Limited Effect Model.' In M. Gurevitch and M. R. Levy (eds.), *Mass Communication Review Yearbook,* vol. 5. (Beverly Hills, 1985).

[4] Lilly, J., and A. Lilly. *The Dyadic Cyclone: The Autobiography of a Couple.* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1906).

These channels have their transmissions in Urdu, Pashto and Punjabi languages. Also, some two dozen legal FM radios have been operating in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The number of illegally operated FM stations is higher. This was the most effective tool used by the Taliban for spreading their messages and also collecting donations. Important announcements were also made through these illegal FM radios and some threats and decisions would also be declared through these easily operated radios (FRC, 2012).

The FM radio actually filled the information vacuum in both FATA and Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA). These radios could technically not be referred to as illegal radio stations as the PEMRA's law had not been extended to FATA and there was no need of acquiring a formal license for running an FM radio.[5]

The FM radios which operated in KP and former FATA during the period under study were more than two dozen in number. Majority of them were controlled by hardcore militants. Some of them were operated from religious seminaries purely for Quranic and Islamic teachings. Some were even owned and run by political figures. Use of FM radios is not new. However, its trend started gaining momentum from Khyber Agency where a religious scholar Mufti Munir Shakir started giving sermons through an FM radio. After him Mulla Fazullah started using FM radio in Swat in 2005. He became so popular through his speeches on radio that the people started calling him 'Radio Mullah'. Another widely heard FM radio was that of Maulvi Faqir Mohammad, the Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) leader in Bajaur Agency. Mangal Bagh, another hardcore militant and head of *Lashkar-e-Islam* in Khyber Agency had his own FM radio. Haji Namdar another militant in Khyber Agency also had a separate FM radio in Khyber Agency. Pir Saifur Rahman and Qari Mahboob, the two other clerics from Barelvi sects ran separate FM radios as well. Commander Tariq Afridi had his own FM in Darra Adamkhel.[6] In Swat two other FM radio were also operated by militant commanders namely Commander Shahid FM and Commander Janat Gul FM. [7]

Some of the FM radios were owned and operated by non-violent religious scholars and clerics for religious education only. Known among them were the one operated from the *Darul Quran Panjpir* in Sawabi district. It would air the Quran lectures delivered by head of the seminary and chief of a religious party – *Ishaat Tauheed wal Sunnah* – Maulana

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[5] Ali, M. *The Rise of 'Radio Mullah'*. 2013, December 23. Retrieved May 12, 2018, from https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/23/the-rise-of-radio-mullah/

[6] Khan, M. A. The FM Mullahs and the Taliban's Propaganda War in Pakistan. *Terrorism Monitor*, *7*(14), 2009, May 26.

[7] Khan, M., Afridi, M. K., & Yousufy, M. Unauthorized Radio Transmissions and Failure of Regulatory Authorities: Case Study of Pakistan (Malakand Region). *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, *6*(4 S 1), 2015: 238-247.

Tayyeb Tahiri. Another prominent religious scholar Maulana Abdullah Shah operates his FM from Charsadda. Maulana Idrees runs FM radio from Nowshera. Qazi Fazullah runs an FM radio from Timergara, Dir Lower. Maulana Hidayatur Rahman operates another FM radio from Darul Uloom Ahya-ul-Uloom, Balambat in Timergara, Dir Lower.

Some political figures and social activists also had FM radios. A few of such radios were Daroo FM from Maidan, Dir Lower which had its focus on health education. Akhundzada Chitan, a Pakistan People's Party leader, had his own FM channel in Bajaur Agency. The Saifullah family, an influential political family in Lakki Marwat district, also operated FM radio (Shams Mohmand, personal communication, May 18, 2018).

FM Radios Run by Militant Commanders

A detailed account of the militant commanders who used FM radios as their main communication tool is given here.

Mullah Fazlullah Alias Radio Mullah

Mullah Fazlullah, a young seminary drop-out, but an impressive orator gained popularity through the speeches which he started giving through his pirated FM radio station based in a mosque in Imamdheri area of Matta sub-division in the scenic Swat valley. He started the FM service in late 2005.[8] Soon he became a most listened to person in the entire Swat district through his fiery and impressive speeches. Generally the people of Swat like other parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are Islam-loving and the religious teachings and addresses attract them easily. Malala Yousafzai describes in her book, "Fazlullah became enormously popular in Swat—people thought of him as a "Robin Hood" figure, restoring power and dignity to good, common Muslims.[9]

Fazllah was young but he had a proper sketch for his activities in his mind. He took the start as a mild reformist, won the hearts and minds of the people gradually through his impressive speeches and popular decisions and then turned towards his actual task that was to gain power. Born in the 1970s, he grew up with the name of Fazle Hayat. He had never been to a school. Most of the time in his childhood, he had spent working in Ski Field on the Malam Jabba Top, one of the most visited tourist spot in the district. He had been admitted to a religious seminary of Deobandi sect, but he could not complete his religious education either. His life changed after his marriage.[10] While he was studying in a religious seminary, he was married

[8] Khan, M. A. The FM Mullahs and the Taliban's Propaganda War in Pakistan. *Terrorism Monitor*, *7*(14), 2009, May 26.

[9] Yousafzai, M., & Lamb, C. *I am Malala: The girl who stood up for education and was shot by the Taliban*. (UK: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 2013).

[10] McCoy, T. Mullah Radio': The radical broadcaster leading the Taliban's war on

to the daughter of Maulana Sufi Mohammad, the head of Tanzeem Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (Organisation for implementation of Mohammadan Law). This was the turning point in his life. Fazlullah was clever enough to make the poor and impoverished segment of the society as his target audience. He focused his attention on women first. He spoke about their rights in Shariah and the conditions they were passing through in Swat. He would also ask them to stay home and keep listening to his radio. The women regarded him as great savior. They started donating everything to him. Whenever, he would ask for donations, there would be abundance of jewelry, cash and other valuable sent by people mostly women. With the help of these donations, he not only improved his FM station. But he also converted the small mosque in Imamdheri to a two-story seminary complex. Also, he started recruiting people for later use in militant activities. Tens of thousands of people would listen to his sermons on the FM radio.[11]

His other target audiences were the illiterate and unemployed folks. Maulana Fazlullah would not keep confined to his FM radio only. He would also make public appearance with intervals of a few days, riding his black horse.[12] This would add to his already increasing popularity. His speeches and actions would also inculcate psychological fear among the population of Swat and this was the reason that when he started his militant movement in 2007, he faced no resistance from the masses. By this time his 'reformist' campaign had been converted into a completely militant one especially after the military action against Lal Masjid in Islamabad in 2007. He had recruited a good number of militants and given them necessary military training. His views on FM radios had also become harsher. He had started settling disputes of the people. He would announce threats and punishments to people through the FM station. His close comrade Shah Dauran was harsher than him in issuing threats. They had also started awarding punishments to 'evil doers' by the time. At that time listening to his radio had become a major compulsion of the people. Nobody could even think to miss Fazlullah's and Shah Dauran's transmissions. If they did they would ask

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Pakistani schoolchildren. *Washington Post*. 2014, December 17. Retrieved May 18, 2018, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/12/17/mullah-radio-the-radical-broadcaster-leading-the-talibans-war-on-pakistani-schoolchildren/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.382f93331083

[11] McCoy, T. Mullah Radio': The radical broadcaster leading the Taliban's war on Pakistani schoolchildren. *Washington Post*. 2014, December 17. Retrieved May 18, 2018, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/12/17/mullah-radio-the-radical-broadcaster-leading-the-talibans-war-on-pakistani-schoolchildren/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.382f93331083

[12] Ali, M. *The Rise of 'Radio Mullah'*. 2013, December 23. Retrieved May 12, 2018, from https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/23/the-rise-of-radio-mullah/

others about the details and what punishment has been announced to whom.[13]

His actions forced the government to hold peace talks with him at the Chief Minister's house in Peshawar. A nine-point peace deal was reached there between the government and the militant outfit led by Fazlullah. One important point of the deal was that he would continue using his FM station and spread his message through it. This gave a sort of legitimacy to his 'unauthorised radio services', which already could not be deemed as pirated or illegal because of the non-extension of PEMRA's law to the PATA, of which Swat was an integral part.[14]

After a brief pause in the militant activities in the wake of the peace deal, the militants led by Fazlullah and Shah Dauran restarted their militant activities. They were specifically against the politicians, government servants especially those serving in the law enforcement agencies. They would simply brand them as 'infidels' and would consider their killing as an obligation. Whenever, they caught any policeman or other official, they would slaughter them in the main Nishat Square in Mingora without even trying them under their own system. They would also speak foul of the anti-polio vaccination. Anti-American rhetoric was also a regular feature of their FM radio. These actions forced the government to launch a full-fledged military operation against them in the name of *Operation Sirat-e-Mustaqeem* (righteous path). The entire population of the Swat valley was evacuated from the district to other safer areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. More than two million people had been internally displaced and accommodated in makeshift camps in Mardan, Nowshera, Charsadda and Peshawar districts.[15]

The displaced people also included 248 journalists. Fazlullah after staging a stiff resistance for quite longer a time finally escaped from the valley to Kunar province of Afghanistan via Bajaur Agency. (Bahauddin, personal communication, December 10, 2018) He continued his militant activities from across the border. However, his FM service has been silenced since then.

Mufti Munir Shakir

Mufti Munir Shakir was not a militant himself. He was rather a good orator representing the Deobandi sect. He was brought to Bar Qambarkhel in

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[13] Khan, M. A. The FM Mullahs and the Taliban's Propaganda War in Pakistan. *Terrorism Monitor*, *7*(14), 2009, May 26.

[14] Ali, M. *The Rise of 'Radio Mullah'*. 2013, December 23. Retrieved May 12, 2018, from https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/23/the-rise-of-radio-mullah/

[15] Walsh, D. Swat valley could be worst refugee crisis since Rwanda, UN warns. *The Guardian*. (2009, May 18). Retrieved May 25, 2015, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/may/18/swat-valley-pakistan-refugee-crisis

Kajori area of Bara sub-division of Khyber Agency in 2003 by a Haji Namdar, head of *Amr bil Ma'aroof wa Nahi Anil Munkir*, a conservative hardliner organisation. Before coming to Khyber Agency, he would give sermon in Kurram Agency wherefrom he was expelled after a bomb explosion. [16]

Mufti Munir's sermons were focused on Quranic teachings only. He would give his sermon from Haji Namdar's headquarter called *Takia* (seat) in Madrassa area. Haji Namdar had not turned militant by that time. The sermon from the FM radio station became very popular in the whole agency. People irrespective of their age and gender would listen to it very attentively for two obvious reasons. One, his very attractive style and his simple way to make people understand the meaning of holy Quran and second, his opposition to the Mufti Saifur Rahman alias '*Pir Da Barey'*, who belonged to the rival Barelvi sect. Mufti Munir would negate the practices of Pir Saifur Rahman and his followers. After getting enough popularity Haji Namdar developed differences with Mufti Munir and asked him to leave his area in 2004. Mufti Munir Shakir shifted to nearby Malikdin Khel (a branch of Afridi tribe that mainly inhabit Khyber Agency) area where a group of volunteers came up to his support. Haji Mangal Bagh, who later became the head of Lashkar-e-Islam, another hardcore militant outfit, was the prominent among these volunteers. Haji Namdar continued using the FM radio that had already been set up there. Mufti Munir established a new FM radio with the support of his new supporters in the Malikdin Khel area and continued delivering his sermons from here. It was here that the new group under the title of Laskhar-e-Islam was founded. (Afridi, personal communication, September 14, 2018).

Most of his sermons were against Pir Saifur Rahman, who already had a good circle of followers and disciples. Pir Saifur Rahman would initially counter his sermons through loud speakers. But in 2005 he too got a FM radio and his followers started delivering speeches through it to counter the campaign launched by Mufti Munir against them. FM Radio being so cheap and of simple technology that Ghafoor Afridi, a local electrician, was the person who set up the FM radios for all these clerics. In an interview with this researcher Ghafoor said that he would make the system with the help of some old gadgets like phones, transistor and radio parts. It is very simple to make. It would cost him Rs 6,000 – 7,000 only and he would charge the clerics with Rs 12,000-13,000 (Ghafoor, personal communication, September 15, 2018).

The verbal clashes through FM radio between the two clerics – Mufti Munir Shakir - later converted into formal fighting. It was March 2006, when a huge number of Mufti Munir's followers gathered under the

[16] Shahid, S. Call for action against gun-toting supporters of Pro-Taleban cleric. *Khaleej TImes*. (2006, April 1). Retrieved May 23, 2018, from https://www.khaleejtimes.com

leadership of Mangal Bagh and attacked a stronghold of Pir Saifur Rahman at Nala locality in Malikdin Khel area. The attackers were heavily armed. Scores of Pir Saifur Rahman's followers were killed in the attack and their houses were demolished.[17]

The fighting invited the intervention by the political administration. Both the clerics went into hiding. However, the political administration managed to expel both the clerics from the agency. Mufti Munir Shakir was arrested by the law enforcement agencies in 2007 and Pir Saifur Rahman shifted to Lahore, where he died in 2010. Upon his release from prison, Mufit Munir Shakir settled down in Sheikh Mohammadi area of Peshawar district where too he set up FM radio and started delivering sermons from it. But this time his speeches made no such difference (Ashfaq, personal communication, September 16, 2018).

Mangal Bagh

Mangal Bagh is an offspring of Sipah tribe in Khyber Agency. However, he was leading the group of volunteers that welcomed Mufti Munir Shakir in Malikdin Khel after he was expelled by Haji Namdar from Bar Qambar Khel (a branch of Afridi Tribe). A bus driver by profession, Mangal Bagh had spent some time in Tableeghi Jamaat. He along with Mufti Munir Shakir founded the hardliner militant group under the name of Lashkar-e-Islam. The group was initially not militant. However, its activities were focused against a rival Ansarul Islam, a group headed by Pir Saifur Rahman. After the arrest of Mufti Munir Shakir, Mangal Bagh became the undisputed head of his organisation and he started using the FM radio station. After the attack on the stronghold of Pir Saifur Rahman followers in 2006, the group became fully militant.[18]

Mangal Bagh now started giving sermon on the FM radio. However, his sermon was mostly comprised of threats to the people. Mangal Bagh announced implementation of Shariah laws in Khyber Agency through the FM radio. His activities became more violent forcing the security forces to launch a military operation against them in June 2008 under the name of *Operation Sirat Mustaqeem* (Righteous Path). Another operation was launched in the name of *Operation Daraghlam* – a threatening Pashto term meaning here I come. Another operation in the name of *Bia Daraghlam* - here I come again. The last of the series of first four operations was launched in November 2009 in the name of *Operation Khwakh ba de sham* – you will like me.[19]

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[17] Ali, I. Khyber Tribal Agency: A New Hub of Islamist Militancy in Pakistan. *Terrorism Monitor*, *6*(11), 2008, May 29

[18] Abbas, S. M., Zaidi. A Profile of Mangal Bagh. *Long War Journal*, 2008: 1-13.

[19] Ali, M. Unrest in Khyber Agency: Fifth operation in Bara on the cards. *The Express Tribune*, 2011, October 22. Retrieved August 14, 2018, from

Very strange names had been given to the operations in Khyber Agency. All of the names were given in typically threatening Pashto language. Perhaps the reason behind such threatening names was to respond to Mangal Bagh in an equally threatening language.

During the operation, Mangal Bagh shifted to the inaccessible scenic Tirah valley where his rivals – the followers of Pir Saifur Rahman – had already reached after the deadly attack on them in Malakdin Nala in 2006. Qari Mehboob, a follower of Pir Saifur Rahman, had already settled in Tirah valley. He had constructed a spiraling mosque in Bagh, the main town in the valley. According to Munir Khan Afridi, correspondent for The News from Khyber Agency, he had welcomed the fleeing fellow supporters of Pir Saifur Rahman in Tirah and had given them shelter. Thus the fighting reached to the erstwhile peaceful Tirah valley. Qari Mehboob was equally powerful. He also had set up an FM station (Afridi, personal communication, August 14, 2018).

Shams Mohmand, a senior journalist based in Peshawar, recalls one of his meetings with Mangal Bagh in Tirah. Shams Mohmand was part of a group of journalists called by Mangal Bagh for interview to Tirah in 2010. They went until Dabori in Orakzai agency on their own and from there fighters of Mangal Bagh took them to the place where he was staying. Traditional hospitality had been arranged for them. They had a long chat with Mangal Bagh and his fellow fighters and spent one night with them. Shams says at a moment during their meeting, Mangal Bagh sought permission from them for giving a speech on FM. Some young boys brought a few devices not bigger than a laptop and placed them in a corner of the building where they were staying. Mangal Bagh went there and started speaking. His speech was full of threats to different people. It also included death threats to a Tribal journalist Nasrullah Afridi, who was later killed in a targeted suicide bombing in Peshawar in 2011. After 40 minutes or so of speech Mangal Bagh went back to them and got busy in the chat. Shams says that when he heard of the threats to Nasrullah, he was shocked and when he [Mangal Bagh] rejoined them, he took up the matter with him. He told Mangal Bagh to stop giving threats to journalists. But he was too angry at Nasrullah claiming that he had inflicted huge losses on their organisation. Though he accepted the journalists demand not to harm Nasrullah for time being but he fixed the condition that Nasrullah would go to him and tender formal apology for what he termed his activities against Lashkar-e-Islam.

Later, during another operation under the name of Khyber 1 which was launched in 2014, Mangal Bagh was pushed out of Tirah Valley and he escaped to the adjoining Nazian districts of Nangarhar Province of Afghanistan, he managed to run his FM radio from there *(Khan, 2015).*

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https://tribune.com.pk/story/279047/khyber-agency-clashes-army-poised-to-conduct-operation-against-lashkar-e-islam/

Haji Namdar

It would not be wrong to refer to Haji Namdar as the pioneer of using FM radio among the militants. He was the first to start using the technology from his seat in Bar Qambar Khel area in Bara tehsil of Khyber Agency. He started the transmissions in December 2003. Himself not a very good orator, he brought Mufti Munir Shakir to give sermons on the radio. Later, when he got enough influence on the local populace, he expelled Munir Shakir and took the control of the radio himself, which he ran till his killing in a suicide attack in August 2008 (Khan, 2009). Haji Namdar had launched his own militant organisation *Tanzim Amr bil Maroof wa Nahi Anil Munkar*. He was a bit more radical in his views and harsh in getting them implemented on the local people. Before, launching the organisation, he was doing some job in Saudi Arabia. Through his FM radio he would repeatedly tell the people that he had left a job worth Rs 40,000 a month in Saudi Arabia for their sake. He had implemented his own codes in the area, like nobody can go to the area under his control without wearing a cap. No one could shave his beard in his area. He would give punishment to the people, if they violate the codes. Later he developed differences with TTP. He was killed in a suicide attack on his mosque. TTP had claimed responsibility for his killing. With his death, his FM radio silenced automatically (BBC, 2008).

Commander Tariq Afridi of Darra Adamkhel

Commander Tariq Afridi, an important TTP commander, also had a short-range FM radio. Though the range of this radio was not more than two kilometer radius, but its influence was huge. Tariq was known as one of the powerful militant commanders. He would issue threats and spread his messages through this radio besides issuances of pamphlets and letters. Tariq was known for kidnapping high value target. He was involved in the kidnapped of a late Polish engineer, two vice-chancellors Prof Lutfullah Kakakhel of Kohat University of Science and Technology and Ajmal Khan of Islamia College University. Tariq Afridi was killed by but his own brother in law in Khyber Agency in August 2012. With his death the influence of TTP in the semi-tribal region of Darra Adamkhel and his FM radio also came to end (News, 2012).

Maulvi Faqir Mohammad

Maulvi Faqir Mohammad is another leading TTP commander whose prime source of gaining popularity among common folks was his FM radio service. Maulvi Faqir, who was having very close ties with Maulana Fazlullah of Swat, ran his FM service simultaneously with the FM radio in Swat. Faqir Mohammad was the leading militant commander in Bajaur. He was among the pioneers of TTP which came into existence in December 2007. But Maulvi Faqir had worked in different militant groups. He had

taken his start by joining the Maulana Sufi Mohammad-led TNSM (Tehrik e Nifaz e Shariat e Mohammadi of Swat) in 1993 after completion of his religious education.[20] His FM radio was, however, the most effective tool that earned him huge popularity. It was through this radio that he would give religious sermons and announce decisions about various tribal disputes. Faqir Mohammad, who had also set up a parallel judicial system in Bajaur Agency, would listen to the complaints of the people and resolve them. The decisions would be declared there and then. But sometime the decisions would also be declared on the FM radio to make them public. Threats were also being issued through the FM service. Even very important decisions like ceasefire would also be announced through the FM radio. In February 2009, he announced unilateral ceasefire after eight months of fierce fighting during which the population from Bajaur Agency had been displaced (*BBC, 2009*). The operation had been launched in August 2008. The FM station used to be operated from the headquarters of Taliban in Sewai area of Mamund tehsil in Bajaur Agency. It never stopped transmission even during the operation. After the military operation, Maulvi Faqir crossed the border towards Kunar province of Afghanistan. He, however, continued his activities from the other side of the border. In 2013, he was arrested by the Afghan forces. His FM radio stopped working after he went across the border (FRC, 2012).

Findings

This study finds out that FM radio is the cheapest and most easily operated and accessible tool of mass communication. It can be operated from small portable devices. It can be managed from anywhere even from a driving car and from the top of a mountain. Local electricians were found to make and install FM radios by using second hand mobile sets, used transistors and other electronic devices. The total cost on installation of a normal FM radio was between Rs 5000 and Rs 13000. Also, it could be easily accessed on mobile sets, radios. Most of the FM radios were unlicensed and thus illegal. The authorities remained unable to regulate them properly.

Some non-controversial religious clerics are still in use of the FM radios in different parts of the province especially Charsdda, Mardan, Nowshera and Sawabi districts. Many people mostly women listen to the sermons and Quranic translations aired through the FM radios. The listeners of such radios believe they have gained a lot of Islamic knowledge using the FM radio.

[20] Sohail, A. N. Al-Zawahiri's Pakistani Ally: Profile of Maulana Faqir Mohammed. *Terrorism Monitor*, *4*(3), (2006, February 9): 4-7.

The state-run FM radio, though were aimed at education, entertainment and information, but it was found that their primary focus was to counter the propaganda disseminated by the pirated radios.

The FM radio was also the most important tool to sending and getting messages at the militancy affected agencies and districts of KP and former FATA. The militant commanders in Swat, Bajaur, Khyber Agency and other areas initially attracted the audience through their impressive speeches and sermons and later when they formally announced their militant activities the people were forced to listen to the messages and threats given through the FM radio. No one could afford to miss the messages aired through the FM radios. If anyone failed to find time to listen to the radio, he would have to ask others, who had listened to it as what threats and messages had been given and to whom.

Conclusion

This study shows that FM radio was used as one of the premium source of information during the past one and a half decade by the militant commanders and some other entities. It also served as a leading propaganda tool during this period. All the stakeholders of the prolonged conflict in the region made effective use of this tool of information for their respective purposes. It can rightly be concluded that the FM radios were made into proper use and it was equally misused at the same time. The state-owned and some privately run radio stations made an effort to follow the objectives of mass communication – information, education and entertainment. However, in some cases even the state established FM radios were used for propaganda and counter-propaganda purposes. The FM radios set up by some non-controversial religious scholars served the cause of promoting Quranic teachings. Those set up by the militant commanders were thoroughly used for propaganda purposes and threatening people, which caused contributed to promoting a distorted picture of the religion. The FM radios deeply affected their respective target audience. The bullet theory of communication comes exactly fit on the use of FM radios by non-controversial scholars in the central districts of KP and the militant leaders in the conflict parts of KP and former FATA.

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HOW EXPERIENCE BECOMES A JOURNALISTIC ASSET? A LOCAL REPORTER'S PERSPECTIVE TO UNDERSTAND CONFLICT-SENSITIVE REPORTING IN THE TROUBLED PASHTUN BELT OF PAKISTAN

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Introduction

In a previous paper (in Press), we adopted a critical theory approach to argue that the model of *objective* journalism, while laying emphasis on neutrality and detachment, disconnects local reporters, in conflict scenario, from feeling the pain of their own ethnic community. Therefore, the *objectivity* model was found too simple to help ethnic Pashtun journalists know occupational intricacies of conflict-sensitive reporting in Pakistan's northwestern terror-hit areas, a site for the U.S-led so-called global war on terror. Using phenomenology as a method, I take this argument further and offer my shared journalistic experience as a resource to establish that *objectivity* obfuscates power politics involved in text production while promoting an ahistorical culture. This is done through objectifying the local reporter's relationship with the troubled site of occurrence (field), a relationship in which a reporter is made insensitive to his own presence as an ethnic body standing at a highly militarized political site to get him focused more on looking at reality through the detached lens of neutral observer. Objectify here means that they look at reality not from the human perspective but usually prefer to project aspects of reality using *objectivity* as a measuring rod to access facts. Using the commercial framework of objective reporting might give a text (news story) an economically-desired impersonal form. But the urge for *neutrality* and *impartiality* neither can solve the crisis of reporting nor can control a journalist's bias by

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discouraging his/her feelings, emotions, and subjectivity. In Pakistan, local reporters not only provide gory spectacles of a conflict which has, according to official figures, consumed over 50,000 lives and displaced millions predominantly in the Pashtun Belt; but the journalists also are getting increasingly vulnerable to violence. This paper argues that neutrality is a challenge in conflict reporting on one's own community much the same way as attachment is a sin in objective model of commercial journalism.

The papers do not discuss power nor does it want to examine in totality the 'objective' paradigm of news constructions. Instead, this paper is looking at the role of *objectivity* in the light of my journalistic experience and observations, a phenomenological perspective focused on the local reporters' use of 'objectivity', a unique situation in which a local ethnic community is not just the target of global violence and State discrimination, but the reporting of this violence by the local reporters also contributes to victimization of the victims. Borrowing words from the French literary theorist Roland Barthes (1981), the phenomenological approach adopted here agrees "to compromise with a power, [but] *affect;* affect was what I didn't want to reduce" (p, 21). This is what I wish to highlight with the help of my shared experience as a local reporter who reported on the war from 2006 to 2010.

The first part of this paper provides an overview of the media structure in the war-hit Pashtun Belt, a troubled site for the essence of my experience. The second section lays emphasis on the lack of local perspective in scholarly literature, identifying how *objectivity* as a framework influences a local reporter's material conditions, undermining reality at the site of occurrence. Offering two concert exemplars, the third section shares my experience, identifying how "objectivity" model addresses the crisis of Pashtun representation, raising the need for invoking journalism that could humanize local Pashtun community's pain. Concluding analyses of the paper lays emphasis on self-reflection as journalistic asset in war reporting. This section recommends ways in which to make local journalists responsive to community issues in troubled Pashtun Belt, and in conflict-riddled parts of the world.

Media in the Pashtun Belt: An Overview

Pashtuns are organized as a multi-tribal society, an estimated population of a combined over 40 million, who are scattered in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In Pakistan, Pashtuns mainly live in the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA)—a region straddling the British delineated Durand Line between Pakistan and Afghanistan—and the Pakhtunkhwa province, a geographical and demographic stretch of vast mountainous borderland I call here the "Pashtun Belt".

In 2001, the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban fighters crossed over from Afghanistan into the Pashtun Belt, which was followed by a number of U.S.-sponsored Pakistani military's operations, a part of the US-led global War on Terrorism. Resultantly, the Pashtun Belt became a global flashpoint. As the war began to escalate, Pakistan announced media deregulation policy in 2002. Over ninety licenses were issued to private TV channels, while 28 foreign media networks were given landing rights to open their offices in Pakistan and rely their programs from there. As many as 106 FM radio stations were issued licenses. This rise in the number of media houses and outlets also increased the number of journalists in Pakistan. A rough estimate I collected from media experts in Peshawar and Islamabad said that before 2002 about 2000 journalists were working in Pakistan, which increased to around 20,000 in 2018, of which about 1,622 worked in the Pashtun belt.

Traditionally, the State's military interests has always discouraged the emergence of ethnic media in Pashtun Belt, a vast stretch of bordering land part of which the State uses for military purpose to exercises strategic influence over its neighboring Afghanistan. Subjecting the airwaves privatization to security interests of the State reinforced the status quo despite the mushrooming media channels, at least it was true in the selective allocation of media rights barring Pashtuns from owning the means of symbolic representation. In 2004, for instance, the first Pashtu-language TV channel was launched by a non-Pashtun from Islamabad, the federal capital. In 2017, Mashriq TV was the only channel launched from Peshawar, but it was owned by a non-Pashtun baron. The lack of enough Pashtun representation in the media political economy also affected ethnic reporters of Pashtun origin, who worked for media networks stationed outside the conflict zone. As working conditions of media labor is a blind spot of communication studies the world over[1] therefore, not much has been written about the implications of this discrimination over the Pashtun journalists. Pashtun reporters/journalists here means Pashtu speaking ethnic reporters who represented local journalism in the Pashtun Belt. This lack of ownership thus curtailed the local reporters' strength, affecting their voice at the national level, and making for them hard to carry out critical reporting—an oppositional form of journalism which speaks truth to power—to highlight agony of their own ethnic community. The challenges of conflict-sensitive reporting, therefore, are unique enough to invite attention toward local ethnic reporters' position and contribution in the field, to examine those

[1] Mosco, Vincent. "Communication and Cultural Labour." *The renewal of cultural studies.* (2011): 230-237.

conditions under which local journalists carry out reporting on violence against their own local community.

Conflicts and Wars: The Local Perspective

Conflict-sensitive reporting has always attracted scholarly attention the world over.[2] But the available work either predominantly deals with the corporate media working in the Western context[3], or highlights the consequences of war for elite Western journalists.[4] How racial stories tend to be reported against a flimsiest background and how unverified stories are deliberately projected ignoring evidence which does not fit into the existing media biases are also a rich topic of Western media research.[5] What is missing, however, is a local dimension to examine frontline journalism. Especially, in conflict scenario, local journalists' perceptions and field contributions do not find a place in researches on global or local media.

One category of local work focused upon in academic literature is called fixer. Local journalists working in a subservient role, i.e., fixers and stringers, are generally described as being hired on an as-needed basis in reporting on wars, daily wage earners who report on their own people for global media outlets. Fixers are generally defined as sub-contractors who greet foreign reporters on their arrival, arrange for them interviews with local experts, and translate local language.[6] Providing "protection" for foreign journalists, local reporters in their global role as "fixers" also are considered "doing the shopping for their journalists" and—if necessary—"negotiation with kidnappers".[7]

This local role is also defined primarily in terms of fixers/local reporters relationship with foreign correspondents, mostly Western and U.S. war journalists.[8] In countries like Pakistan, however, the situation is

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[2] Allan, Stuart."Conflicting Truths: Online News and the War in Iraq." *International News in the 21st Century. Eastleigh: John Libbey*, 2004: 285-99.

[3] Robinson, Piers. *The Cnn Effect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention*: Routledge, 2002.

[4] Rodgers, James. *Reporting Conflict*. Macmillan International Higher Education, 2012.

[5] Braham, Peter. "How the Media Report Race." In *Culture, Society and the Media*, edited by T. Bennett M. Gurevitch, J. Curran and J. Woollacott, Menthuen: Routledge, 2005: 274-293.

[6] Erickson, Emily, and John Maxwell Hamilton. "Foreign Reporting Enhanced by Parachute Journalism." *Newspaper Research Journal* 27, no. 1, 2006: 33-47

[7] Palmer, Jerry, and Victoria Fontan. "'Our Ears and Our Eyes' Journalists and Fixers in Iraq." Journalism 8, no. 1, 2007: 5-24

[8] Kramp, Leif, and Stephan Weichert. "Covering the World in Despair: A Survey of German Crisis Reporters." *Journal of War & Culture Studies* 7, no. 1, 2014: 18-35

different. Growing insecurity has restricted foreign reporters from visiting the country's violence-hit bordering areas, raising the local journalists' importance and need. Hence, the national and global media hire local journalists as fixers and reporters who report on a conflict zone which is also their home station, a site that juxtaposes their family life and work routines. On the one hand, the local reporters are trained in *objectivity*, a professional ideology that bars reporters to define news from the perspective of local affiliations. On the other hand, the term fixers and local reporters themselves identify reduced occupational statuses: Fixers are hired for their accessibility to the troubled zone and are kept mainly for providing data and quotes to feed media outlets stationed outside the conflict zone. While the national media engaged local reporters but do not pay them enough to make both ends meet. Such challenges undermine local reporters' agency, raising chances of their manipulation by visiting foreign journalists and media outlets stationed outside the conflict zone. Owing to lack of scholarly attention, however, such challenges receive less attention because of which media labor could be rightly called the blind spot of communication research.

Despite the post-9/11surge in scholarly work on wartime journalism, understanding conflict-sensitive reporting is still associated with the "normative professional ideal of Anglo-American journalism".[9] Because of the traditional models of war reporting, professionalism in journalism undermines local reporters' social origin along with objectifying their relationship with the site of occurrence. This uncritical reception turns *objective* reporting merely into a collection of "facts", which, then, ignores that "facts do not exist on their own but are located within wide-ranging sets of assumptions", and therefore, "which facts are thought to be relevant to a story depends on which sets of assumptions are held".[10] Not just that this objective journalistic approach fails to see the context of these "facts" but believing in a set of assumptions based on already existing presupposition also reinforces a news framework, i.e., *objectivity*, which are open to distortion to uphold ruling class interests. In embedded journalism, for instance, military represents an unaccountable power controlling information flow to/from the conflict zone, a captive form of journalism in which reporters' compromise on truth in a bid to ensure their access to war-related events. As the bulk of researchers generally ignore conditions under which

[9] Deacon, David. *British News Media and the Spanish Civil War: Tomorrow May Be Too Late*: Edinburgh University Press, 2008

[10] Braham, Peter. "How the Media Report Race." In *Culture, Society and the Media*, edited by T. Bennett M. Gurevitch, J. Curran and J. Woollacott, Menthuen., 274-293: Routledge, 2005

news production is carried out,[11] truth is usually the first causality of war: an event in a war may be reported not as it happens, but the quoting of sources and representation of evidence at the site of tragedy may become an exercise in mass deception, contributing to perpetuating violence not just against local people but also against a reporter. Understanding *objectivity'*s implications thus invite attention toward local reporters and their conditions of work, a gap this paper aims to identify in conflict scenario adopting phenomenological approach.

Why Phenomenology?

Phenomenological approach is concerned with personal experience, highlighting taken for granted general assumptions. This method, however, attaches equal attention to structural assumptions describing them through the lens of personal observations attaching primacy to emotional attachment, and individual perceptions. "Whereas a narrative study reports the life of a *single individual*, *a phenomenological study* describes the meaning for several individuals of their *lived experiences* of a concept or a phenomenon"[12] Even sentiments and emotions, as part of shared experience, become an experiential asset to learn from.

Roland Barthes (1981) in his classic work *Camera Lucida* explained his personal sentiments as part of a phenomenological approach to show his feelings for the photograph of his ancestors. Barthes (1981) argues, "As a *spectator* I was interested in photography only for 'sentimental reasons;' I wanted to explore it not as a question (a theme) but as a wound: I see, I feel, hence I notice, I observe, and I think" (p. 21). In the same way, my interest in using phenomenology is mainly because it allows me to heal my wound by sharing my experiences. Partly because of my sentimental attachment with journalism, both as a teacher and as a reporter, and mainly because I found *objectivity* a threat to the spirit of Pashtun journalists and the interests of the community. Like Barthes, my feelings for my community of origin compelled me to abandon 'detachment' and 'neutrality' so as to make reporting a basis for sharing common cause and pain.

My own experiential understanding of the phenomenon of terrorism started in 2003, the year when I joined as a journalism faculty teaching in a public sector university in Pashtun Belt. War on Terror had started in Afghanistan in 2001, and the U.S bombing of Al-Qaida fighters had forced the latter to cross over into Pakistan's Pashtun Belt. Every weekend on way from the university to my family home in Kohat district, I had to pass

[11] Ibid., 273

[12] Creswell, John , and Oaks Thousand. *Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design Choosing among Five Approaches*: Sage Publications, 2007

through check points set up by military and militants. Crippling effects of the U.S funded counter-terror operations turned local people lives into a collateral damage, a loss that often went unnoticed in the national and international media. Along with teaching, my participation in a community-dialogue project of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) helped me to interact with common people who were caught in this existential struggle. Working in a changed paradigm helped me to mix not only with the troubled people of my ethnic community, it also led me to feel for them, an empathy I did not develop before working as an objective journalist. Gradually I began to transform my neutrality into attachment, not in the political context but in the emotional sense of the word. I do not plead here 'activism', and 'advocacy'; I believe that all these are visibly inclined towards political ends, which means extending service to groups, factions, parties or the state. My sense of attachment was the cultural and social outcome of embodied experience that invited constant reflection from me in my spare moments. Like Barthes, I wanted to explore my community as a wound, not just as a question (a theme). Unlike Barthes, however, I was not a spectator. I was an insider, a terror victim who wanted to examine his social wound from a position of some power as a social actor.

To give voice to my troubled ethnic community, I joined a national TV channel DawnNews in 2006. Working on this victim-agent position capacitated me to shed off those ideological blinders which I have grew as postcolonial subject, the schooling outcome of my long organizational social learning. Regular interacting with the social wound developed in me the capacity to think and reflect. What is happening all around me? Why only Pashtuns? The invocation of self-reflective faculties grounded me within an irreducible experience, a consciousness that gradually turned into a site of unification for the origin of my culture and the culture of my professional orientation. As an apparent outcome of a genuine desire, the gradual occupational change could be called as an urge to abrogate the functional rules of occupational engagement called *professionalism*. Such rules lie at the base of a reporters' cynicism towards feeling the pain of people who are reduced in objective journalism to an impersonal and amoral status of no less than a data bank, i.e., sound bites and news quotes. Boasting about rubbing shoulders with military generals on embedded trips, one local journalist, who worked for a large television channel, once put it this way to me: "Only a fool can afford to skip free chopper rides and the hot food offered on such trips to FATA or Swat." "What would they eat once the 'war on terror' ends?" This is what I often heard from desperate colleagues working in lowly status as free lance journalists and fixers. This uncritical and fatalistic approach questions a reporters' modus operandi, ethnical responsibility and conceptual understanding of reporting. To know more

about this new phase of commercial journalism in Pakistan, I latter began to write newspaper columns.[13] For confirmation of news reports, I used to remain in direct contact with the national-level and the local-level military spokesmen and political leaders that helped me to develop some know-how about the political economy of news making in the Pashtun Belt. Apart from invoking my personal experience, this paper is based on a data from the year 2007 to 2010 which I recorded in three note books based on which I wrote over 50 articles for prestigious national English newspaper, *Dawn* (Ashraf 2008-10).

The Crisis of Representation: *Facticity R*obs Context

I have noted that the local reporters' portrayal of the Pashtun Belt oscillates between total indifference and selective exposure. In the first case, everyday lived experience is generally ignored and life is painted through the brush of history. Whatever attention common people receive is tainted with the framework of aged-old stereotypes such as "tribesmen", "gharatmand qabail" (brave tribesmen), "deeply religious society", "elaqa ghair" (no-goarea), "information blackhole" etc. Such platitudes identify Pashtuns more with their "tough" geography and less as people with flesh and bones, justifying Pakistani state's use of heavy force. In not-so-normal circumstances, however, the media coverage remains selective in which emphasis is laid on a wider regional context to highlight strategic significance of the borderland. This security-centric approach shifts the attention away from the Pashtun Belt, obscuring consequences of the U.S.-led "war on terror." Even local reporters could not help to challenge this selective exposure. In their search on bare *facts*, which are offered to them in press conferences and military briefings, local reporters often fail to investigate those conditions in which *facts* emerge to become news in the first place. Yet, whenever I talked to them about these issues, most of the local reporters took pride in doing what they called *objective journalism*, a reporting that revolves around neutrality and detachment. Instead of challenging an existing social order, however, I found technical rationality impairing journalists' reflective capacity in a sense that their belief in neutrality provides them with an excuse to avoid critical reporting, leaving them to be content with mass communication gadgets and the conceptual framework of *objectivity.*

[13] I joined *DawnNews*, a premier Pakistan-based English language TV channel, which aired current affairs programs for a couple of years after which it was converted into Urdu language. I quit working with the channel in 2009 to start free-lance reporting.

An eerie reflection was the scene staged in the year 2009 at the security forces' headquarters in Saidu Sharif, Swat. In my presence, six teenagers with trembling hands, half-covered pale faces and shabby clothes, were paraded by military officials before a group of media men at the heavily barricaded Army Circuit House. Around half a dozen Digital Satellite News Gathering vehicles were parked outside, connected to production staff in big cities of Islamabad, Karachi and Lahore. The military arranged such events to brief local reporters on their military operations. Because of increasing insecurity, foreign journalists were barred from entering the valley and even the country's national media was dependent on local reporters, whose significance laid in their knowledge about the local context of war-related stories. For example, the local reporters apparently knew that the boys, which the military were parading, had deserted the Swat militants after getting a few days of forced training sessions. Later, the children's parents willingly handed them over to the security forces to avoid the wrath of intelligence agencies. Yet, the military side prevailed, claiming that the teenagers were recovered in a timely military operation that saved them from turning into suicide bombers. No sooner had the press conference ended, the media men rushed out to connect to their Digital Satellite News Gatherings (DSNG), a chaotic scene, indeed. How to be first with the news was the main issue at hand. Before the journalists could get into their live DSNGs, a few reporters were asked by their producers to announce that the children were would-be suicide bombers. The reason? One channel had already flashed a ticker branding them as such. Some of the rest had to follow citing military and police as their sources, a cacophony in which a couple of voices, which tried to reveal the truth, were lost.

The exchange value of terrorism begins to turn into a political capital. The following week, on July 27, a senior parliamentarian, Bashir Bilour, exaggerated the figures in his TV interview saying that the government, in fact, had arrested "200 brainwashed children who had been trained for suicide bombing" (Geo TV 2009). The issue caused a stir. The national and international media began to digest unverified facts. The politician was on air almost everywhere.[14] After two weeks of waiting to see if the army spokesman would release any clarification, this issue of local importance got my attention. After inquiry, I came to know that the Swati people were silent because they feared that the law enforcement authorities

[14] Former Senior Minister of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province Bashir Bilour escaped many suicide attacks. Later, however, he was killed in one such attack when "a suicide bomber detonated the explosives strapped to his body at a close distance from Bashir Bilour, inflicting critical wounds to his chest and stomach that later proved FATA" (The News, 2012)

would make the brainwashed children an excuse to carry out raids on their houses, which would further add to the increasing numbers of missing persons or extra-judicial killing at the hands of authorities. Following a lead from my inquiry in Swat, I talked to the Pakistan Army spokesman Major General Athar Abbas, who accepted in his 'off the record' conversation with me that the news was fabricated. The general said that announcement of the news on national television made him perturbed. "How could the army produce 200 would-be suicide bombers if the foreign media insisted on producing them before the cameras? Nobody apparently had a clue to it! Surprisingly, the local military office in Swat also did not issue any clarification despite accepting that the information was wrong. General Abbas confided to me later on phone that "a clarification would have resulted in a confrontation with the political government."

In retrospect, a serious probe on the part of a single journalist in Peshawar could have met the requirements of responsible reporting.[15] Perhaps the media men were not interested in verifying their information—although news from conflict zones is indeed hard to confirm as it is always accompanied by confusion. Some journalists in Peshawar, whom I talked to later, believe that this was part of a conspiracy to retain the element of sensation in the conflict zones of the 'hot Frontier,' a global flash point. As media sensationalism could potentially stimulate a war economy by creating the need for a military action, local reporting apparently serves to extend the cause of militarization pleading neutrality in the already troubled Pashtun Belt.

What is shown to reporters is considered enough an evidence to avoid looking into the context, a form of local journalism in which military propaganda rules over truth. For example, to explain the sensational nature of reporting in the Pashtun Belt, Bill Roggio in his report for *The Long War Journal* website wrote about the incident of 200 brain-washed children and sarcastically connected it to previous examples of sensational reporting:

> Once I saw that NWFP (former name of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province) senior minister Balour and Major General Athar Abbas were the primary sources, red lights flashed. When the The *Times Online* claimed the Swat Taliban had kidnapped nearly 1,500 child suicide bombers, alarm bells were ringing. The Swat Taliban are estimated to have had 7,000 fighters maximum. Depending on how you do the math, this would make child suicide bombers equal to 18 to 21 percent of the Swat Taliban's forces. That is preposterous on its face.

Though a single press conference arranged by military in Swat cannot be held a representative sample to understand the national and international media reporting of the war in the Pashtun Belt, yet sensational patterns of media coverage do carry an instructive value, a common theme in local journalism. Using such pattern as a lens could help provide insight into the impersonal and detached way the military, militants and journalists play on civilians' sensitivities, already been pushed to the center of a tragic humanitarian crisis.

The local reporters' apparent indifference to understand this challenge cannot be explained without looking into the market value of this conflict, a local trend giving birth to objectification of violence—to explain violence without humanizing the actual social cost. One warm evening, for instance, I was passing through the overcrowded parts of the Peshawar city area along with a few journalist friends when the deafening sound of an explosion invited our attention towards Qissa Khwani, a centuries old bazar in Peshawar. Reaching over there, we found a yawning crater surrounded by fire and smoke; it was a suicide blast which left scores of dead or injured. Some of the injured cried for help, others just sat there stunned with body parts missing. Still others were in mutilated pieces, reduced to greasy smithereens. Breathing with difficulty in a thick dusty air which was filled with sickening smell of burnt flash, I stood in a state of stupor by the dimly lit narrow wall. Despite my efforts to move away from the gory scene, my local journalist friends asked me not to go: they want me to help them with holding gadgets in their bid to talk to their respective newsrooms. In other words, they were waiting for a live phone talk from their media outlets to explain the tragic scene standing at the site of occurrence.

In TV journalism, a journalist who is first on the scene understands very well how destruction can become a commodity for sale, a hidden economics of mass media which have long been the subject of intense scholarly debate since early 1970s. After examining financial control in media industries, for example, a few Marxist scholars [16] connected media ownership to the business of selling audience to advertisers, a much contested argument leading to a heated debate in 1970s.[17] The debate focused on how information craving by people made violence a productive

[16] Yorke, Dane. "The Radio Octopus." *American Mercury* 23, no. 38, 1931: 16

[17] Smythe, Dallas W. "Communications: Blindspot of Western Marxism." *Canadian Journal of Political & Social Theory* 1, no. 3, 1997: 1-27 & Murdock, Graham. "Blindspots About Western Marxism: A Reply to Dallas Smythe." *Canadian Journal of Political & Social Theory* 2, no. 2, 1978: 109-115.

source for commercial media. More threatening is a commercial culture related to the objectification of conflict-sensitive journalism. Many times I have noted my journalist colleagues ignoring their own safety in their bid to be first with the news, a practice called "breaking news" in which information is presented as a 'hot cake' for public consumption. The saleable spectacle of breaking news is carried out in charged environment giving a feel of cut-throat competition. Standing at the site of the carnage, I waited not just to help my journalist friends, but I also watched other reporters thronging the scene, looking for exploring new dimension, a breaking news, to add to the developing story. Caught in the commercial trap of this ratting game, however, local reporters, working at such tragic sites, usually remain inattentive to their own security.

Covering breaking news minute-by-minute is what local reporters actually do. Relaying every bit of information to their respective media channels outside the conflict zone had become a ritual for these local journalists, a routine practice devoid of reflection. In other words, breaking news have become the new normal turning risky work into a fait accompli, a macabre necessity and a violence to which the local journalists contributed and paid the price for.

Out of the total 40 Pashtun journalists killed in the war since 2001, many have lost their lives in a wave of violence the region had never seen before: two-suicide attacks on average each day for three consecutive years from 2008 to 2010 (SATP 2018). Inviting global attention, this carnage confronted the reporters with risky conditions, raising the need for an alternative conceptual model in which human interests are given primacy over cold market calculations i.e., ratings and a commercial aspiration to be first with the news.

Reflective Journalism: A Liberative Concept?

In a previous paper, we offered a theoretical argument emphasizing the importance of local journalists' reflectivity, the outcome of experience evolving around rationalizing human relations by reviewing presuppositions. I have made it clear that reflective journalism do not plead here 'activism', and 'advocacy' because these variants of journalism are clearly inclined towards political ends. But reflective journalism connects a reporter directly with aggrieved party (read people here) through the medium of embodied experience, a prospective shared asset in the case of Pashtun reporters. In this kind of reporting, a local journalists sense of attachment could possibly be inspired by his/her cultural and social sense of ownership, an embodied experience that invites constant reflection in spare moments.

One of phenomenology's founding fathers, Schutz, believed that experience becomes meaningful only when attention is reflected towards the

self (Lindlof and Taylor 2017; Natanson 1970).[18] If reporting could be considered a continuous process, which Natanson (1968, p. 222) called *an act*, the occupational experience of a journalist could be called a finished project which Natanson called *an action*. "The meaning of an action can thus be grasped only through reflection concerning its actual or projected completion"(Lindlof and Taylor 2017). This line of argument is informed by my own experience the phenomenological essence of which I shared in the method section. Using local experience as an asset, a journalist's reflectivity could be invoked and made productive by sensitizing local journalists to respond to their violence-hit surroundings. This shift could transform reporting by encouraging journalists to stay inside the event; put their spirit in the process of writing/observing; and learn from journalism by making their own experiences the center of their reflective self. With respect to reflexive movement of 1970s, sociologist Alvin Gouldner (1970) argues, "A systematic and dogged insistence upon seeing ourselves as we see others would transform not only our view of ourselves but also our view of others".[19] This understanding can help avoid both the compulsions and complications of *neutral* and *detached* reporting, which, I found, Pashtun journalists face in their efforts to follow *objectivity*.[20]

Objectivity objectifies a local reporter's relationship to the site of occurrence. I offered a couple of exemplars to show the way market rationality promotes conformity to the ruling structure of power. The grossly inaccurate news of 200 brainwashed children showed how self-reflection was a casualty of the objective structure of journalism in which lack of probing into sources, the rush to be first with news and unconditional dependence on military evidence led to a creation of dramatic news production. Glimpses of this one-sided reporting is identified the world over wherein commercial media marginalize those ethnicities and races which are struggling on the receiving end of ruling power. In late 1970s, for instance, commercial media in England was held responsible for creating a moral panic by identifying an alleged plot in which a black political group was shown taking over seven major cities in Manchester. It was a case of

[18] Lindlof, Thomas R, and Bryan C Taylor. *Qualitative Communication Research Methods*: Sage publications, 2017

[19] Lindlof, Thomas R, and Bryan C Taylor. *Qualitative Communication Research Methods*: Sage publications, 2017

[20] The idea of reflexive journalism originally came from the 1970s reflexive movement, which suggested practical alternative to theoretical sociological problems in the form of reflexive sociology. Gouldner (1970) argued "the historical mission of a Reflexive Sociology would be to transform the sociologist, to penetrate deeply into his daily life and work, enriching them with new sensitivities, and to raise the sociologist's self-awareness to a new historical level" (as cited in Lemert, 1993, p. 466).

dramatic reporting the shoddy nature of which was revealed later as a propaganda stunt by a few workers associated with right-wing organizations (Kushnick 1970).[21] Despite subsequent revelation, the press stuck to the original story. Why? It might be because the original idea of a 'Black Power Election Plot' was profitable enough that revealing the truth would have ended the suspense or public interests; or perhaps the original idea suited perceived public attitudes about Black Power well enough that the press simply ignored the evidence (Braham 1982).[22] In the political economy of commercial reporting, objectivity reduces a journalist to become a cog in the machine of media production, valorizing detachment and neutrality and undermining the significance of experience and affinity, which, otherwise, could be availed as resources in humanizing information.

In the case of Pashtun journalists, objectification was inherent partly in those news values which determine the Western journalism core and defines a story's worth. Violence and discrimination is given primacy over peace and harmony and the dramatized coverage of volatile issues is carried out from power and capital's perspective. What we cannot ignore here is the commercial organizational interests' role in shaping representation, limiting a reporter's experience while subjecting his work to presuppositions: the objective forces of capital promoting breaking news culture. Looking for a certain kind of actuality desensitizes a reporter to the surroundings, while limiting the possibility of his/her reflection on action. Professional obligations become a reporter's refuge not to think about what is not salable. Thanks to lack of independent access to a conflict zone, excessive demand for conflict-related news increased local reporters' chances to work as fixers and freelancers, a secondary position from where local reporters cannot effectively enforce their will to influence organizational decision making. These subordinate roles neither empower them to raise critical questions nor afford them an opportunity to access credible sources for verifying news. Such compulsions turn a local reporter into a rally point, an on-the-ground embodied resource which is hired by national and global media to provide them data and quotes mainly. From this perspective, it is not just the theoretical/conceptual domain of *objectivity*, inherent in professional values and technical rationality, which are at the core of a local reporter's training, that could be held responsible for limiting the understanding of news in local journalism. On-site experience, which was identified in this paper and was found overwhelmed by the insensitive

[21] Kushnick, Louis. "Black Power and the Media." *Race Today* 2, 1970: 439-42

[22] Braham, Peter. "How the Media Report Race." In *Culture, Society and the Media*, edited by T. Bennett M. Gurevitch, J. Curran and J. Woollacott, Menthuen.,: Routledge, 2005: 274-293

culture of dangerous working conditions, also needs a focus. This critical understanding would bracket field experience as a potential source to understand these blind spots, a valuable asset for practical realization to identify threats to oneself and to that of community as a whole.

One way of dealing with this challenge is to avoid training local journalists in neutrality and detachment so that these reporters could expand the horizon of their experience to reflect on their community and think upon their professional role on everyday basis. In journalism schools, in other words, reporters must be conceptually trained and occupationally socialized keeping in view their local requirements, which would help them valorize their relationship with own community and also value their occupational experience as the focus of their attention. In the Pashtun Belt, for example, I have found local reporters considering their work limited to objectively write a story based on a narrative style of 5Ws (Who, What, When, Where, Why) and 1H (How). Fulfilling these requirements relieve them of thinking beyond to critically look into the power politics involved in the making or distorting of conflict-related news. The challenge is not just limited to insecurity or threats from military and militants. But the issue, I argue, is their own contentment and conformity which stops them from thinking out of the box. This lack has reduced local journalism to an ahistorical culture of reporting in which events are reported more often out of context. Obfuscation of power politics is dominant theme in this kind of journalism a glimpse of which I have tried to show in this paper with reference to the military press conference in Swat. Reflective journalism, I suggest, is a possible answer to the crisis of reporting in a conflict zone and the absence of which would contribute to militarization, thanks to objectivity's focus on valorizing parties looking at conflict and violence through objectified and detached commercial lens.

Conclusion

The 9/11 attacks in the United States did not change the world only, they also challenged utility of pre-war literature on journalism. Thus, identifying those factors which shape news in conflict scenario requires multi-disciplinary approach, the opposite of medium centric approaches rooted in media professionalism, i.e., *objectivity*. That is why journalists are discouraged to articulate choices and priorities to project human interest stories. Instead, they are generally bound to define news in accordance with market-oriented presuppositions/values. In many cases, journalism is not about reporting a truthful evidence. Reporting, instead, has to fulfill a technical and commercial criteria a glimpse of which was shown in this paper.

In conflict scenario, where foreign reporters are barred from accessing a conflict zone, a local reporter emerges as credible information source sharing spatial and temporal affinities with a local community. But how to turn his/her experience into an occupational asset depends upon local journalism's recognition in the so-called professional field of global media/journalism. The professional realization of a local reporter's field experience would also encourage reflectivity to be used as a method to improve the standard of local journalism. This realization has never been so strong as it has got now because of growing corporate media influence the world over. Rodney Benson (2004) stressed the need for reinvention of media sociology so as to connect organizational routines to larger structures such as the 'field', the working world of professional journalists. Benson (2004) notes that "the dominant models are either too micro-oriented or too macro-oriented; in both cases, they are leading researchers to look in the wrong places for explanations" (p. 311). Benson's (2004) observation is significant for conflict sensitive reporting where the bulk of researchers ignore the material conditions under which news production is carried out, a gap which this paper aimed to identify sharing my personal field experience, adopting a phenomenological approach.

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HOW EXPERIENCE BECOMES A JOURNALISTIC ASSET? A LOCAL REPORTER'S PERSPECTIVE TO UNDERSTAND CONFLICT-SENSITIVE REPORTING IN THE TROUBLED PASHTUN BELT OF PAKISTAN

Syed Irfan Ashraf[*]

Introduction

In a previous paper (in Press), we adopted a critical theory approach to argue that the model of *objective* journalism, while laying emphasis on neutrality and detachment, disconnects local reporters, in conflict scenario, from feeling the pain of their own ethnic community. Therefore, the *objectivity* model was found too simple to help ethnic Pashtun journalists know occupational intricacies of conflict-sensitive reporting in Pakistan's northwestern terror-hit areas, a site for the U.S-led so-called global war on terror. Using phenomenology as a method, I take this argument further and offer my shared journalistic experience as a resource to establish that *objectivity* obfuscates power politics involved in text production while promoting an ahistorical culture. This is done through objectifying the local reporter's relationship with the troubled site of occurrence (field), a relationship in which a reporter is made insensitive to his own presence as an ethnic body standing at a highly militarized political site to get him focused more on looking at reality through the detached lens of neutral observer. Objectify here means that they look at reality not from the human perspective but usually prefer to project aspects of reality using *objectivity* as a measuring rod to access facts. Using the commercial framework of objective reporting might give a text (news story) an economically-desired impersonal form. But the urge for *neutrality* and *impartiality* neither can solve the crisis of reporting nor can control a journalist's bias by

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discouraging his/her feelings, emotions, and subjectivity. In Pakistan, local reporters not only provide gory spectacles of a conflict which has, according to official figures, consumed over 50,000 lives and displaced millions predominantly in the Pashtun Belt; but the journalists also are getting increasingly vulnerable to violence. This paper argues that neutrality is a challenge in conflict reporting on one's own community much the same way as attachment is a sin in objective model of commercial journalism.

The papers do not discuss power nor does it want to examine in totality the 'objective' paradigm of news constructions. Instead, this paper is looking at the role of *objectivity* in the light of my journalistic experience and observations, a phenomenological perspective focused on the local reporters' use of 'objectivity', a unique situation in which a local ethnic community is not just the target of global violence and State discrimination, but the reporting of this violence by the local reporters also contributes to victimization of the victims. Borrowing words from the French literary theorist Roland Barthes (1981), the phenomenological approach adopted here agrees "to compromise with a power, [but] *affect;* affect was what I didn't want to reduce" (p, 21). This is what I wish to highlight with the help of my shared experience as a local reporter who reported on the war from 2006 to 2010.

The first part of this paper provides an overview of the media structure in the war-hit Pashtun Belt, a troubled site for the essence of my experience. The second section lays emphasis on the lack of local perspective in scholarly literature, identifying how *objectivity* as a framework influences a local reporter's material conditions, undermining reality at the site of occurrence. Offering two concert exemplars, the third section shares my experience, identifying how "objectivity" model addresses the crisis of Pashtun representation, raising the need for invoking journalism that could humanize local Pashtun community's pain. Concluding analyses of the paper lays emphasis on self-reflection as journalistic asset in war reporting. This section recommends ways in which to make local journalists responsive to community issues in troubled Pashtun Belt, and in conflict-riddled parts of the world.

Media in the Pashtun Belt: An Overview

Pashtuns are organized as a multi-tribal society, an estimated population of a combined over 40 million, who are scattered in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In Pakistan, Pashtuns mainly live in the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA)—a region straddling the British delineated Durand Line between Pakistan and Afghanistan—and the Pakhtunkhwa province, a geographical and demographic stretch of vast mountainous borderland I call here the "Pashtun Belt".

In 2001, the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban fighters crossed over from Afghanistan into the Pashtun Belt, which was followed by a number of U.S.-sponsored Pakistani military's operations, a part of the US-led global War on Terrorism. Resultantly, the Pashtun Belt became a global flashpoint. As the war began to escalate, Pakistan announced media deregulation policy in 2002. Over ninety licenses were issued to private TV channels, while 28 foreign media networks were given landing rights to open their offices in Pakistan and rely their programs from there. As many as 106 FM radio stations were issued licenses. This rise in the number of media houses and outlets also increased the number of journalists in Pakistan. A rough estimate I collected from media experts in Peshawar and Islamabad said that before 2002 about 2000 journalists were working in Pakistan, which increased to around 20,000 in 2018, of which about 1,622 worked in the Pashtun belt.

Traditionally, the State's military interests has always discouraged the emergence of ethnic media in Pashtun Belt, a vast stretch of bordering land part of which the State uses for military purpose to exercises strategic influence over its neighboring Afghanistan. Subjecting the airwaves privatization to security interests of the State reinforced the status quo despite the mushrooming media channels, at least it was true in the selective allocation of media rights barring Pashtuns from owning the means of symbolic representation. In 2004, for instance, the first Pashtu-language TV channel was launched by a non-Pashtun from Islamabad, the federal capital. In 2017, Mashriq TV was the only channel launched from Peshawar, but it was owned by a non-Pashtun baron. The lack of enough Pashtun representation in the media political economy also affected ethnic reporters of Pashtun origin, who worked for media networks stationed outside the conflict zone. As working conditions of media labor is a blind spot of communication studies the world over[1] therefore, not much has been written about the implications of this discrimination over the Pashtun journalists. Pashtun reporters/journalists here means Pashtu speaking ethnic reporters who represented local journalism in the Pashtun Belt. This lack of ownership thus curtailed the local reporters' strength, affecting their voice at the national level, and making for them hard to carry out critical reporting—an oppositional form of journalism which speaks truth to power—to highlight agony of their own ethnic community. The challenges of conflict-sensitive reporting, therefore, are unique enough to invite attention toward local ethnic reporters' position and contribution in the field, to examine those

[1] Mosco, Vincent. "Communication and Cultural Labour." *The renewal of cultural studies.* (2011): 230-237.

conditions under which local journalists carry out reporting on violence against their own local community.

Conflicts and Wars: The Local Perspective

Conflict-sensitive reporting has always attracted scholarly attention the world over.[2] But the available work either predominantly deals with the corporate media working in the Western context[3], or highlights the consequences of war for elite Western journalists.[4] How racial stories tend to be reported against a flimsiest background and how unverified stories are deliberately projected ignoring evidence which does not fit into the existing media biases are also a rich topic of Western media research.[5] What is missing, however, is a local dimension to examine frontline journalism. Especially, in conflict scenario, local journalists' perceptions and field contributions do not find a place in researches on global or local media.

One category of local work focused upon in academic literature is called fixer. Local journalists working in a subservient role, i.e., fixers and stringers, are generally described as being hired on an as-needed basis in reporting on wars, daily wage earners who report on their own people for global media outlets. Fixers are generally defined as sub-contractors who greet foreign reporters on their arrival, arrange for them interviews with local experts, and translate local language.[6] Providing "protection" for foreign journalists, local reporters in their global role as "fixers" also are considered "doing the shopping for their journalists" and—if necessary—"negotiation with kidnappers".[7]

This local role is also defined primarily in terms of fixers/local reporters relationship with foreign correspondents, mostly Western and U.S. war journalists.[8] In countries like Pakistan, however, the situation is

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[2] Allan, Stuart."Conflicting Truths: Online News and the War in Iraq." *International News in the 21st Century. Eastleigh: John Libbey*, 2004: 285-99.

[3] Robinson, Piers. *The Cnn Effect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention*: Routledge, 2002.

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[7] Pendry, Richard. "Sub-Contracting Newsgathering in Iraq." *The International Journal of Communication Ethics* 8, no. 3/4, 2011: 14-20.

[8] Kramp, Leif, and Stephan Weichert. "Covering the World in Despair: A Survey of German Crisis Reporters." *Journal of War & Culture Studies* 7, no. 1, 2014: 18-35

different. Growing insecurity has restricted foreign reporters from visiting the country's violence-hit bordering areas, raising the local journalists' importance and need. Hence, the national and global media hire local journalists as fixers and reporters who report on a conflict zone which is also their home station, a site that juxtaposes their family life and work routines. On the one hand, the local reporters are trained in *objectivity*, a professional ideology that bars reporters to define news from the perspective of local affiliations. On the other hand, the term fixers and local reporters themselves identify reduced occupational statuses: Fixers are hired for their accessibility to the troubled zone and are kept mainly for providing data and quotes to feed media outlets stationed outside the conflict zone. While the national media engaged local reporters but do not pay them enough to make both ends meet. Such challenges undermine local reporters' agency, raising chances of their manipulation by visiting foreign journalists and media outlets stationed outside the conflict zone. Owing to lack of scholarly attention, however, such challenges receive less attention because of which media labor could be rightly called the blind spot of communication research.

Despite the post-9/11surge in scholarly work on wartime journalism, understanding conflict-sensitive reporting is still associated with the "normative professional ideal of Anglo-American journalism".[9] Because of the traditional models of war reporting, professionalism in journalism undermines local reporters' social origin along with objectifying their relationship with the site of occurrence. This uncritical reception turns *objective* reporting merely into a collection of "facts", which, then, ignores that "facts do not exist on their own but are located within wide-ranging sets of assumptions", and therefore, "which facts are thought to be relevant to a story depends on which sets of assumptions are held".[10] Not just that this objective journalistic approach fails to see the context of these "facts" but believing in a set of assumptions based on already existing presupposition also reinforces a news framework, i.e., *objectivity*, which are open to distortion to uphold ruling class interests. In embedded journalism, for instance, military represents an unaccountable power controlling information flow to/from the conflict zone, a captive form of journalism in which reporters' compromise on truth in a bid to ensure their access to war-related events. As the bulk of researchers generally ignore conditions under which

[9] Deacon, David. *British News Media and the Spanish Civil War: Tomorrow May Be Too Late*: Edinburgh University Press, 2008

[10] Braham, Peter. "How the Media Report Race." In *Culture, Society and the Media*, edited by T. Bennett M. Gurevitch, J. Curran and J. Woollacott, Menthuen., 274-293: Routledge, 2005

news production is carried out,[11] truth is usually the first causality of war: an event in a war may be reported not as it happens, but the quoting of sources and representation of evidence at the site of tragedy may become an exercise in mass deception, contributing to perpetuating violence not just against local people but also against a reporter. Understanding *objectivity'*s implications thus invite attention toward local reporters and their conditions of work, a gap this paper aims to identify in conflict scenario adopting phenomenological approach.

Why Phenomenology?

Phenomenological approach is concerned with personal experience, highlighting taken for granted general assumptions. This method, however, attaches equal attention to structural assumptions describing them through the lens of personal observations attaching primacy to emotional attachment, and individual perceptions. "Whereas a narrative study reports the life of a *single individual*, *a phenomenological study* describes the meaning for several individuals of their *lived experiences* of a concept or a phenomenon"[12] Even sentiments and emotions, as part of shared experience, become an experiential asset to learn from.

Roland Barthes (1981) in his classic work *Camera Lucida* explained his personal sentiments as part of a phenomenological approach to show his feelings for the photograph of his ancestors. Barthes (1981) argues, "As a *spectator* I was interested in photography only for 'sentimental reasons;' I wanted to explore it not as a question (a theme) but as a wound: I see, I feel, hence I notice, I observe, and I think" (p. 21). In the same way, my interest in using phenomenology is mainly because it allows me to heal my wound by sharing my experiences. Partly because of my sentimental attachment with journalism, both as a teacher and as a reporter, and mainly because I found *objectivity* a threat to the spirit of Pashtun journalists and the interests of the community. Like Barthes, my feelings for my community of origin compelled me to abandon 'detachment' and 'neutrality' so as to make reporting a basis for sharing common cause and pain.

My own experiential understanding of the phenomenon of terrorism started in 2003, the year when I joined as a journalism faculty teaching in a public sector university in Pashtun Belt. War on Terror had started in Afghanistan in 2001, and the U.S bombing of Al-Qaida fighters had forced the latter to cross over into Pakistan's Pashtun Belt. Every weekend on way from the university to my family home in Kohat district, I had to pass

[11] Ibid., 273

[12] Creswell, John , and Oaks Thousand. *Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design Choosing among Five Approaches*: Sage Publications, 2007

through check points set up by military and militants. Crippling effects of the U.S funded counter-terror operations turned local people lives into a collateral damage, a loss that often went unnoticed in the national and international media. Along with teaching, my participation in a community-dialogue project of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) helped me to interact with common people who were caught in this existential struggle. Working in a changed paradigm helped me to mix not only with the troubled people of my ethnic community, it also led me to feel for them, an empathy I did not develop before working as an objective journalist. Gradually I began to transform my neutrality into attachment, not in the political context but in the emotional sense of the word. I do not plead here 'activism', and 'advocacy'; I believe that all these are visibly inclined towards political ends, which means extending service to groups, factions, parties or the state. My sense of attachment was the cultural and social outcome of embodied experience that invited constant reflection from me in my spare moments. Like Barthes, I wanted to explore my community as a wound, not just as a question (a theme). Unlike Barthes, however, I was not a spectator. I was an insider, a terror victim who wanted to examine his social wound from a position of some power as a social actor.

To give voice to my troubled ethnic community, I joined a national TV channel DawnNews in 2006. Working on this victim-agent position capacitated me to shed off those ideological blinders which I have grew as postcolonial subject, the schooling outcome of my long organizational social learning. Regular interacting with the social wound developed in me the capacity to think and reflect. What is happening all around me? Why only Pashtuns? The invocation of self-reflective faculties grounded me within an irreducible experience, a consciousness that gradually turned into a site of unification for the origin of my culture and the culture of my professional orientation. As an apparent outcome of a genuine desire, the gradual occupational change could be called as an urge to abrogate the functional rules of occupational engagement called *professionalism*. Such rules lie at the base of a reporters' cynicism towards feeling the pain of people who are reduced in objective journalism to an impersonal and amoral status of no less than a data bank, i.e., sound bites and news quotes. Boasting about rubbing shoulders with military generals on embedded trips, one local journalist, who worked for a large television channel, once put it this way to me: "Only a fool can afford to skip free chopper rides and the hot food offered on such trips to FATA or Swat." "What would they eat once the 'war on terror' ends?" This is what I often heard from desperate colleagues working in lowly status as free lance journalists and fixers. This uncritical and fatalistic approach questions a reporters' modus operandi, ethnical responsibility and conceptual understanding of reporting. To know more

about this new phase of commercial journalism in Pakistan, I latter began to write newspaper columns.[13] For confirmation of news reports, I used to remain in direct contact with the national-level and the local-level military spokesmen and political leaders that helped me to develop some know-how about the political economy of news making in the Pashtun Belt. Apart from invoking my personal experience, this paper is based on a data from the year 2007 to 2010 which I recorded in three note books based on which I wrote over 50 articles for prestigious national English newspaper, *Dawn* (Ashraf 2008-10).

The Crisis of Representation: *Facticity R*obs Context

I have noted that the local reporters' portrayal of the Pashtun Belt oscillates between total indifference and selective exposure. In the first case, everyday lived experience is generally ignored and life is painted through the brush of history. Whatever attention common people receive is tainted with the framework of aged-old stereotypes such as "tribesmen", "gharatmand qabail" (brave tribesmen), "deeply religious society", "elaqa ghair" (no-goarea), "information blackhole" etc. Such platitudes identify Pashtuns more with their "tough" geography and less as people with flesh and bones, justifying Pakistani state's use of heavy force. In not-so-normal circumstances, however, the media coverage remains selective in which emphasis is laid on a wider regional context to highlight strategic significance of the borderland. This security-centric approach shifts the attention away from the Pashtun Belt, obscuring consequences of the U.S.-led "war on terror." Even local reporters could not help to challenge this selective exposure. In their search on bare *facts*, which are offered to them in press conferences and military briefings, local reporters often fail to investigate those conditions in which *facts* emerge to become news in the first place. Yet, whenever I talked to them about these issues, most of the local reporters took pride in doing what they called *objective journalism*, a reporting that revolves around neutrality and detachment. Instead of challenging an existing social order, however, I found technical rationality impairing journalists' reflective capacity in a sense that their belief in neutrality provides them with an excuse to avoid critical reporting, leaving them to be content with mass communication gadgets and the conceptual framework of *objectivity.*

[13] I joined *DawnNews*, a premier Pakistan-based English language TV channel, which aired current affairs programs for a couple of years after which it was converted into Urdu language. I quit working with the channel in 2009 to start free-lance reporting.

An eerie reflection was the scene staged in the year 2009 at the security forces' headquarters in Saidu Sharif, Swat. In my presence, six teenagers with trembling hands, half-covered pale faces and shabby clothes, were paraded by military officials before a group of media men at the heavily barricaded Army Circuit House. Around half a dozen Digital Satellite News Gathering vehicles were parked outside, connected to production staff in big cities of Islamabad, Karachi and Lahore. The military arranged such events to brief local reporters on their military operations. Because of increasing insecurity, foreign journalists were barred from entering the valley and even the country's national media was dependent on local reporters, whose significance laid in their knowledge about the local context of war-related stories. For example, the local reporters apparently knew that the boys, which the military were parading, had deserted the Swat militants after getting a few days of forced training sessions. Later, the children's parents willingly handed them over to the security forces to avoid the wrath of intelligence agencies. Yet, the military side prevailed, claiming that the teenagers were recovered in a timely military operation that saved them from turning into suicide bombers. No sooner had the press conference ended, the media men rushed out to connect to their Digital Satellite News Gatherings (DSNG), a chaotic scene, indeed. How to be first with the news was the main issue at hand. Before the journalists could get into their live DSNGs, a few reporters were asked by their producers to announce that the children were would-be suicide bombers. The reason? One channel had already flashed a ticker branding them as such. Some of the rest had to follow citing military and police as their sources, a cacophony in which a couple of voices, which tried to reveal the truth, were lost.

The exchange value of terrorism begins to turn into a political capital. The following week, on July 27, a senior parliamentarian, Bashir Bilour, exaggerated the figures in his TV interview saying that the government, in fact, had arrested "200 brainwashed children who had been trained for suicide bombing" (Geo TV 2009). The issue caused a stir. The national and international media began to digest unverified facts. The politician was on air almost everywhere.[14] After two weeks of waiting to see if the army spokesman would release any clarification, this issue of local importance got my attention. After inquiry, I came to know that the Swati people were silent because they feared that the law enforcement authorities

[14] Former Senior Minister of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province Bashir Bilour escaped many suicide attacks. Later, however, he was killed in one such attack when "a suicide bomber detonated the explosives strapped to his body at a close distance from Bashir Bilour, inflicting critical wounds to his chest and stomach that later proved FATA" (The News, 2012)

would make the brainwashed children an excuse to carry out raids on their houses, which would further add to the increasing numbers of missing persons or extra-judicial killing at the hands of authorities. Following a lead from my inquiry in Swat, I talked to the Pakistan Army spokesman Major General Athar Abbas, who accepted in his 'off the record' conversation with me that the news was fabricated. The general said that announcement of the news on national television made him perturbed. "How could the army produce 200 would-be suicide bombers if the foreign media insisted on producing them before the cameras? Nobody apparently had a clue to it! Surprisingly, the local military office in Swat also did not issue any clarification despite accepting that the information was wrong. General Abbas confided to me later on phone that "a clarification would have resulted in a confrontation with the political government."

In retrospect, a serious probe on the part of a single journalist in Peshawar could have met the requirements of responsible reporting.[15] Perhaps the media men were not interested in verifying their information—although news from conflict zones is indeed hard to confirm as it is always accompanied by confusion. Some journalists in Peshawar, whom I talked to later, believe that this was part of a conspiracy to retain the element of sensation in the conflict zones of the 'hot Frontier,' a global flash point. As media sensationalism could potentially stimulate a war economy by creating the need for a military action, local reporting apparently serves to extend the cause of militarization pleading neutrality in the already troubled Pashtun Belt.

What is shown to reporters is considered enough an evidence to avoid looking into the context, a form of local journalism in which military propaganda rules over truth. For example, to explain the sensational nature of reporting in the Pashtun Belt, Bill Roggio in his report for *The Long War Journal* website wrote about the incident of 200 brain-washed children and sarcastically connected it to previous examples of sensational reporting:

> Once I saw that NWFP (former name of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province) senior minister Balour and Major General Athar Abbas were the primary sources, red lights flashed. When the The *Times Online* claimed the Swat Taliban had kidnapped nearly 1,500 child suicide bombers, alarm bells were ringing. The Swat Taliban are estimated to have had 7,000 fighters maximum. Depending on how you do the math, this would make child suicide bombers equal to 18 to 21 percent of the Swat Taliban's forces. That is preposterous on its face.

Though a single press conference arranged by military in Swat cannot be held a representative sample to understand the national and international media reporting of the war in the Pashtun Belt, yet sensational patterns of media coverage do carry an instructive value, a common theme in local journalism. Using such pattern as a lens could help provide insight into the impersonal and detached way the military, militants and journalists play on civilians' sensitivities, already been pushed to the center of a tragic humanitarian crisis.

The local reporters' apparent indifference to understand this challenge cannot be explained without looking into the market value of this conflict, a local trend giving birth to objectification of violence—to explain violence without humanizing the actual social cost. One warm evening, for instance, I was passing through the overcrowded parts of the Peshawar city area along with a few journalist friends when the deafening sound of an explosion invited our attention towards Qissa Khwani, a centuries old bazar in Peshawar. Reaching over there, we found a yawning crater surrounded by fire and smoke; it was a suicide blast which left scores of dead or injured. Some of the injured cried for help, others just sat there stunned with body parts missing. Still others were in mutilated pieces, reduced to greasy smithereens. Breathing with difficulty in a thick dusty air which was filled with sickening smell of burnt flash, I stood in a state of stupor by the dimly lit narrow wall. Despite my efforts to move away from the gory scene, my local journalist friends asked me not to go: they want me to help them with holding gadgets in their bid to talk to their respective newsrooms. In other words, they were waiting for a live phone talk from their media outlets to explain the tragic scene standing at the site of occurrence.

In TV journalism, a journalist who is first on the scene understands very well how destruction can become a commodity for sale, a hidden economics of mass media which have long been the subject of intense scholarly debate since early 1970s. After examining financial control in media industries, for example, a few Marxist scholars [16] connected media ownership to the business of selling audience to advertisers, a much contested argument leading to a heated debate in 1970s.[17] The debate focused on how information craving by people made violence a productive

[16] Yorke, Dane. "The Radio Octopus." *American Mercury* 23, no. 38, 1931: 16

[17] Smythe, Dallas W. "Communications: Blindspot of Western Marxism." *Canadian Journal of Political & Social Theory* 1, no. 3, 1997: 1-27 & Murdock, Graham. "Blindspots About Western Marxism: A Reply to Dallas Smythe." *Canadian Journal of Political & Social Theory* 2, no. 2, 1978: 109-115.

source for commercial media. More threatening is a commercial culture related to the objectification of conflict-sensitive journalism. Many times I have noted my journalist colleagues ignoring their own safety in their bid to be first with the news, a practice called "breaking news" in which information is presented as a 'hot cake' for public consumption. The saleable spectacle of breaking news is carried out in charged environment giving a feel of cut-throat competition. Standing at the site of the carnage, I waited not just to help my journalist friends, but I also watched other reporters thronging the scene, looking for exploring new dimension, a breaking news, to add to the developing story. Caught in the commercial trap of this ratting game, however, local reporters, working at such tragic sites, usually remain inattentive to their own security.

Covering breaking news minute-by-minute is what local reporters actually do. Relaying every bit of information to their respective media channels outside the conflict zone had become a ritual for these local journalists, a routine practice devoid of reflection. In other words, breaking news have become the new normal turning risky work into a fait accompli, a macabre necessity and a violence to which the local journalists contributed and paid the price for.

Out of the total 40 Pashtun journalists killed in the war since 2001, many have lost their lives in a wave of violence the region had never seen before: two-suicide attacks on average each day for three consecutive years from 2008 to 2010 (SATP 2018). Inviting global attention, this carnage confronted the reporters with risky conditions, raising the need for an alternative conceptual model in which human interests are given primacy over cold market calculations i.e., ratings and a commercial aspiration to be first with the news.

Reflective Journalism: A Liberative Concept?

In a previous paper, we offered a theoretical argument emphasizing the importance of local journalists' reflectivity, the outcome of experience evolving around rationalizing human relations by reviewing presuppositions. I have made it clear that reflective journalism do not plead here 'activism', and 'advocacy' because these variants of journalism are clearly inclined towards political ends. But reflective journalism connects a reporter directly with aggrieved party (read people here) through the medium of embodied experience, a prospective shared asset in the case of Pashtun reporters. In this kind of reporting, a local journalists sense of attachment could possibly be inspired by his/her cultural and social sense of ownership, an embodied experience that invites constant reflection in spare moments.

One of phenomenology's founding fathers, Schutz, believed that experience becomes meaningful only when attention is reflected towards the

self (Lindlof and Taylor 2017; Natanson 1970).[18] If reporting could be considered a continuous process, which Natanson (1968, p. 222) called *an act*, the occupational experience of a journalist could be called a finished project which Natanson called *an action*. "The meaning of an action can thus be grasped only through reflection concerning its actual or projected completion"(Lindlof and Taylor 2017). This line of argument is informed by my own experience the phenomenological essence of which I shared in the method section. Using local experience as an asset, a journalist's reflectivity could be invoked and made productive by sensitizing local journalists to respond to their violence-hit surroundings. This shift could transform reporting by encouraging journalists to stay inside the event; put their spirit in the process of writing/observing; and learn from journalism by making their own experiences the center of their reflective self. With respect to reflexive movement of 1970s, sociologist Alvin Gouldner (1970) argues, "A systematic and dogged insistence upon seeing ourselves as we see others would transform not only our view of ourselves but also our view of others".[19] This understanding can help avoid both the compulsions and complications of *neutral* and *detached* reporting, which, I found, Pashtun journalists face in their efforts to follow *objectivity*.[20]

Objectivity objectifies a local reporter's relationship to the site of occurrence. I offered a couple of exemplars to show the way market rationality promotes conformity to the ruling structure of power. The grossly inaccurate news of 200 brainwashed children showed how self-reflection was a casualty of the objective structure of journalism in which lack of probing into sources, the rush to be first with news and unconditional dependence on military evidence led to a creation of dramatic news production. Glimpses of this one-sided reporting is identified the world over wherein commercial media marginalize those ethnicities and races which are struggling on the receiving end of ruling power. In late 1970s, for instance, commercial media in England was held responsible for creating a moral panic by identifying an alleged plot in which a black political group was shown taking over seven major cities in Manchester. It was a case of

[18] Lindlof, Thomas R, and Bryan C Taylor. *Qualitative Communication Research Methods*: Sage publications, 2017

[19] Lindlof, Thomas R, and Bryan C Taylor. *Qualitative Communication Research Methods*: Sage publications, 2017

[20] The idea of reflexive journalism originally came from the 1970s reflexive movement, which suggested practical alternative to theoretical sociological problems in the form of reflexive sociology. Gouldner (1970) argued "the historical mission of a Reflexive Sociology would be to transform the sociologist, to penetrate deeply into his daily life and work, enriching them with new sensitivities, and to raise the sociologist's self-awareness to a new historical level" (as cited in Lemert, 1993, p. 466).

dramatic reporting the shoddy nature of which was revealed later as a propaganda stunt by a few workers associated with right-wing organizations (Kushnick 1970).[21] Despite subsequent revelation, the press stuck to the original story. Why? It might be because the original idea of a 'Black Power Election Plot' was profitable enough that revealing the truth would have ended the suspense or public interests; or perhaps the original idea suited perceived public attitudes about Black Power well enough that the press simply ignored the evidence (Braham 1982).[22] In the political economy of commercial reporting, objectivity reduces a journalist to become a cog in the machine of media production, valorizing detachment and neutrality and undermining the significance of experience and affinity, which, otherwise, could be availed as resources in humanizing information.

In the case of Pashtun journalists, objectification was inherent partly in those news values which determine the Western journalism core and defines a story's worth. Violence and discrimination is given primacy over peace and harmony and the dramatized coverage of volatile issues is carried out from power and capital's perspective. What we cannot ignore here is the commercial organizational interests' role in shaping representation, limiting a reporter's experience while subjecting his work to presuppositions: the objective forces of capital promoting breaking news culture. Looking for a certain kind of actuality desensitizes a reporter to the surroundings, while limiting the possibility of his/her reflection on action. Professional obligations become a reporter's refuge not to think about what is not salable. Thanks to lack of independent access to a conflict zone, excessive demand for conflict-related news increased local reporters' chances to work as fixers and freelancers, a secondary position from where local reporters cannot effectively enforce their will to influence organizational decision making. These subordinate roles neither empower them to raise critical questions nor afford them an opportunity to access credible sources for verifying news. Such compulsions turn a local reporter into a rally point, an on-the-ground embodied resource which is hired by national and global media to provide them data and quotes mainly. From this perspective, it is not just the theoretical/conceptual domain of *objectivity*, inherent in professional values and technical rationality, which are at the core of a local reporter's training, that could be held responsible for limiting the understanding of news in local journalism. On-site experience, which was identified in this paper and was found overwhelmed by the insensitive

[21] Kushnick, Louis. "Black Power and the Media." *Race Today* 2, 1970: 439-42

[22] Braham, Peter. "How the Media Report Race." In *Culture, Society and the Media*, edited by T. Bennett M. Gurevitch, J. Curran and J. Woollacott, Menthuen.,: Routledge, 2005: 274-293

culture of dangerous working conditions, also needs a focus. This critical understanding would bracket field experience as a potential source to understand these blind spots, a valuable asset for practical realization to identify threats to oneself and to that of community as a whole.

One way of dealing with this challenge is to avoid training local journalists in neutrality and detachment so that these reporters could expand the horizon of their experience to reflect on their community and think upon their professional role on everyday basis. In journalism schools, in other words, reporters must be conceptually trained and occupationally socialized keeping in view their local requirements, which would help them valorize their relationship with own community and also value their occupational experience as the focus of their attention. In the Pashtun Belt, for example, I have found local reporters considering their work limited to objectively write a story based on a narrative style of 5Ws (Who, What, When, Where, Why) and 1H (How). Fulfilling these requirements relieve them of thinking beyond to critically look into the power politics involved in the making or distorting of conflict-related news. The challenge is not just limited to insecurity or threats from military and militants. But the issue, I argue, is their own contentment and conformity which stops them from thinking out of the box. This lack has reduced local journalism to an ahistorical culture of reporting in which events are reported more often out of context. Obfuscation of power politics is dominant theme in this kind of journalism a glimpse of which I have tried to show in this paper with reference to the military press conference in Swat. Reflective journalism, I suggest, is a possible answer to the crisis of reporting in a conflict zone and the absence of which would contribute to militarization, thanks to objectivity's focus on valorizing parties looking at conflict and violence through objectified and detached commercial lens.

Conclusion

The 9/11 attacks in the United States did not change the world only, they also challenged utility of pre-war literature on journalism. Thus, identifying those factors which shape news in conflict scenario requires multi-disciplinary approach, the opposite of medium centric approaches rooted in media professionalism, i.e., *objectivity*. That is why journalists are discouraged to articulate choices and priorities to project human interest stories. Instead, they are generally bound to define news in accordance with market-oriented presuppositions/values. In many cases, journalism is not about reporting a truthful evidence. Reporting, instead, has to fulfill a technical and commercial criteria a glimpse of which was shown in this paper.

In conflict scenario, where foreign reporters are barred from accessing a conflict zone, a local reporter emerges as credible information source sharing spatial and temporal affinities with a local community. But how to turn his/her experience into an occupational asset depends upon local journalism's recognition in the so-called professional field of global media/journalism. The professional realization of a local reporter's field experience would also encourage reflectivity to be used as a method to improve the standard of local journalism. This realization has never been so strong as it has got now because of growing corporate media influence the world over. Rodney Benson (2004) stressed the need for reinvention of media sociology so as to connect organizational routines to larger structures such as the 'field', the working world of professional journalists. Benson (2004) notes that "the dominant models are either too micro-oriented or too macro-oriented; in both cases, they are leading researchers to look in the wrong places for explanations" (p. 311). Benson's (2004) observation is significant for conflict sensitive reporting where the bulk of researchers ignore the material conditions under which news production is carried out, a gap which this paper aimed to identify sharing my personal field experience, adopting a phenomenological approach.

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THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW TO THE ISSUES FACED BY THE REFUGEES IN GENERAL AND AFGHANS IN PARTICULAR

Muhammad Zubair*

"*Human rights violations are a major factor in causing the flight of refugees as well as an obstacle to their safety and voluntary return home. Safeguarding human rights in countries of origin is therefore critical both for the prevention and for the solution of refugee problems. Respect for human rights is also essential for the protection of refugees in countries of asylum".*-**United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees**

Abstract

The article considers human rights application as an alternative to such situations where a nation-state is not a signatory to the international refugees' law nor has any domestic arrangements for the refugees on their soil due to which they are living in a legal limbo. While the initial perception about human rights and refugee law was that both of these areas are divisions of public international law completely separate from one another, but now it is well established that the interaction between these is multifaceted as demonstrated at nation-state level and academic writings.

Whether refugees' rights are human rights? A query like this may be a challenging task in contemporary environment, when there are frequent incidents of refugees' mistreatments on the pretext of restrictive policies related to them. António Guterres, has observed that "the human rights agenda out of which United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was born, and on which we depend, is increasingly coming under strain. The international economic crisis brought with it a populist wave of

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anti-foreigner sentiment, albeit often couched in terms of national sovereignty and national security."[1]

Against such an environment, reviewing the relationships in-between human rights and refugee laws is vital in-order to categorize the complete variety of nation-states' duties and thus report their practices towards asylum seekers and refugees.

Keywords: International Human Rights Law, UNCHR, Afghan Refugees, Pakistan

Introduction:

More than fifty millions of refugees have been successfully returned to their homelands ever-since the ending of World War II, however almost an equivalent number of them are getting it difficult to recapture their essential human rights. At present, UNHCR's office is helping about sixty five millions of refugees globally. Greater violations of human rights, internal conflicts, civil-wars, violence against minorities, forceful relocations apart from natural calamities are the causes which create refugees. Although respective regimes are accountable to their citizens to protect their fundamental human rights, while on the other hand refugees are facing protection issues from the host nations. Therefore, these displaced people need to be protected by the international community in-order to help these needy people especially as they have left their near and dear ones. By definition these people are the sufferers and there is need to provide them protection.

The jurisprudential foundation of refugee's law is the notion of common humanity and the responsibility of the comity of nations to protect human lives, promotion of humanity's well-being, to reduce sufferings of human-beings and to help states in the furtherance of these matters. Therefore, the main aim of the refugees' law is to provide shelter during the period of sever threat, to make sure a dignified living for refugees until their voluntary and safe return. Hence, this branch of international law should be viewed from the perspective of human rights system which protects these vulnerable sections, to which the comity of nations have agreed to act as a surrogate guarantor of their dignity. Therefore, the notion of refugees' protection in-itself can't be separated from the concept of human rights. Accordingly the crux of the law of refugees is to define and protect the refugee's rights.

[1] A. Guterres, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) remarks at the Opening of the Judicial Year of the European Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg, 28 January 2011.

In contemporary World, international human-rights law is the fastest growing area of international law. The only benchmark in 1951 during the drafting times of the Refugees' Convention for the protection of human rights at the global level[2] was the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).[3] Today, in contrast, human rights at global level comprises not only the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)[4]and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)[5],but also a range of dedicated global and regional pacts. As a result, the individual today is the holder of an impressive range of human rights.[6] Broadly speaking, refugees' law may be included in international human-rights law. The refugees' problem thus viewing from the human-rights viewpoint has become unprecedentedly important nowadays. Against this backdrop, the current article considers some of the human-rights which are vital for refugees and having great implications on their protection regime.

Human Rights of Refugees:

The problems faced by refugees have become a global issue. The situation of insecurity and uncertainty faced by refugees under customary law led to such a position where it became necessary to take steps which would ensure to provide them their fundamental rights to whom they are entitled to as human-beings.[7] One of such challenges faced by this vulnerable section of the comity of nations is to respect their human rights. Various human rights instruments at the global, regional and domestic level are there for the enhancement of the refugees' protection, which has greatly contributed in this direction. This is a recently developed idea for the protection of refugees through the establishment of a mechanism of human rights law and it has been developed by no one else than the United Nations. The charter of the UN states as one of the objectives and principles of it is "promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all

[2] B.S. Chimni (ed.), International Refugee Law: A Reader, Sage Publications (New Delhi, 2000), p. 165.
[3] UN Doc. A/RES/217A (III) (10 December 1948).
[4] UNTS, Vol. 999, p. 171 (No. 14668), adopted on 16 December 1966 and entered into force on 23 March 1976.
[5] UNTS, Vol. 993, p. 3 (No. 14531), adopted on 16 December 1966 and entered into force on 3 January 1976.
[6] James C. Hathaway & John A. Dent, Refugee Rights: Report on a Comparative Survey, York Lanes Press (Toronto, 1995), reprinted in B.S. Chimni (ed.), p. 202.
[7] Harpal Kaur Khera, "The Legal Status of Refugees—Their Rights in the country of Asylum", Civil and Military Law Journal, Vol. 26. No. 1, 1990, p. 57.

without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion."[8] Irrespective of the status of a human-being in a specific state, the application of human rights to everyone is due to the dignity inherent in them. Therefore on the basis of this principle, all human beings whether they are refugees such as the Afghans in Pakistan or not are entitled to the same level of treatment in terms of rights and freedoms, which have been mentioned under the international human-rights instruments. Here one thing is of great importance to them as a refugee that in majority of the civil rights, the nationality requirement is of no value as mentioned in the ICCPR that the protection under it is extended to everybody or all individuals regardless of their status.[9] Even immigrants illegally present in a country can take the benefits of this by virtue of being human-beings.[10]

Distinguishing a refugee from an economic migrant is always a difficult task. Here one can argue that if a person's life and freedom is under threat, then it is irrelevant whether that threat is coming to him/her from starvation or arbitrary execution due to his/her belief. Then under such a situation, being a human regardless of the status, such an individual is entitled to minimum level of human rights and treatments.[11] There are different stages during which a refugee's human rights are violated which include violations at home, at escape stage and during the refugee-hood or on return.[12] Debate on forced migration is inextricably linked to various human rights issues. Various human rights having universal recognition are directly invoked to having application to refugees and other asylum-seekers. Such rights include right to life, right to protect from torture and ill treatment, a person should not be made stateless, freedom of movement, having a right to leave any state, even their own one, and have a right to come back to their own, and the right not to be returned forcefully.[13]

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[8] Brain Gorlick, "Human Rights and Refugees: enhancing protection through international Human Rights Law", Working Paper No. 30 (Oct. 2000), p. 11, http://www.unhcr.org./ch accessed on 27/02/2019.

[9] James C. Hathaway & John A. Dent, Refugee Rights: Report on a Comparative Survey, York Lanes Press (Toronto, 1995), reprinted in B.S. Chimni (ed.), p. 202-203.

[10] Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law (2nd ed.), Oxford University Press (1996), p. 232.

[11] United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR or OHCHR), Human Rights and Refugees, Centre for Human Rights, UN Office at Geneva (1993), p.17 <http: //www. unhchr. ch/html/menu6/2/fs20.htm>.

[12] Joan Fitzpatrick (ed.), Human Rights Protection for Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, and Internally Displaced Persons: A Guide to International Mechanisms and Procedures, Transnational Publishers (2002), p. .1

[13] United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR or OHCHR), Human Rights and Refugees, Centre for Human Rights, UN Office at Geneva (1993), pp.14-15. <http: //www.unhchr. ch/html/menu6/2/fs20.htm>.

Implementation of international human rights is made through a method which is significantly different from international refugee law. There is no tribunal at international level for the enforcement of refugees' rights, if there are claims that their rights have been violated as mentioned in the international refugees related instruments and in such a situation they are depended upon the national arrangements in their hosting states, while on the other hand there are various setups at global and regional level for the human-rights enforcement, if ones human-rights having been violated.[14]

Therefore, the human rights impact on the definition of refugees is basically grounded in the following core features:

1: Just like any other conventional rule, Geneva Convention's article 1 should be interpreted as well as applied inside the normative framework existing at its interpretation's time, which includes the treaties related to human rights adopted since it existence.[15] Interpretation like this has proven its worth to be necessary for the adaption of Geneva Convention to continuously shifting realities of forced migrations.

2: The standards provided by the human rights have uniformity at the global level, which can help in the harmonization of the frequently unilateral and divergent interpretations by the state parties.

3: Provided the inherent subjectivity in various main concepts of the refugee's definition, human-rights values provide a more objective and predictable normative structure in the determination of a genuine refugee.

The foundation upon which the definition of refugee's is based, especially the concept of persecution obviously demonstrates the penetration of human-rights into refugee's law. Earlier in 1953, Jacques Vernant "equates 'persecution' with severe measures and sanctions of an arbitrary nature, incompatible with the principles set forth in the Universal Declaration of

[14] Joan Fitzpatrick (ed.), Human Rights Protection for Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, and Internally Displaced Persons: A Guide to International Mechanisms and Procedures, Transnational Publishers (2002), p. 4.

[15] '[A]n international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation'. *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)*, ICJ Reports (1971) 16, at 31. Furthermore, human rights treaties constitute 'any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties' under Art. 31(1)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

Human Rights".[16] Even though at that time these understandings were not generally shared,[17] gradual recognition came with the passage of time during the 1960 and 1970s with the exceptional growth of human rights. The notion of persecution was framed by Goodwin-Gill in his pioneer studies which published during 1983 against the human rights' background.[18] The work was further standardized in his influential book "The *Law of Refugee Status"*, by Hathaway which published during 1991. The definition of persecution according to him is as, "sustained or systemic violation of basic human-rights demonstrative of a failure of state protection".[19] Having a definition of persecution, while referring to human rights has developed into conventional perception in legal doctrine.[20] Further interesting development is the acknowledgement on the part of states in their subsequent practices to the Geneva Convention. Numerous jurisdictions[21] at national level, administrative authorities[22] along with European Union Qualification Directive[23] have restated it.

Human rights application isn't restricted to the concept of persecution rather they have also shaped several additional distinct characteristics of refugees' definition. Already recognized by numerous national jurisdictions, the word refugee has to be considered being written against the backdrop of international human rights law, comprising as revealed or articulated in the UDHR…and the ICCPR'.[24]

Persecution's foundation provides one of the most noticeable examples of the human-rights ideas: religious and political opinions obviously stand on

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[16] J. Vernant, *The Refugee in the Post-War World* (1953), p. 8

[17] Grahl-Madsen (n 32) at 193–4.

[18] G. S. Goodwin-Gill, *The Refugee in International Law* (1983), 38–46. See also E. Lapenna, 'Le réfugiéetl'émigrantdans le cadre des droits et libertésfondamentaux', 22 *AWR Bulletin* (1984) 50; G. Melander, *The Two Refugee Definitions* (1987).

[19] J. C. Hathaway, *The Rights of Refugees under International Law* (2005), esp. at 104-105.

[20] C. J. Harvey, 'Refugee Law, the Judges and a "New" Human Rights Culture', 14 *Immigration and Nationality Law and Practice* (2000) 5.

[21] *Canada v. Ward* [1993] 103 DLR 4th 1; *Horvath v. Secretary of State for the Home Department* (n 26); *K. v. Refugee Status Appeals Authority* [2005] NZAR 441 (2004)

[22] *INS Basic Law Manual*, quoted in D. Anker, *Law of Asylum in the United States*(1999) 174; UK Asylum Policy Instructions, *Considering the Protection (Asylum) Claim and Assessing Credibility* (2010) 22–3.

[23] Art. 9 of Council Directive 2004/83/EC, OJ 2004 L 304/12, 29 April 2004, on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted.

[24] *Applicant A v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs* [1997] 190 CLR 225, 296–7 (Kirby J)

the ideas of freedom of thoughts[25] and of opinions and expressions,[26] while the rest of the grounds that is, nationality, race, and membership of a particular social group, comes within the principles of non-discriminations.[27]

Even though there is no clear mentioning of gender as one of the persecution's ground, however, human rights has played a major role in the further development of it through the adoption of gender sensitive approach which shows its evolution. Gender-sensitivity has become forerunner approach of the human rights of the refugee's definition.[28] Therefore, claims on the basis of gender along with those of sexual orientations, now-a-days are usually deemed as being categorized to fall within the broader areas of membership of a specific social group.

The non-refoulment's principle is generally considered as the foundation upon which the international refugee law is based.[29] Its history can be traced back to the treaties of extradition which concluded at some point in the 19th century, but for the first time its approval were clearly given in the Convention related to the international status of refugees in 1933. Under existing law related to refugees, Article 33 (1) of the Geneva's Convention is its basic source.

The significance of this fundamental principle is further certified by Article 42, which bars reservations to Article 33. Hence this basic principle of law related to refugees having been reaffirmed in nearly all instruments[30] in-between states, to such a level that it has adopted the shape of customary international law.[31]

International human rights development significantly altered the normative contents of refugee's status. While comparing with the refugee's law, human rights represent two basic features; its inclusiveness as well as universal. This distinguishing characteristic stands upon the idea that by definition human rights are inherent in the quality of human beings. As a result of this,

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[25] Arts 18 of the UDHR and ICCPR
[26] Arts 19 of the UDHR and ICCPR
[27] Arts 2 of the UDHR and ICCPR
[28] D. Anker, 'Refugee Law, Gender, and the Human Rights Paradigm', 15 *Harv. Hum. Rts. L.J.* (2002) 133, at 138–9.
[29] G. S. Goodwin-Gill and J. McAdam, *The Refugee in International Law* (2007) 201–84; Hathaway, *The Rights of Refugees under International Law* at 278–369.
[30] Agreement relating to Refugee Seamen, 23 November 1957, completed by the Protocol to the Agreement relating to Refugee Seamen of 12 June 1973, Art. 10; Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 10 September 1969, Art.II(3).
[31] Declaration of States Parties to the 1951 Convention and or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, UN Doc HCR/MMSP/2001/09 (2002), para. 4.

the enjoyment of rights under the Covenant is not restricted only to the state's citizens (Pakistan's national) but rather available to all those present in that particular state irrespective of their status including refugees such as Afghan in Pakistan etc..[32] The extra significance of human rights is clear with respect to the refugees as well as asylum-seekers that have been denied the benefits under majority of the provisions of the Geneva's Convention by means of disputable and restrictive interpretations. But human rights leave far more impact on the refugees and are not limited to their legal status. It also maintains its central role for the assertion of refugees rights which have due recognition under the Geneva's Convention also.

The enduring application of human rights has been helpful in guarantying an extra set of important rights. A variety of human rights which supplements the Geneva's Convention is both extensive as well as significant. A greater opportunity in-order to further the protection of refugees lies through the application of human rights rests on the non-discrimination's principle. Furthermore, Art. 26 of the ICCPR make sure that all are getting equal treatment before the law and protects them from discrimination and is not restricted to the rights given in the ICCPR.[33] Similarly, references to 'national origins' as well as 'other status' amongst the non exhaustive category of banned bias ground apparently include both discriminations in-between refugees and other biased treatment between citizens and refugees.

Conclusion:

It may be summarized from the above discussions that human rights have assumed the shape of ultimate standard in the determination of who the refugee is. The infusion of human rights into the sphere of refugees' matters has demonstrated to be more instrumental in shaping universal and vibrant understandings of the definition of refugees, which will be more helpful in the international law's evolution in future. Thus it therefore helps in the prevention of Geneva's Convention from becoming an ineffective instrument by adjusting it to the ever shifting realities of future related to forced migration. The main reason behind this infusion of the two different areas of international law can be traced back to the existence of treaty bodies of human rights. They are instrumental in shaping a vital role in the proliferation of human rights into the refugee's law. Clearly it doesn't suggest any kind of hierarchical relationship in-between these branches of international law, since both of these regimes retain their conventional autonomies. These bodies have repeatedly cleared their intensions that they

[32]*The Position of Aliens under the Covenant*, UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 18 (1986) para, 2

[33]HRCttee, *General Comment No. 18: Non-discrimination*, UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6, at 146 (1989), para. 12.

have nothing to do with the examination of claims made by asylum-seekers or the monitoring of contracting nations' performance with respect to the observances of their responsibilities under the Refugees' Convention.[34] Nevertheless, from the content's perspectives of the particular norms, the boundaries in-between both the regimes have been consistently blurred. There is an extremely close relationship in-between both of these two areas of the international law due to which they are so much interdependent on one another that it is almost not possible to split one area from the other one.

The combine applicability of both these areas of international law has further strengthened the protection regime of refugees' law through a mutually supporting process. This merger in-between the two has reached to such a level that now it is virtually impossible to dissociate one from the other or even it can be argued to such as extent that human rights law has absorbed the refugees' law.

Whereas the Refugee's Convention has maintained symbolic relevance to some extent, the difference in-between the aliens and citizens which condition the very substance of refugee's status has been marginalized to large extent and superseded generally by the application of human rights to non-nationals.[35]

It is high time for the development of progressive approach to the problems faced by the refugees at global level, such an approach should be based on the fundamental human rights of the refugees as well as the asylum countries interests and international comity of nations, to secure cooperation from all these stake holders to find durable solutions of their problems. Provided the close connection in-between these two areas, international human rights values are great tools for the enhancement and complementation of the present international refugees' protection regime by giving it proper direction and orientation.

The contemporary legal framework at global level recognized on refugees a range of fundamental human rights which shows the contribution of a number of instruments and treaties. It can be safely stated that the existing law related to refugees has evolved out of the human rights law and an inseparable part of it. Human rights therefore, with the passage of time have become an integral part of the customary international law and on the basis of this, it is the need of the hour that all states of the world whether signatory

[34]*T.I. v.The United Kingdom*, ECHR (2000) Reports 2000-III; *M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece*para. 342.

[35]http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof: accessed on 20/2/2019

to the international refugee instruments or not such as Pakistan should recognize the human rights of the refugees including Afghans living in Pakistan.

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[A]n international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation'. *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970)*, ICJ Reports (1971) 16, at 31. Furthermore, human rights treaties constitute 'any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties' under Art. 31(1)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

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